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Introduction
“You could not step twice into the same river.”
— Heraclitus (535 BC – 475 BC)
The river of time flows fast. The world has experienced dramatic economic changes over
the past decades. While the largest developing country, China, presented an unprecedented
economic miracle, some other countries bogged down in the mire of development with low
growth rate and large volatility.
Trying to understand the stories in developing countries requires great effort. The huge
inter-country heterogeneity makes it difficult to distinguish the net effect of a macroeconomic
policy from the influence of other factors like political institution, culture, and natural environ-
ment. Moreover, since the data for developing countries is often incomplete or with a low qual-
ity, it is hard to test the macroeconomic theory or summarize the regularity from the observed
phenomena. In consequence, though it is frequently found that a helpful policy in developed
countries may work unsatisfactorily or cause unexpected negative byproducts in developing
economies, it is extremely controversial about the underlying reason. This thesis consists of
three explorations on macroeconomic policies in developing countries. The first essay evalu-
ates the desirability of public capital investment, taking China as the study subject. The second
paper investigates the impact of international financial liberalization on the public debt across
a set of developing countries. The third research attempts to understand whether domestic fi-
nancial development affects the aggregate output volatility. In order to provide a glance over
my findings, the main contents of these three papers are summarized as below.
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The first paper works on the debate about the existence of infrastructure overinvestment in
China. In order to evaluate the optimal allocation between infrastructure and non-infrastructure
capital, much literature compares their marginal products by implicitly assuming that the opti-
mality holds when the marginal products are equal. We show in an endogenous growth model
that this criterion is misused as long as the investment efficiencies and depreciation rates of
different capitals differ. We derive a simple benchmark criterion, linking capital marginal
product, investment efficiency and depreciation rate together, for policy evaluation. Empiri-
cally, this paper employs a semiparametric varying coefficient model to calculate the marginal
products of infrastructure capital and private capital in a panel of 30 Chinese provinces during
2004-2015. Based on our policy evaluation criterion, it is found that generally there is still an
underinvestment of infrastructure in Chinese provinces. We find even in the western provinces,
which had relatively high infrastructure capital ratio and were believed to have “too much in-
frastructure” according to some previous studies, the optimal match between infrastructure and
non-infrastructure capital was roughly maintained after 2008.
The second paper provides both empirical evidence and theoretical explanation that, inter-
national financial liberalization was linked to the decrease of external public debt in developing
countries since the 1990s. It is often thought that financial globalization facilitates the inter-
national borrowing of governments. However since the 1990s we have seen a significantly
negative comovement between increased financial globalization and decreased external public
debt to GDP ratio in developing countries. Using a panel dataset for 46 developing economies
during 1990-2007, this paper empirically confirms that financial liberalization in the home
country was correlated with the retirement of external public debt. The estimated coefficient
for financial openness in other countries is not sufficiently robust. We rely on cointegrating
regression methods of FMOLS and DOLS because of the nonstationarity (and cointegration)
of the relevant macroeconomic variables, which is often (incorrectly) ignored in previous em-
pirical works. Our estimation is robust as we carefully check different data sources, possible
reverse causality and omitted variable. We also provide a plausible theoretical argument why
financial liberalization can help reduce external public debt ratio. The main mechanism is that
financial globalization shrinks the interest rate differential between developing and advanced
countries, which reduces the government’s domestic financing cost and dampens its incentive
to borrow externally.
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Is financial development positively, negatively, or not linked to the aggregate output volatil-
ity? Very controversial debates exist in both empirical and theoretical literature. The third paper
argues that financial development can either exacerbate or dampen output volatility, depending
on the type of industry whose credit access is expanded. Using a two-sector real business cycle
model augmented with the collateral constraint a` la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), we show that if
the borrowing constraint is relaxed in the consumption goods sector, macroeconomic volatility
will rise. On the contrary, if the financial friction is lessened in the capital goods sector, output
volatility may decline or be roughly unchanged. The underlying intuition is that the sensitivity
of output to economic shocks crucially depends on the intensity of firms to adjust their produc-
tion inputs, which relies on the marginal products of capital and labor. Financial development
increases the labor marginal product, but alters the overall capital marginal product through two
opposite effects on the capital allocation dynamics. Credit expansion mainly causes an inter-
industry capital reallocation if it occurs only in consumption industry, while the reallocation
effect is dominated by the economy-wide capital expansion if the financial development occurs
in capital industry. In the latter case the overall marginal product of capital decreases, but in the
former case no substantial change is induced. Therefore, the industrial heterogeneity and the
associated capital allocation are crucial, in order to analyze the effect of financial development
on aggregate output volatility.
3
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Chapter 1
Does China invest too much in
infrastructure?
This paper works on the debate about the existence of infrastructure overinvestment in
China. In order to evaluate the optimal allocation between infrastructure and non-infrastructure
capital, much literature compares their marginal products by implicitly assuming that the opti-
mality holds when the marginal products are equal. We show in an endogenous growth model
that this criterion is misused as long as the investment efficiencies and depreciation rates of
different capitals differ. We derive a simple benchmark criterion, linking capital marginal
product, investment efficiency and depreciation rate together, for policy evaluation. Empiri-
cally, this paper employs a semiparametric varying coefficient model to calculate the marginal
products of infrastructure capital and private capital in a panel of 30 Chinese provinces during
2004-2015. Based on our policy evaluation criterion, it is found that generally there is still an
underinvestment of infrastructure in Chinese provinces. We find even in the western provinces,
which had relatively high infrastructure capital ratio and were believed to have “too much in-
frastructure” according to some previous studies, the optimal match between infrastructure and
non-infrastructure capital was roughly maintained after 2008.
Keywords: infrastructure, public capital, marginal product, overinvestment, China
JEL Classification: H54, O11, O18, O25
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1.1 Introduction
The accumulation of infrastructure played an important role in China’s rapid economic devel-
opment over the past decades. However nowadays an overinvestment of infrastructure may
exist and be detrimental in China, according to the concerns of some economists and policy
makers.1 Figure 1.1 shows the gross fixed capital formation rates as percentage of output in 9
countries during 1978-2015.2
Figure 1.1: Gross fixed capital formation rates (% of GDP) in 9 countries, 1978-2015
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Compared to other countries, it is obvious that the investment rate in China is unusually
high. In recent years, its fixed capital formation rate reached a level of around 45%. In the
past three decades, only Singapore in the early 1980s has ever reached this level. A great part
of China’s capital investment was distributed into infrastructure industries. Since the 1990s,
the ratio of infrastructure investment which is indicated by the curve “China (infrastructure)”
was relatively stable and fluctuated between 10% and 15% of annual GDP. This ratio of in-
frastructure investment is even close to the gross fixed capital formation rates over all sectors
1Typical arguments to evaluate the existence of overinvestment of public capital or gross capital as a whole
in China can be grouped into 7 types. Unfortunately they are all not competent to answer our research question.
Section 1.2.1 provides a brief summary on these arguments.
2Data source: “China (by NBS)” is the “Gross Fixed Capital Formation” divided by “Gross Domestic Product
by Expenditure Approach” reported by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. “China (infrastructure)”,
whose original data is also reported by the NBS, refers to the ratio of only infrastructure-relevant industrial invest-
ment based on author’s calculation as the sum of investment across 4 industrial sectors: (i) production and supply
of electricity, gas and water, (ii) transport, storage and post, (iii) information transmission, computer services and
software, (iv) management of water conservancy, environment and public facilities. Other data is directly from
the World Development Indicators (WDI). The gross fixed capital formation rate of China reported by the NBS is
slightly different from the data by WDI. But the difference is small and never larger than 1%.
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in Russia, Germany, America and Brazil. This phenomenon induces a natural question: Does
China really need so much infrastructure? In November 2008, the Chinese central government
started an unprecedented 4 trillion RMB (586 billion US$) fiscal stimulus package to deal with
the global financial crisis. The money was mainly invested into infrastructure. The warning
about a possible overinvestment of infrastructure became especially important in recent years,
when people found that the public debt of some local governments, which is often related to
radical infrastructure construction, had risen to a frightful level. But how much infrastructure
is too much, and how to evaluate the proper level of the infrastructure capital stock in an ag-
gregate economy? The existing literature is not sufficient to answer these questions, neither
theoretically nor empirically.
The list of literature on the benefits and functioning of infrastructure (or similarly, public
capital or government capital) is very long, but there is not much consensus to be found. Since it
is extremely complicated to determine an “optimal” level of infrastructure (which involves the
exact knowledge about the utility function, production technique, financing channels, house-
hold wealth distribution, demographic and geographic situation and so forth), we focus instead
on the efficient allocation between infrastructure and non-infrastructure investment within a
country. We proceed as follows. (i) We first employ a theoretical endogenous growth model
to derive a criterion for evaluating whether there is overinvestment or underinvestment in in-
frastructure capital. (ii) Then we empirically estimate the effects of public and private capital
on Chinese provincial output. (iii) By comparing our estimation result with the criterion from
theoretical model, we are able to answer the question whether China invests too much in in-
frastructure. In this paper we focus on the spending aspect of government investment with
respect to aggregate production and hence, some other issues like financing the infrastructure
construction and the poverty reduction effect of infrastructure development are not our concern.
Throughout our paper, we use the terms “public capital” and “infrastructure” interchangeably.
Likewise, “private capital” and “non-infrastructure” refer to the same thing in this paper.
The analysis in our paper has two main implications. First, the theoretical model of infras-
tructure investment shows that the investment efficiency and depreciation rate gap of different
types of capital should be considered in determining the optimal allocation between them. Sec-
ond, the econometric estimation indicates a room for investing more in infrastructure in most
Chinese provinces, even though the infrastructure stock has already increased grossly in recent
decades.
Our paper contributes to the literature not only by providing a policy analysis on the de-
sirability of infrastructure investment in China, but also by shrinking the gap between the
theoretical and empirical studies on public capital topic. There are a lot of growth models
incorporating public capital. However the connection between theoretical model and empirical
work is often weak. Theoretical research has already studied many interactive aspects of pub-
lic infrastructure, such as the network effect, congestion, capital adjustment cost, investment
efficiency, endogenous depreciation, capital quality and composition. But the empirical studies
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still prefer measuring the output effects of public capital and then advocating that public capital
should be invested more (less) when its estimated productivity is high (low), or when it does
(does not) positively affect economic growth. One possible reason why the empirical research
substantially neglects the fruits of the theoretical literature is the lack of macroeconomic data
for the theoretical elements. Our framework relies on a comparison between the output effect
of infrastructure and its opportunity cost i.e. non-infrastructure capital. This produces a sim-
ple policy assessment criterion requiring only three components: the capital marginal product,
investment efficiency and depreciation rate.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents a brief literature review.
Section 1.3 employs an endogenous growth model to derive the optimality condition for in-
frastructure policy analysis, and presents our theoretical finding of a simple policy evaluation
criterion in a first-best case. Section 1.4 describes the details of our semiparametric varying
coefficient econometric model employed to estimate the capital marginal product. The issues
regarding our data and capital stock estimates are in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 displays our
regression results and the corresponding policy implications. Conclusion is given in Section
1.7.
1.2 Literature review
In this section we present a brief literature review. We first take a glance at several different
approaches in the literature that may be used to evaluate the existence of public capital over-
investment, and discuss why none of them is sufficient to answer our research question. Then
we summarize the main findings from the recent public capital literature, which is the basis for
our theoretical and empirical analysis. Afterwards we talk about three main difficulties for our
research topic of evaluating whether an overinvestment exists in an aggregate economy. These
three difficulties are frequently confronted in literature. An understanding of them makes it
clear why our paper has to spend much space analyzing a growth model, constructing a regres-
sion equation, and investigating the official statistical data.
1.2.1 Evaluating the (in)existence of public capital overinvestment
In the literature there are several typical approaches to evaluate whether an overinvestment of
public capital exists. The arguments can be grouped into seven types. (1) The first approach
relies on some neoclassical aggregate indicators such as the capital-to-output ratio as in Gros
(2015), the difference between Gross Capital Income/GDP and Gross Investment/GDP ratios
as in He, Zhang and Shek (2007), or the (GDP-Investment)/GDP ratio as in Lee, Syed and
Liu (2013). But this approach depends on many strong assumptions and is perhaps not ap-
plicable in a transition economy like China. (2) The second is to predict some “reasonable”
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investment rate by estimated coefficients from regressions based on the data of “comparable”
countries, as done in Lee, Syed and Liu (2012). But ignoring the heterogeneity of the Chinese
economy can make the estimated “good” investment rate misleading. (3) The third approach
measures the crowding-in and crowding-out effects of public investment on private investment,
as in Cavallo and Daude (2011), Xu and Yan (2014). This approach provides some hints re-
garding whether the overinvestment exists. But not only the amount but also the productivity
of investment matter for economic growth. Thus, the investigation of a crowding-out effect
of public investment alone cannot generate a clear answer for our research question. (4) The
fourth calculates the rates of return in industries, as in Ding, Guariglia and Knight (2012).
This is probably not really useful since the rate of return of a certain industry in the market
often differs from its social rate of return, especially for public-goods-relevant industries. (5)
Another approach employs frontier production function techniques such as data envelopment
analysis. This approach, including Qin and Song (2009), Wu (2008) etc., generally finds that
investment efficiency in the western and inland provinces of China is lower than that in the
eastern coastal areas. But the strict assumptions underlying this approach limit its reliability
for policy analysis, and the estimated efficiencies of different capitals are not comparable. (6)
Another type of argument directly compares the domestic physical availability of facilities (e.g.
the transportation network density, proportion of population with access to the Internet) with
the international counterparts. This, while supplying information about the future development
potential of capital in the country, does not take account of the contemporary interaction with
other economic sectors. (7) The last one is using micro-level evidence or impressions, such
as the phenomenon of “ghost towns” in some regions or the high-speed train without many
passengers. This is often discussed in nonacademic media and influential in shaping public
awareness. However, the fact that some places are rich of investment can occur at the same
time while investment is sparse elsewhere, even within the same city or same town. From an
aggregate perspective we need some “average” conclusion across different areas and industries.
Ding, Guariglia and Knight (2012) and Lee, Syed and Liu (2012, 2013) present brief liter-
ature reviews on the macro- and micro-data-based research for China grounded on (some of)
the 7 approaches aforementioned.
1.2.2 Findings from the recent literature
Our study is primarily linked to the theoretical and empirical literature on public capital’s output
effect. The existing literature is huge – we can easily find at least hundreds of research papers
discussing how infrastructure affects the economic growth and output. In order to summarize
what we have learned from the previous studies, here we present a short review mainly based
on some literature review papers since the 2000s.
The theoretical research mostly uses the framework of Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans model,
either with the decentralized economy solution or the social planner problem. The frequently
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cited work of Barro (1990) devised a fundamental endogenous growth model with public capi-
tal. Irmen and Kuehnel (2009) and Dissou and Didic (2013) provide helpful literature reviews
for the theoretical development since 1990s. In these two review papers, different growth mod-
els from literature are incorporated into one consistent framework which evolves according to
the change of underlying assumptions. In order to obtain an explicit expression of solution to
offer comprehensive perspective, the model has to be subject to some specific function forms.
Leduc and Wilson (2012) provide a novel DSGE model to study both the short-run and long-
run effect of infrastructure investment, which can be employed to compare with the estimation
results from the “fiscal multiplier” literature. The findings from the theoretical literature can be
roughly summarized as follows. (1) The conclusions and policy recommendations often hinge
on the specific assumptions in the growth model, such as the form of production function, de-
gree of congestion effect, and the public investment financing instruments. (2) The theoretical
findings are not tightly linked to the practical policy evaluation. Particularly, some important
elements in theoretical model are often simply ignored in reality because of the difficulity to
measure or lack of reliable data.
In the domain of empirical research four approaches are usually relied on: estimating the
production function, estimating the cost function, using vector autoregression model, or work-
ing on cross-section regression. Romp and de Haan (2007) is often cited because of their com-
prehensive review on the previous empirical research. Bom and Ligthart (2014), Dissou and
Didic (2013), Duran-Fernandez and Santos (2014), Elburz, Nijkamp and Pels (2017), Ligthart
and Sua´rez (2011) as well as Nu´n˜ez-Serrano and Vela´zquez (2017) also give the discussions
of the empirical literature. The findings from the previous empirical studies can be roughly
summarized into two points. (1) So far, most empirical studies have provided evidences for the
importance of public capital on economic activity. For example, averagely speaking the esti-
mated output elasticity of infrastructure is significantly positive (but not too large, e.g. around
0.1-0.2). (2) However much more effort of offering refined data and robust methodology is
called for, since the documented magnitude and charateristics of public capital’s impact vary
greatly and depend critically on the data, econometric model and technique used.
1.2.3 Three main difficulties in our research topic
There are three main difficulties in our research. The first is the lack of an explicit criterion
to evaluate the appropriate level of infrastructure capital. Second, there is no official data of
the capital stock for empirical research. Third, there exists a series of econometric difficulties
to measure the output effects of public capital. We have to overcome all these obstacles. We
hereby briefly discuss these three issues.
Theoretical studies have found that the proper level of infrastructure capital depends on the
specific macroeconomic conditions such as the production function property of infrastructure
and the government’s tax rate. Despite of the fruits of theoretical research, many empirical
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studies are keen on estimating the output effect of infrastructure and advocating to invest more
if the estimated effect is large. This opinion has the obvious problem that it only considers the
benefit of public capital without taking into account its cost. A more careful consideration as in
some empirical works explicitly concerns the tradeoffs among investing in public capital and
other sectors, which is essentially a benefit-cost analysis. Since the direct cost of raising funds
for infrastructure is difficult to be measured, the most obvious opportunity cost of infrastructure
– investing in private capital – is more often compared with. A lot of empirical works cannot
proceed farther beyond reporting the output elasticities of infrastructure and non-infrastructure
capitals, often because many of them use physical index of infrastructure which is uncom-
parable to the currency measure of non-infrastructure. Some literature argues to invest more
infrastructure because the estimated elasticity is positive. This is questionable since it is the
marginal product rather than elasticity who really matters. A few of studies, including Peterson
(1994), Canning (1999) and Shi and Huang (2014), explicitly compare the marginal products
of public and private capitals. This public-private capital tradeoff approach typically resorts to
the formula Fk = Fg by implicitly assuming that the optimality holds when the marginal product
of public capital Fg equates that of private capital Fk. However, as we will show later the static
equality Fk = Fg only holds in a macroeconomic environment without a lot of elements such as
capital depreciation, infrastructure congestion, and investment efficiency.3 On the other hand,
while theoretical models produce fruitful insights into the real world, we currently still lack a
sufficiently simple but powerful criterion to evaluate the desirability and tradeoff of infrastruc-
ture stock, without resorting to estimating many parameters,. The misused formula Fk = Fg is
so intuitive, at least in a micro-static partial equilibrium. Will a macroeconomic model provide
a different equation, or just add something on it? We will show in a Ramsey model that it is
particularly important not to ignore the investment efficiency and depreciation of capital. We
will derive a simple evaluation criterion linking capital marginal product, investment efficiency
and depreciation together.
An explicit dataset for aggregate capital stocks in developing countries is scarce. This is
also true for China. Zhang, Wu and Zhang (2004) and Zhang (2008) estimate China’s provincial
gross capital stock during 1952-2000 and 1952-2004, respectively, by the Perpetual Inventory
Method (PIM). Most recent studies estimating the capital stock in China use methods analogous
to their work. For our research topic, we should go further to estimate both infrastructure and
non-infrastructure capital stocks separately. Jin (2012, 2016), Hu, Fan and Xu (2016), and Shi
and Huang (2014) recently estimated China’s infrastructure capital stocks at provincial level.
However, their works are not without shortcomings and we have to construct the capital stock
series from the first step, while the data we can rely on is quite limited.
3Recently, cointegrated panel (e.g. Canning and Pedroni, 2008) or vector error correction model (e.g. Egert,
Koz´luk and Sutherland, 2009) is employed to escape from calculating marginal products. By construction, the
estimated long-run effect coefficient of infrastructure capital variable should be (smaller/larger than) zero if the
infrasctructure is (over-/under-) optimally invested. But in this paper we do not rely on these methods because we
do not want the explicit economic dynamics of variables to be hidden by the numerical equations.
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Following the seminal work of Aschauer (1989), a great amount of empirical research at-
tempts to quantify the output effects of public capital. However this is econometrically difficult.
The spurious regression and reverse causality issues are two of the most severe obstacles but
unfortunately we do not have a perfect way to deal with them. Moreover, since China has very
large inter-district heterogeneities and speedy institutional and economic transitions, we have
more difficulties to select a sufficiently robust regression method. We select the semiparamet-
ric varying smooth coefficient model to allow for the inter-district heterogeneity of estimated
parameters, while maintaining the variation meaningful in economics.
1.3 Theoretical model
In this section, we utilize an endogenous growth model with public capital to derive an op-
timization criterion for infrastructure investment evaluation. The criterion should have two
crucial features: (1) it should base only on aggregate variables and parameters that are easily
measurable; (2) it should be robust to varieties of the model setup and economic environment.
The first feature is indispensable because a reliable microeconomic dataset covering Chinese
provinces and industries is scarce, which makes agent-level theoretical criteria inapplicable.
The second feature is necessary because a well-defined economic model for a fast-growing
transition country like China is lacking.
1.3.1 Two approaches: a dilemma
The literature mostly uses the framework of Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans model, either with the
decentralized economy solution or the social planner solution. The pros and cons of both
decentralized economy analysis and central planner solution are so substantial that we in fact
bog down a dilemma of model selection.
In a decentralized economy, the government is limited to setting several policy variables
like the tax rate and public expenditure. Given these policies, the households and firms behave
autonomously. This kind of “second-best” situation is clearly more realistic and prevalent in
literature. However, it can hardly be used in Chinese context because of three major disad-
vantages. (1) The associated analysis works well only when the economy is in or close to the
steady state – for instance we can describe the economy’s dynamics in (and only in) the neigh-
borhood of steady state using a linear differential equation system. But we know little about
the steady state of China’s economic development. (2) In order to obtain closed form solutions,
the model has to impose specific forms of utility function, production function, and/or some
strong assumptions such as constant return to scale in production. These assumptions may not
suit China. (3) It is required to measure some key parameters (e.g. the preference parameter of
elasticity of substitution in consumption), which are unavailable empirically.
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The solution for social planner problem, in which the versatile benevolent government op-
timizes all variables, supplies a “first-best” case. This is clearly not realistic but useful in our
policy analysis. (1) As shown below, a clear and simple optimal relation between marginal
products of infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital can be derived for the first-best situ-
ation. Thus we only need to measure a small number of variables, which greatly facilitates
our econometric regression. (2) It is no longer necessary to limit the economy to be close to
the steady state. Instead, we are able to analyze the whole transition dynamics. This is es-
pecially powerful in Chinese context. Therefore, we make our theoretical model stuck to the
first-best situation with some loss of modeling reality. In Appendix 1.B we give two decen-
tralized economy examples to demonstrate that the central planner solution indeed provides a
good benchmark.
1.3.2 Theoretical model
We construct a social planner problem to derive the optimality conditions, in a first-optimal
situation, which generate a convenient equation regarding the tradeoff between private capital
and public capital investment. Our social planner model incorporates several key elements de-
veloped in the recent literature, including the congestion cost of public capital (Dioikitopoulos
and Kalyvitis, 2008; Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998; Ott and Turnovsky, 2006; Turnovsky, 1997),
and the inefficiency of private and public investment (Pritchett, 2000; Gupta et al., 2014).4
We assume that there are two types of agents in a closed economy – households as consumer-
producers, and the government which taxes and provides public service. There is no interme-
diary financial sector in this economy. Thus the allocation of private investment and public
investment is conducted through taxation.5 Here, following the tradition of growth model in
continuous time we omit the time index subscript of each variable.
1.3.2.1 Model setup
The social planner maximizes the social welfare, defined as the discounted sum of households’
utilities, in the form:
4We do not model the maintenance in public capital which decreases the public capital’s depreciation rate
(Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis, 2008; Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis, 2004; Rioja, 2003), because the existence of
public capital maintenance will change the size of depreciation rate gap in our policy evaluation criterion but
not the format of the criterion. Thus, introducing the maintenance spending into the model would not provide
essentially different insight.
Moreover, we do not consider the possible implementation lag of government investment (Leeper, Walker and
Yang, 2010), because it can be shown that as long as the implementation delay for building public capital and
impatience of household are not too severe, the effects of implementation lag are almost negligible.
5Absence of financial friction disables us to model the interaction of private and public investment via financial
channels, which is important if we concern the crowding-in or crowding-out effects of public investment. The end
of Section 1.6.2 briefly discusses some relevant issues.
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ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtU(C,L,Cg)dt
where ρ is time preference rate;C is aggregate private consumption; L is aggregate labor;Cg is
the public consumption good provided by the government which benefits households directly.
Households are consumer-producers, who accumulate private capital and produce by a concave
production function satisfying the Inada conditions. The production function is:
Y =F (K,Ksg,L) = F(K,Kg,L)
where K is aggregate private capital stock and Ksg is the service provided to each household by
aggregate public capital Kg. We set Ksg = ψKg where ψ =
( k
K
)ξ
measures the the congestion
effect in public capital. Here k is the private capital stock of each production unit in the econ-
omy and 0 6 ξ 6 1 is a congestion effect parameter. Kg becomes a pure public good when
ξ = 0 and a private good when ξ = 1. Since all producers are assumed homogeneous, from
the perspective of social planner ψ =
( k
K
)ξ
can be regarded as a fixed parameter ψ = N−ξ
where N = Kk is the total amount of production units. Note that we directly model the aggregate
economy as a whole. In fact in such a social planner problem, if we as usual first write down
the representative agent’s equations and then aggregate to obtain the economy-wide ones, we
will just get to the aggregate model here.
Households allocate after-tax income between consumption and private capital investment.
Abstracting from fiscal risk, the government is assumed to keep a balanced budget in every
period. The stock of private capital K and public capital Kg evolve according to the transition
equations:
K˙ = φk[(1− τ)Y −S−C]−δkK
K˙g = φg(1−µ)(τY +S)−δgKg
where φk,φg ∈ [0,1] measure the efficiency of private and public capital investment, respec-
tively. In order to keep model tractable, we simply assume φk and φg are constant parameters.6
Accordingly, the value of (1− φk) and (1− φg) can be interpreted as the size of capital ad-
justment costs of private and public investment, which may be important in countries without
well established institutions and project management. Moreover, the existence of φk and φg
indicates that public capital and private capital stocks are generally not one-to-one convertible.
6Literature shows that the (nearly) constant capital investment efficiency is likely in practice, at least in some
developing countries. Arestoff and Hurlin (2006), Hurlin and Arestoff (2010) investigate the efficiency of public
capital investment in Colombia and Mexico. They find that the new capital created can be well approximated by
a simple linear function of investment: f (It) = αIt where the efficiency parameter α is constant and below 0.5.
This is also confirmed by Gupta et al. (2014), from which we find the average “normalized Public Investment
Management Indices (PIMI)” for 40 low income and 31 middle income countries are quite similar in the 1990s
and 2000s.
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Parameter δk is the fixed depreciation rate of K. δg is the depreciation rate of Kg. Variable τ
gives the rate of income tax and S is the amount of lump-sum tax. So the government’s tax
income is τY + S.7 The variable µ indicates the proportion of tax revenue used for providing
public consumption goods Cg. The flow of public consumption goods Cg is:
Cg = µ(τY +S)
Since Ksg = ψKg, the equation of K˙g can be equivalently written in terms of Ksg as:
K˙sg = ψφg(1−µ)(τY +S)−δgKsg
1.3.2.2 Equilibrium optimality conditions
To get the first order optimality conditions, we have the usual (present value) Hamilton func-
tion:
H = e−ρtU(C,L,Cg)+λ1 {φk[(1− τ)Y −S−C]−δkK}
+λ2
{
ψφg(1−µ)(τY +S)−δgKsg
}
+λ3
{
µ(τY +S)−Cg
}
in which the control variables are {C,L,Cg,τ,µ,S} and the state variables are K and Ksg (or
equivalently Kg). The combination of first order conditions ∂H∂C = 0,
∂H
∂L = 0,
∂H
∂Cg = 0,
∂H
∂τ =
0, ∂H∂µ = 0,
∂H
∂S = 0,
∂H
∂K =−λ˙1, ∂H∂Ksg =−λ˙2 (with the proper transversality conditions) gives
us several important relations with clear economic meanings:
Uc =Ucg
−Ul =UcFl
φkλ1 = ψφgλ2 = λ3
φkFk = φgFg+(δk−δg)
where Uc,Ucg,Ul are the marginal utilities of C,Cg,L; and Fl,Fk,Fg are the marginal products
of L,K,Kg. The congestion effect on public capital does not matter in any of these equations
since the social planner can fully handle this externality. The meanings of these four equa-
7If consumption tax or government bond is additionally introduced into the model, (just as expected in a social
planner economy) the basic conclusions of our model would not be changed at all.
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tions above are explicit. The first equation indicates the equality between the marginal utility
of private consumption and public consumption good; the second equation demonstrates the
tradeoff between leisure and working more for more consumption; the third equation means
that at optimality the “effective” shadow values of constraints should be equal.
Among these equations, we want to focus on the last one. It indicates the tradeoff between
infrastructure capital and non-infrastructure capital. Generally, the optimal ratio of the marginal
products of infrastructure and non-infrastrucutre capital depends on investment efficiency and
the corresponding depreciation rates. The equation φkFk = φgFg+(δk−δg) can be equivalently
written as (φgFg−δg) = (φkFk−δk), which can be interpreted as that the social rates of return
to infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital should be equal. It is notable that Canning and
Bennathan (2000) obtain a similar criterion. But they derive it mainly from an accounting
perspective and explain marginal product minus depreciation rate as the internal rate of return
to investment project. They omit the possibility of nonzero investment adjustment cost and
unequal depreciation rates.
1.3.3 Implication for policy analysis
The implication for policy analysis of the formula (φgFg− δg) = (φkFk− δk) is clear. That is,
at optimality the society should allocate capital resource in a way that each marginal unit of
capital should have the same contribution everywhere, taking into account two aspects: (1) the
existence of capital adjustment cost and investment inefficiency, and (2) the dynamic effects of
private and public investment that in order to sustain economic growth the capital decays in the
following periods should be compensated. Hence the capital sector whose investment efficiency
is lower or depreciation rate is larger should be invested less until its marginal productivity
is large enough to offset these disadvantages. In the policy evaluation practice, we need to
measure the data of three items: the capital investment efficiency φg and φk, depreciation rate
δg and δk, marginal product Fg and Fk. Then we can compare (φgFg−δg) versus (φkFk−δk) to
decide whether the infrastucture has an overinvestment or underinvestment.8
It is widely believed that in developing countries the coefficients of capital investment effi-
ciency φg and φk are significantly below one. Arestoff and Hurlin (2006), Gupta et al. (2014),
Hurlin and Arestoff (2010) and Pritchett (1996) estimate that only roughly “half of the money
invested in investment projects will have a positive impact on the public capital stocks in the
developing countries”. The investment efficiency term φg and φk play two roles in our policy
8In some early literature, either the depreciation of capital was not considered (e.g. Barro, 1990; Futagami,
Morita and Shibata, 1993; Turnovsky, 1997; Aschauer, 2000; or by modeling public services as flow) or it was
assumed that there is no difference between δk and δg (e.g. Bajo-Rubio and Dı´az-Rolda´n, 2005). Accordingly the
condition Fk = Fg was stated. Our result shows that, even in a most tractable social planner problem the relation
Fk = Fg does not hold in general, as long as we consider a little bit more realistic economic environment. Hence, in
empirical work before we compare the marginal products of public and private capital from aggregate production
function, we should care that between Fk and Fg there should exist a wedge which depends on the parameters (and
probably also policy variables).
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assessment criterion. (1) First, they serve as weights to change the relative importance of Fg
versus Fk. At optimality, ceteris paribus, the type of capital with lower investment efficiency
is required to have higher marginal product. (2) Second, since the values of φg and φk are both
below one, they raise the importance of the depreciation difference (δk− δg). In an extreme
case, if the investment efficiency is sufficiently small, the depreciation difference may even
dominate.
The magnitude of depreciation rate difference (δk− δg) is not negligible. The difference
of depreciation rates is the result of distinct physical composition of infrastructure and non-
infrastructure capital. The infrastructure mostly consists of structure (Rioja, 2003), which de-
preciates at a relatively low rate. In contrast, the equipment, machine and some other materials
with faster depreciation rates make up a large proportion of the non-infrastructure capital. Bai,
Hsieh and Qian (2006) assume a depreciation rate of 8% for structures and 24% for machinery
in China. Zhang, Wu and Zhang (2004) assume that the depreciation rate is 6.9% for building,
14.9% for equipment, and 12.1% for other capitals. At this moment let us assume that infras-
tructure is made up completely of structures (Hu, Fan and Xu, 2016; Shi and Huang, 2014),
and non-infrastructure consists half of structures and half of machines (Shi and Huang, 2014).
Using the depreciation rates from Zhang, Wu and Zhang (2004), the depreciation difference
(δk − δg) would be 4%. In Shi and Huang (2014) (which actually use the value from Bai,
Hsieh and Qian, 2006), Huang and Shi (2014), the depreciation difference (δk−δg) is 8% and
7% respectively. From the literature, e.g. Kamps (2006), Arslanalp et al. (2010), Arestoff and
Hurlin (2006), we can also make an international comparison of depreciation rates as well as
the difference between infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital. Table 1.1 lists the values
of capital depreciation rate and the difference (δk,δg,δk−δg) in some empirical literature.
Table 1.1: Values of capital depreciation rate in some empirical literature
Literature δk δg δk−δg Sample Country and Period
based on
Zhang, Wu and Zhang (2004) 10.9% 6.9% 4%
China, 1952-2000
based on
Bai, Hsieh and Qian (2006) 16% 8% 8%
China, 1978-2005
Huang and Shi (2014) 14% 7% 7% China, 1995-2011
Kamps (2006) 8.5% 4% 4.5% 22 OECD countries, 2001
Arslanalp et al. (2010) 8.5% 4% 4.5%
22 OECD countries, 2001
7% 3.25% 3.75%
13 middle-income non-OECD
countries, 2001
Arestoff and Hurlin (2006) - 2.5% - 26 developing countries, 1998
Note: “based on” means the paper does not directly provide the estimated values of δk and δg. We
calculate them by assuming that infrastructure (non-infrastructure) is made up completely of buildings
(half buildings and half machines).
We learn two points from these studies. First, infrastructure has a significantly lower depre-
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ciation rate than private capital. Second, we find that the magnitude of (δk−δg) is comparable
to that of δg. In literature the typical estimated magnitude of Fk or Fg roughly ranges from 0.2 to
0.4.9 Thus, the depreciation difference documented in Table 1.1 roughly counts for 10%-40%
of the estimated marginal product of capital.10 Obviously, neglecting the depreciation differ-
ence could significantly misguide the policy making on resource allocation between private and
public investment, especially when Fk and Fg are close to each other. Moreover, if the capital
adjustment cost is substantial or investment efficiency is low, the importance of the depreciation
rate difference even increases.
1.4 Empirical model
According to the previous theoretical analysis, we can evaluate the desirability of infrastructure
investment based on the criterion φkFk = φgFg + (δk − δg). In this formula, the investment
efficiency φk, φg and depreciation rate δk, δk are structural parameters that we can obtain by
analyzing the statistical data (which will be discussed in Section 1.5). What we need to estimate
using econometric method are the marginal products Fk and Fg. We will first estimate the output
elasticity of capital, and then calculate the marginal product based on the estimated elasticity.
Regardless of some drawbacks of the aggregate production function approach (discussed in
e.g. Haughwout, 1998, 2002), the estimation of aggregate production function has become the
dominant method. Our empirical model also relies on it. Since the empirical part of our paper
is analogous to that in Shi and Huang (2014) (henceforth SH for short), we now move to a short
discussion on their paper and then lay out our econometric model after that.
9The estimated marginal product of capital varies depending on the method and data used. Here we list some
examples of the estimated capital returns in China. (Although the capital return does not necessarily equate the
marginal product of capital in aggregate production sense, it should be an indicator of the size.) The pre-tax return
on capital is roughly 21% in 2005 in Bai, Hsieh and Qian (2006), 15% in 2013 in Bai and Zhang (2014), and 18%
in 2013 in Thomas (2013). The median value of the marginal revenue product of capital is 32% in 2007 in Ding,
Guariglia and Knight (2012).
10We can use a simple numerical example with Cobb–Douglas production function to illustrate the importance
of (δk−δg), while temporarily omitting the existence of investment inefficiency. The details of this exercise are in
Appendix 1.A. Figure 1.7 in Appendix 1.A.1 displays the capital resource misallocation within one single period
if a depreciation gap (δk− δg)=0.06 is not taken into account. The resulting capital misallocation is serious. By
setting the depreciation difference to 0.04, 0.06, 0.08 respectively and calculating the allocation of Kg and K based
on equation Fk = Fg and equation Fk = Fg +(δk− δg), it is found that if the social planner incorrectly uses the
equation Fk = Fg, on average as much as 4.79%, 7.36% and 10.1% of stock K would be misallocated from public
capital into the private sector. Even worse, in a long-run perspective, neglecting the depreciation rate difference
causes a severe deviation from the optimal convergence path toward the steady state. Clearly, the consequence is
a grave welfare loss. In our policy experiment demonstrated in Figure 1.8 of Appendix 1.A.2, where the economy
starts with half steady state capital stocks with depreciation rates (δk,δg,δk− δg)=(0.12, 0.06, 0.06), a welfare
loss as large as 5.54% permanent consumption reduction would occur. The loss is 2.40% and 10.3% in the case of
(δk,δg,δk−δg)=(0.11, 0.07, 0.04) and (0.13, 0.05, 0.08), respectively. The numerical instances provide important
lessons for developing countries. Especially for low-income countries far behind the steady state and with high
depreciation rates, if the planners do not consider the depreciation difference seriously, the associated welfare loss
may even climb to 20%, 30% or more.
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SH use a semiparametric aggregate production function to estimate the marginal products of
infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital in 28 Chinese provinces during 1997-2011. Based
on their estimation result, they propose that, after 2008, most western (eastern and central)
provinces exhibited an oversupply (undersupply) of infrastructure relative to private capital
since the marginal product of infrastructure in the region is lower (higher). According to our
findings from the theoretical model, their policy suggestion needs more inspection because
they do not consider the wedge of investment efficiency and depreciation rate. However the
main merits of their work are obvious. First, they recalculate the provincial capital stock series
in China by especially noting that the price of infrastructure may be different from that of
private capital. Also, they depreciate the two types of capitals by different rates. Thus, their
estimated capital stock data is perhaps more reliable than some previous works. Second, they
use the recently developed semiparametric varying coefficient method to estimate the output
elasticities of capital. By allowing the coefficients to vary with economic circumstance, they
are able to better model the nonlinear interaction between public capital, private capital and
production. Third, they carefully deal with several severe problems prevalent in aggregate
production regression, especially the issues of spurious correlation and reverse causality.
1.4.1 Model specification
A lot of econometric challenges stand in front of us when we try to identify the marginal
products of aggregate production factors. Now we start to discuss these econometric difficulties
one by one and write down our regression model accordingly. The organization of this section
is analogous to that in SH since our framework is admittedly revised from theirs. In each model
equation below we simply save the subscript index for district in each variable, as it is apparent
that we are talking about a panel data set.
1.4.1.1 Misspecification of functional form
Previous literature has often used a Cobb-Douglas or translog production function. But it is
considerably suspect whether these functional forms correctly specify the nonlinearity between
production input and output. Nonparametric or semiparametric models can help us go beyond
these imposed functional forms. Theoretically, by some proper nonparametric techniques we
can directly estimate the aggregate production function of the form:
lnYt = f (lnKg,t , lnKt , lnLt)+ lnAt
whereKg,t , Kt and Lt are the stock of infrastructure, non-infrastructure capital and labor amount,
respectively; Yt is the aggregate output; At is the TFP. However pure nonparametric estimation
can hardly be interpreted in economic terms. For the topic of production functions, a semipara-
metric varying coefficient model is especially powerful, since it allows the output elasticities
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of input factor to vary with economic environment while keeping the ways of variation nonar-
bitrary.
Classical microeconomic theory shows that the marginal product of one production factor
could be influenced by other input factors. Concerning the private and public capital investment
at macroeconomic level, it is natural to believe that a good match of public and non-public
capitals is crucial for the productivities of both capitals.11 Hence, we set out our model in
a way that allows the elasticities of capital (and labor) to change over time, as a function of
infrastructure to non-infrastructure capital stock ratio zt = Kg,t/Kt . In other words, the output
elasticities of infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital can be written as βg,t = βg(zt) and
βk,t = βk(zt), respectively. This setup is adopted by SH. Of course we may also consider the
coefficients to vary with respect to other variables. In the estimation robustness check part in
Section 1.6.3, we study other possibilities.
Furthermore, we write the production function in per capita form without argument Lt . This
is because of three reasons. (1) First, we follow the constant returns to scale assumption, which
is widely used in the literature estimating aggregate production functions. (2) Second, the labor
in one province is not really a variable input here. Because there is no data on the working
hour of Chinese workers, the constructed variable Lt is based on the demographic information
rather than dynamic labor input. (3) Third, we find that output and capital stocks are clearly
at least I(1) in logarithmic terms, but labor supply is not necessarily that. As documented
by the panel unit root test results in Table 1.6 at Appendix 1.D, all the regression variables
are I(1) in our baseline sample of 2004-2015 data. However the property of lnLt series is
actually found sensitive to the selection of sample period. Directly using population as the
definition of Lt is clearly not suitable since the labor proportion in population is substantially
heterogeneous across provinces. If we use the amount of labor defined as people aged 15-64 to
represent Lt , we will find lnLt in some provinces is nearly I(0) because the population slightly
increases while labor to population ratio slightly decreases. This makes the econometric model
questionable. If we (ultimately) use Lt of skill-adjusted labor amount (which is discussed in
detail in Section 1.5), it is found that the variation of lnLt could be almost constant in some
provinces. This renders efficiently estimating parameters difficult. Therefore, as a result of
these three abovementioned reasons we consider the aggregate production function in intensive
form:
lnyt = f (lnkg,t , lnkt)+ lnAt
11For example, we can consider a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production function: Yt ={
β
(
Kαt K
1−α
g,t
)γ
+(1−β )Lγt
} 1
γ
. The output elasticities with respect to infrastructure and non-infrastructure are
εyg,t = (1−α)β
(
Kg,t
Kt
)−αγ (Kg,t
Yt
)γ
and εyk,t = αβ
(
Kg,t
Kt
)(1−α)γ (Kt
Yt
)γ
, respectively. In this case, εyg,t and εyk,t
depend on the values of structural parameters, infrastructure to non-infrastructure capital ratio, and capital stock
to output ratio.
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where the variables in lower case letter are variables per skill-adjusted labor.
1.4.1.2 Spurious correlation
Along with the high speed development in China, the variables of output and capital stock are
definitely nonstationary. Thus the problem of spurious correlation arises. In literature, there
are three major ways to deal with spurious regression issue.
(i) Detrending There are several detrending methods including first (or higher order) dif-
ferencing, linear detrending (e.g. Hassler, 1999), stochastic detrending (e.g. Ferson, Sarkissian
and Simin, 2010), HP filter and so on. A comparison of detrending methods can be found
in Burnside (1998) and Canova (1998a,b). The typical literature with aggregate production
function framework uses the first differencing. While first differencing removes the spurious
correlation, it has defects. It “destroys any long run relationship that may exist amongst the
levels of variables of interest” (Abdih and Joutz, 2008), but this does not matter in our model as
we focus on the marginal effect within one period rather than the “long run relationship”. On
the other hand, the other detrending methods do not work since they demand relatively strong
assumption underlying the data generating process which we lack here. (Actually we tried the
linear detrending, stochastic detrending and HP filter but did not obtain any meaningful result.)
Thereby, we choose the first differencing to detrend the data.
(ii) Cointegration The cointegration method is popular, conditional on the existence of
a cointegration relationship. Abdih and Joutz (2008) give an example of using cointegration
analysis to investigate the impact of public capital on American private sector output. But we
do not employ cointegration technique because (1) we do not find an easy way to incorporate
varying coefficient model into cointegration analysis; (2) more importantly, for our data sample
the existence of conintegration relationship is uncertain. We find the relation is sensitive to the
selection of sample period. In some cases the relevant variables are integrated of different
orders – this feature violates the precondition of cointegration analysis.
(iii) Error correction model The error correction model (ECM) can estimate both the
short term effects and long term effects of explanatory variables. However, the typical ECM
suits the case that dependent variable gradually returns to its long run equilibrium after a change
in independent variables. But in our aggregate production function framework, we actually
assume that the dependent variable of output reaches the new equilibrium level within one
period. This rules out the employment of ECM.
Therefore, we resort to the first differencing method and get:
∆ lnyt = ∆ f (lnkg,t , lnkt)+∆ lnAt
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where the symbol ∆ refers to the first differencing operator. Next we express the equation
using ∆ lnkg,t and ∆ lnkt , based on the mean value theorem. For a continuous function g(x),
mean value theorem tells that g(x2)− g(x1) = ∂g∂x (cx1+(1− c)x2) · (x2− x1) where ∂g∂x is the
gradient, x could be a vector and c ∈ (0,1). Thus we have ∆ f (lnkg,t , lnkt) = βg,t˜∆ lnkg,t +
βk,t˜∆ lnkt where βg,t˜ and βk,t˜ measure the marginal output contributions of infrastructue and
non-infrastructure capital at one specific (unknown) time point t˜ between period t and t−1. As
mentioned previously, it is not unreasonable to assume that the output elasticities of capitals
vary along with the ratio of zt˜ = Kg,t˜/Kt˜ . Built on this assumption, the model now becomes:
∆ lnyt = βg(zt˜)∆ lnkg,t +βk(zt˜)∆ lnkt +∆ lnAt
Since zt˜ = Kg,t˜/Kt˜ measures the ratio of capital stocks which can only vary gradually, we
can use zt to reasonably approximate it. Therefore, the model can be expressed by:
∆ lnyt = βg(zt)∆ lnkg,t +βk(zt)∆ lnkt +∆ lnAt
1.4.1.3 Reverse causality
The reverse causality issue arises because an increase of capital stock could be just a result of
capital accumulation in an environment of output increase. In econometrics, this mainly turns
out to be the endogeneity problem of capital stock variables. Reverse causality problem is often
mitigated by IV or GMM regression. But as (1) IV or GMM method cannot be incorporated
with varying coefficient model smoothly and (2) our sample’s short time dimension critically
hinders their powers, we deal with reverse causality from three other aspects. We rely on the
start-of-the-year capital stock as explanatory variable, add time fixed effects dummies, and
introduce a proxy variable for TFP shock in the regression equation.
In the regression, the capital stock kg,t and kt are defined as the stocks at the start of year
t. Since the dependent variable yt is produced during year t, it naturally has not much impact
backward on the past capital stocks, unless one year ago the agents already had strong antici-
pation on the future output dynamics. In order to control for this potential “anticipation”, we
further decompose the TFP term.
The TFP term can be written as ∆ lnAt = σt +∆εt where σt is the time fixed effect common
to all provinces and εt is the residual which is the TFP shock. Reverse causality arises when the
term lnkg,t or lnkt is correlated to εt . This is possible since the government (or firm, household)
may adjust the factor input when they perceive (anticipate or observe) the TFP shock. For
instance, the government can invest more infrastructure as discretionary policy to stimulate the
economy when negative TFP shock comes or is anticipated to come. The existence of reverse
causality makes the estimation biased.
The TFP shock ∆εt can be divided into two components ∆εt = ∆ωt +∆µt where ωt is the
component that can be perceived by the agents and hence correlated to lnkg,t and lnkt , while µt
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is the uncorrelated error term that cannot be perceived. So it is important to find a valid proxy
variable forωt . SH propose to use the approach fromAckerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006, 2015)
(ACF) to address the reverse causality problem. But, because of the assumptions of ACF do not
hold in our context of aggregate production function, ACF approach is in fact not suitable for
us. Appendix 1.E states why we think SH misuse the ACF approach. However the underlying
idea of ACF approach – using proxy variables to control for unobservables when estimating
productivity – indeed works. As pointed out in SH, two conditions for proxy variable should
hold: (i) the proxy is not an input factor for the output, (ii) it is monotonic with ωt . We use
the HP-filtered consumption to GDP ratio to proxy the conceived TFP shocks. The reason is as
follows: based on economic theory, the private consumption should be smooth over time, which
indicates that the fluctuations in consumption ratio should be the result of some “shocks”.
This proxy variable obviously satisfies condition (i), since consumption to GDP ratio is
definitely not a production input. Regarding condition (ii), we can test it after regression. After
we estimate the model, we can obtain the estimated value ofωt . Then we can test the monotonic
relationship between proxy variable and the perceived TFP shock. Appendix 1.H gives us the
result. We find that the monotonicity indeed well holds.
Denoting proxyt as the proxy variable for the perceived TFP shock, we write that ∆proxyt =
φ(∆ωt) where φ(·) is a monotonic function of ∆ωt . Then we have ∆ωt = φ−1(∆proxyt). For
simplicity, we use the semiparametric varying coefficient form to approximate the function
φ−1(·). We write as:
∆ωt = φ−1(∆proxyt) = ϕt∆proxyt = ϕ(zt)∆proxyt
(In the robustness check in Section 1.6.3 we also check the case of using a third order polyno-
mial to proxy ∆ωt .) Thus we now have:
∆ lnyt = βg(zt)∆ lnkg,t +βk(zt)∆ lnkt +ϕ(zt)∆proxyt +σt +∆µt
1.4.1.4 Spillover effects from neighboring regions
We follow SH’s setting of spatial spillover effects of infrastructure and non-infrastructure cap-
ital but simply assume that there is no spatial autocorrelation of shocks. Now we get our final
complete regression model:
∆ lnyt = βg(zt)∆ lnkg,t +βk(zt)∆ lnkt +ϕ(zt)∆proxyt
+θg ∗W ∗∆ ln k˜g,t +θk ∗W ∗∆ ln k˜t +σt +∆µt
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where k˜g,t and k˜t denote the vector of capital stocks in other provinces, andW is a known spa-
tial weight matrix. We use the relative economic size of one province among all the adjacent
provinces as weight, with the geometric mean of 2003-2015 real GDP as indicator of economic
size. No geographically adjacent provinces only have zero weights. Table 1.2 gives the defini-
tions of all variables in our econometric model. The data sources of the variables are discussed
in Section 1.5.
Table 1.2: Definitions of variables in econometric model
Variable Definition
yt GDP per skill-adjusted labor
zt ratio of infrastructure to non-infrastructure capital stock
kg,t infrastructure capital stock per skill-adjusted labor
kt non-infrastructure capital stock per skill-adjusted labor
proxyt proxy variable for TFP shock; we use the HP-filtered consumption to GDP ratio
W spatial weight matrix; we use the relative economic size of one province among
all the adjacent provinces as weight
k˜g,t vector of infrastructure capital stocks in other provinces
k˜t vector of non-infrastructure capital stocks in other provinces
σt time fixed effect common to all provinces
µt error term
1.4.2 Estimation
The varying coefficient model can be estimated by the local constant least-squares method as
described in Li and Racine (2007). For a regression model Yi = X
′
iβ (Zi)+ εi the general form
of the estimator is:
βˆ (z) =
[
n
∑
j=1
X jX
′
jK
(
Z j− z
h
)]−1 n
∑
j=1
X jY jK
(
Z j− z
h
)
For K(·), we choose the Gaussian kernel function. The bandwidth h is selected by least-
squares cross-validation. The coefficients for time fixed effects and spillover effects can be
estimated by the three steps procedure suggested in Li and Racine (2007) for the “partially
linear varying coefficient model”. We use the residual based wild bootstrap method suggested
by Mammen (1993) to estimate the standard errors of estimated coefficients.
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1.5 Data
This section provides the details on our data. We first discuss the data source and sample.
Then we outline our procedures of estimating capital stock by the Perpetual Inventory Method.
Afterwards we demonstrate the estimated capital stock and investment efficiency in China.
1.5.1 Data source and sample
We rely on the official statistics documented in different kinds of statistical yearbooks published
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. The data on the GDP and price level are
from China Statistical Yearbook 1994-2016. The data sources for the capital and labor are
relatively complicated. We put the details in Appendix 1.F. Most of the after-2003 data in
China Statistical Yearbook are also readily downloadable from NBS’ website.
We define infrastructure as the sum of 4 industrial sectors: (i) production and supply of
electricity, gas and water, (ii) transport, storage and post, (iii) information, transmission, com-
puter service and software, (iv) management of water conservancy, environment, and public
facilities.12 Accordingly, non-infrastructure is defined as all other industries in the economy
except the abovementioned four infrastructure industries. Labor input is calculated by the la-
bor amount adjusted by the average years of schooling.
We classify the 31 provinces in mainland China into eastern, central and western parts,
according to the official classification of NBS. Therefore we have 11 eastern provinces: Beijing,
Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Zhejiang;
8 central provinces: Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, Shanxi; and 12
western provinces: Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai,
Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan. We find that Tibet is indeed an outlier since
it (i) has a very high infrastructure ratio, (ii) has a great proportion of data missing, and (iii)
is with a very small economy size. Hence we do not include Tibet in our regression. So we
have a panel of 30 Chinese provinces. The data for Chongqing before 1997 is calculated from
Sichuan data, as Chongqing was a part of Sichuan previously.
We mainly focus on the data during 2003-2015. On the one hand, NBS changed the statis-
tical system in 2003, which makes the data before 2003 actually uncomparable. On the other
hand, as we start our estimation of capital stocks from 1993, we think that the influence of
estimate errors for base year capital stock should sufficiently vanish 10 years later i.e. 2003. In
the robustness check section, we also look at the regression result based on 2000-2015 data.
12If the concept of “infrastructure” is more widely defined as in some literature, the “infrastructure” in this
present paper is just “economic infrastructure” which is “a direct input to economic activity”. And the fixed
capital for social services (such as school, hospital) should be sorted into another part of the concept – “social in-
frastructure”. Moreover, not all capitals in the 4 infrastructural industries necessarily work as the “infrastructure”.
But the data at hand does not allow us to distinguish the different capital components within the industries. Hence,
it is important to take into account the possibly distinct definitions of “infrastructure” when comparing our results
with other papers.
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1.5.2 Estimating capital stock by Perpetual Inventory Method
Without a dataset for the capital stocks, as a tradition, the stocks of both infrastructure and
non-infrastructure capitals can be estimated by the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). Thus,
we have
Kt = (1−δt−1)Kt−1+ It−1
where Kt denotes the capital stock at the beginning of period t; δt−1 is the depreciation rate; and
It−1 is the efficiency-adjusted investment flow.13 PIM requires the data of 4 elements: initial
(base period) capital stock, capital investment time series, capital price, and capital deprecia-
tion profile. We select the year 1993 as the base year to calculate the capital stock at constant
price. Starting from an initialized stock at the beginning of 1993, the capital stock series in
the subsequent years can be calculated from the investment data. (1) The initial capital stock
in 1993 can be estimated in several ways. We calculate it using the capital investment growth
rate and depreciation rate in the subsequent four years, assuming that they were the same in all
years before 1993. In formula, we have K1993 = I1993/(gr+δ ) where K1993 is the capital stock
in 1993, I1993 is the capital investment in 1993, gr is the assumed growth rate of capital invest-
ment before 1993 (for which we use the country-wide average 1993-1997 growth rate 24.96%
for infrastructure and 13.75% for non-infrastructure), and δ is the corresponding depreciation
rate. (2) Regarding the investment-efficiency-adjusted capital investment flow data, we follow
Jin (2016) and Wang and Szirmai (2012) to use the item of “Newly Increased Fixed Assets”
in Chinese statistical system, as its definition is more consistent with what we need compared
to other investment series data.14 (3) We use the “Price Index for Investment in Fixed Assets”
to deflate the price for both infrastructure and non-infrastructure capitals. (4) The selection for
capital depreciation rate is quite controversial. Wemake a compromise among the existing stud-
ies and choose 8% and 9.5% as the depreciation rate for infrastructure and non-infrastructure,
respectively.
13It is important to explicitly distinguish the two timing notations of Kt in literature where Kt could be defined
as the stock at the beginning or end of period t. Unexpectedly, we find some literature confuses this and is actually
in mistake.
14Here we cite the definition of “Newly Increased Fixed Assets” from China Statistical Yearbook as below.
“Newly Increased Fixed Assets refers to the value of fixed assets that has completed the construction and purchase,
and has been delivered to the production or owner units, including investment in projects that have been completed
and put into operation in current year and the investment in equipment, tools and appliance that meet the standard
of fixed assets and fees that should be apportioned. This is an indicator that demonstrates the results of investment
in fixed assets in monetary terms, and an important indicator to reflect the speed of construction and to calculate
the efficiency of investment.”
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Figure 1.2: Average K/Y and Kg/Y ratios in eastern, central and western provinces,
1993-2015
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Figure 1.3: Average Kg/K ratios in eastern, central and western provinces, 1993-2015
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Employing the method and data abovementioned, we are able to estimate the infrastruc-
ture and non-infrastructure capital stocks for 31 provinces in mainland China. According to
Gupta et al. (2014)’s estimation for the public capital stocks in a group of countries, the mean
(non-efficiency-adjusted) public capital stock in middle-income countries during 2000-2009 is
93.2% of GDP. Adjusting the capital stock by efficiency will halve the value. This number is not
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very far from our estimation. Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 show the average K/Y , Kg/Y and Kg/K
ratios in the eastern, central, western regions and the country as a whole during 1993-2015.
We know from the graph that K/Y rates were relatively stable before 2006 and obviously rose
after then. Kg/Y ratios smoothly increased in the three regions before 2002, remained stable
during 2003-2012, and rose after 2013. The gaps of capital to GDP ratios among three regions
aggravated after the 1990s. Kg/K ratios climbed up in the first decade of the sample period and
went down after the peaks around 2002.
Figure 1.10 in Appendix 1.G additionally shows the evolution of K, Kg and Y shares (as the
fraction of country-wide sum) of the three districts. It is obvious that the output shares were
stable for all the three regions, while the shares of infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital
stocks demonstrated some variations especially after 2006. The most notable phenomenon is
the large decline of the share of Kg in the eastern area accompanied with a large increase in the
western area during the whole sample period. In 1993, the share of Kg was around 65% in the
eastern district and 15% in the western disctrict. The numbers become 45% and 30% in 2015.
In contrast, the GDP share was maintained around 60% and 20% in the eastern and western
zones, respectively. One may guess this fact implies that the infrastructure in the western
region was less productive since an increase of Kg’s proportion did not go with an increase of
Y ’s. However, we in fact observe that the share of non-infrastructure K increased as well in
recent years. Hence, we need a rigorous comparison about the relative contributions of K and
Kg to output. The next section presents our regression results.
1.5.3 Estimated investment efficiency
Investment efficiency is measured by the ratio of “Newly Increased Fixed Assets” to “Total
Investment in Fixed Assets”. This ratio is equal to the item “Rate of Projects of Fixed Assets
Completed and Put into Operation” in Chinese statistical system.15 We use HP filter to obtain
a smooth trend of the ratio, in order to get rid of the business cycle fluctuations.
Figure 1.4 demonstrates the estimated average efficiency of non-infrastructure and infras-
tructure investment in the eastern, central and western areas during 1993-2015. We see that
in recent years (1) the investment efficiency of infrastructure was around 60%, and the effi-
ciency of non-infrastructure was slightly higher; (2) the investment efficiency was highest in
the central provinces and lowest in the western area, though the difference was not huge.
15Here we cite the definition of “Rate of Projects of Fixed Assets Completed and Put into Operation” from
China Statistical Yearbook as below. “Rate of Projects of Fixed Assets Completed and Put into Operation refers to
the ratio of the newly increased fixed assets to the total investment made in the same period. This a comprehensive
indicator reflecting the speed of the employment of fixed assets and the investment efficiency at the macro-level.
As the newly increased fixed assets is the result of a long period while the investment is completed in the current
year, this indicator is expected to be used to reflect the employment of fixed assets over a long period of time.”
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Figure 1.4: Average investment efficiency of infrastructure and non-infrastructure in east-
ern, central and western provinces, 1993-2015
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Year
R
at
io
(a) Infrastructure
 
 
Eastern provinces
Central provinces
Western provinces
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Year
R
at
io
(b) Non-infrastructure
 
 
Eastern provinces
Central provinces
Western provinces
29
1.6 Empirical result
This section presents our regression results and the corresponding policy implications. We will
first document the estimated output elasticities. Then we compare the marginal products of
infrastructure and non-infrastructure. By applying the policy evaluation criterion derived in the
previous theoretical section, we find that there is still a space of investing more infrastructure
in most Chinese provinces. The robustness of our result is inspected at the end of this section.
1.6.1 Output elasticity
We summarize our estimation of coefficients in Table 1.3. For comparison, we also report
the results from one-way fixed effects model, and median values of estimation from varying
coefficient model without TFP proxy and spillover effects. For the complete varying coefficient
model with TFP proxy and spillover effects, we report the values of 5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and
95% quantile over the entire data panel.16 The significance level of estimated coefficients is
evaluated by the corresponding estimation standard errors which can be obtained by residual
based wild bootstrap method. Result for a monotonicity test for proxy variable with respect to
perceived TFP shock can be found in Appendix 1.H.
The estimated coefficients are located within the range in line with literature. The coeffi-
cients for infrastructure, non-infrastructure capital and TFP shock proxy variable are signifi-
cant in almost all cases. The spillover effect is generally insignificant. This is not surprising
since we are working on the data of Chinese provinces with usually very wide area, in which
most capitals are located far from the provincial boundary and thus have little connection to
other provinces. We check the cross-section correlation, auto-correlation (by Box-Pierce and
Ljung-Box tests), normality (by Shapiro-Wilk test) and heteroscedasticity of the residuals. The
residuals typically well behave and should not bias our estimation.
16In Table 1.3 the quantile of each coefficient is reported separately. Thus, for instance, a data point with βg at
25% quantile is not necessarily with βk at 25% quantile. That is also the case in Table 1.4.
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Table 1.3: Estimated output elasticities of infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital
Coef.
Estimated Value
Semiparametric Varying Coefficient Model
One-Way without
Fixed Spillover without
Effects and TFP Spillover Complete Model
Model Proxy
Median Median
5% 25%
Median
75% 95%
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
βg 0.130*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.120*** 0.127***
[0.023] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.027] [0.027] [0.024] [0.032]
βk 0.233*** 0.228*** 0.230*** 0.227*** 0.231*** 0.238*** 0.246*** 0.305***
[0.022] [0.029] [0.026] [0.025] [0.024] [0.029] [0.029] [0.044]
ϕ -0.255*** - -0.264** -0.301*** -0.297*** -0.283*** -0.229** -0.107
[0.092] [0.115] [0.116] [0.121] [0.117] [0.117] [0.129]
θg -0.036* - - -0.031
[0.020] [0.020]
θk 0.012 - - 0.005
[0.014] [0.014]
σt Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.584 0.553 0.551 0.578
Obs. 360 360 360 360
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; bootstrapped standard errors in brackets for the varying coeffi-
cient model.
1.6.2 Marginal product
With the estimated output elasticity, ratio of capital to output and price level, we can calculate
the marginal products of infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital. Table 1.4 shows the
results.
The median marginal products of infrastructure and non-infrastructure are 22.4% and 21.9%,
respectively. The magnitude is consistent with the estimated Chinese capital return rate in the
literature. For example, the estimated pre-tax return on capital is roughly 21% in 2005 in Bai,
Hsieh and Qian (2006), 15% in 2013 in Bai and Zhang (2014), and 18% in 2013 in Thomas
(2013). The median value of the marginal revenue product of capital is 32% in 2007 in Ding,
Guariglia and Knight (2012).
The median marginal product of infrastructure is very close to that of non-infrastructure,
which results in a median value of Fg/Fk around one. Taking into account the investment effi-
ciency and depreciation rate, the adjusted ratio [φgFg+(δk− δg)]/φkFk is increased compared
to the unadjusted ratio Fg/Fk. In order to check whether it is desirable to invest more infrastruc-
ture, we can inspect the value ofMPdi f f = φgFg+(δk−δg)−φkFk (which we call it “dynamic
marginal product difference”). As documented in the last row of Table 1.4, the difference of
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Fg and Fk adjusted by investment efficiency and depreciation rate is positive averagely. This
indicates an underinvestment of public capital.
Table 1.4: Estimated marginal products of capital
Variable
Estimated Value
5% 25%
Median
75% 95%
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
Fg 0.138 0.186 0.224 0.267 0.355
Fk 0.117 0.160 0.219 0.275 0.415
F(g+k) 0.124 0.171 0.221 0.264 0.350
Fg/Fk 0.557 0.812 1.060 1.310 1.790
[φgFg+(δk−δg)]/φkFk 0.598 0.887 1.110 1.330 1.920
φgFg+(δk−δg)−φkFk -0.101 -0.018 0.012 0.038 0.081
Note: F(g+k) is the marginal product of capital as a mix of public and private capital with current capital
ratio maintained.
Figure 1.5 shows the marginal products of infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital, as
well as the difference of marginal products net of investment efficiency and depreciation rates,
for 30 provinces during 2004-2015. Figure 1.6 demonstrates the average dynamic marginal
product difference in the eastern, central and western regions, taking the capital investment
volumes at each year as weights. These two figures enable us to obtain the main findings of our
paper.
The main findings can be summarized as two points. (1) The dynamic marginal prod-
uct difference MPdi f f has experienced an overall increase during the sample period. By
investigating its components, we see that (i) the investment efficiencies of infrastructure and
non-infrastructure were relatively stable with similar variation trends (see Figure 1.4 in Section
1.5.3); (ii) the depreciation rates were constant (by assumption); (iii) the infrastructure marginal
product was stable but the non-infrastructure marginal product declined in most provinces. (2)
In the early years of the sample period, the dynamic marginal product difference was around
zero or slightly negative in most areas. This implied no need to expand the infrastructure con-
struction. However, recently the level of MPdi f f was significantly above zero. This indicated
that the benefit of investing more infrastructure exceeded that of private capital.
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Figure 1.5: Estimated marginal products of infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital in 30 provinces, 2004-2015
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Note: Blue curve is Fg; red curve is Fk; gray shaded area is φgFg−φkFk+(δk−δg) with its 90% confidence interval. After the name of each province, the letters
E, C, W refer to the eastern, central, and western region, respectively.
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Figure 1.6: Evolution of estimated average dynamic marginal product difference φgFg−
φkFk+(δk−δg) in eastern, central and western provinces, 2004-2015
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Note: The gray shaded area is φgFg−φkFk+(δk−δg) with its 90% confidence interval.
Next we discuss in more detail the situations in each province and the eastern, central
and western areas. As shown in Figure 1.5, in most eastern provinces the efficiency-adjusted
marginal product of infrastructure net of depreciation was above that of non-infrastructure.
This was a signal of infrastructure lack. Exceptions are Hainan, Shanghai, Tianjin, some early
years for Fujian, Guangdong, Zhejiang, where the dynamic marginal product difference was
approximately zero or negative. However, since the negative value was still close to zero,
we can regard these provinces as holding a roughly balanced allocation of infrastructure and
non-infrastructure capitals. Subfigure 1.6(b) tells us that the average marginal product differ-
ence in the eastern provinces was significantly positive after 2011. Thus, an underinvestment
of infrastructure clearly existed in the east. Although we categorize these provinces into one
group, the great inter-province heterogeneity should not be neglected. For instance, in Beijing,
Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, and Tianjin, Fg was always higher than Fk. But in other eastern
provinces Fg was often close to Fk, in which case the investment efficiency and depreciation
rate difference were quite important.
Some studies (such as SH) argue that there was already too much infrastructure in the
western provinces. As demonstrated by Figure 1.6(d), our estimation supports this opinion
for the sample period before 2008. After that period, however, our estimation demonstrates
no evidence of significant overinvestment of infrastructure in most western provinces. For
Chongqing, Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, and Xinjiang, MPdi f f was close to zero for the whole
period. That is to say, a good match of infrastructure and non-infrastructure capital was roughly
maintained. For several other provinces like Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai,
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Sichuan, Yunnan, though the infrastructure was overinvested in the early years when private
capital’s productivity was high, the value ofMPdi f f converged to zero after 2008. Overall, we
think that the current infrastructure investment policy in the west did not result in an overstock
of infrastructure.
The situation of the central provinces is similar to that in the east, and we do not analyze
in detail here. We see from Figure 1.6(c) that the average marginal product difference in the
central region was near zero in the early years and significantly positive recently. This indicates
a space for more infrastructure investment.
In Appendix 1.I we discuss some supplementary support for our argument that it is still
desirable to invest more in infrastructure in China. The first is regarding the crowding-in effect
of infrastructure investment. The second is about the high return of capital in infrastructure-
relevant firms. (1) A drawback of our analysis framework is that by considering infrastructure
and non-infrastructure as two separate production inputs, we fail to explicitly test whether in-
frastructure stimulates or impedes non-infrastructure investment. Particularly, if infrastructure
investment crowds out the private capital, the output enhancement effect of infrastructure may
be offset. But the literature provides empirical evidences that public investment crowds in pri-
vate investment in China. Appendix 1.I.1 presents the details on this aspect. This supports our
argument that it is beneficial to invest more in infrastructure. (2) Considering that most infras-
tructure in China is invested by government or state-owned enterprises (SOEs), our estimation
result may be challenged by the opinion that the efficiency of government and SOEs is probably
low. However there exist firm-level empirical evidences that the infrastructure-relevant firms
indeed have high capital return rates. The information is discussed in Appendix 1.I.2.
1.6.3 Robustness analysis
Nonparametric models are usually very flexible. We check the robustness of the estimated
coefficients in different model setups and by different samples, and find no crucial change of
the result. We describe our exercises briefly as below.
Our econometric model uses proxy variable to control for TFP shock. (1) Previously we
only use the first order polynomial of proxy variable ϕ(zt)∆proxyt to get ∆ωt . Column (1)
in Table 1.5 presents the result of using the third order polynomial ϕ(zt) ∗∆proxyt +ϕ2(zt) ∗
(∆proxyt)2+ϕ3(zt)∗ (∆proxyt)3, whose difference is negligible. (2) In the baseline model we
use the HP-filtered cyclical component of private consumption to GDP ratio as proxy variable.
We may also try other possible proxy variables such as the government spending to GDP ratio
or capital formation rate. These alternative choices do not make the estimates for βg and βk
largely changed. The results are not reported here.
In our baseline model, we assume that the estimated capital elasticity coefficients βg and
βk are both functions of variable zt . It is possible that they are functions of several variables.
Then we consider to add more variables in the part of zt . For instance we can assume βg and
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βk are functions of (zt ,Kt/Yt). Here Kt/Yt is the ratio of non-infrastructure capital to GDP. We
report the results in column (2) of Table 1.5. Expanding the content of zt variable improves the
R2 value but introduces a “sparse sample” problem. Since we only have 360 observations (12
years times 30 provinces), the sample points are sparsely distributed in the two dimensional
space of (zt ,Kt/Yt). This severely damages the power of our kernel function and results in very
volatile estimates for some points close to the boundary of sample space. But for most sample
points our baseline estimate is robust.
There are several alternative ways to estimate the capital stock, depending the assumptions
underlying the estimation. (1) First, we may change the depreciation rate. We check the result
of setting (δg,δk)=(0.095, 0.095). The column (3) of Table 1.5 displays the result, which is
close to the baseline estimation. (2) We may define the non-infrastructure as excluding the
household residential capital, compared to our baseline case with residential capital. The es-
timation result is just analogous. (3) We also change the base year by which we calculate the
constant price capital stock. We choose the year to 2003, 2013 and find no much difference.
In our baseline estimation we exclude the data before 2003, because of the uncomparability
of pre- and post-2003 data as a consequence of statistical system change. Here we test whether
our result is sensitive to the sample period. For example, we change our sample period to year
2000-2015. We report the result in column (4) in Table 1.5. The estimated coefficients are close
to our baseline values.
It is possible that the location can have some fixed effects on the aggregate production
function. Even though first differencing should eliminate the section fixed effects, there are
possibly some location features that vary constantly and slightly in each year and still appear
in our first differenced equation. We try to add the dummy variables for location, either for the
30 provinces or 8 economic regions (Northeast, North Coastal, Eastern Coastal, South Coastal,
the Middle Yellow River, Middle Reaches of the Yangtze River, Southwest, and Big Northwest
regions) according the official categorization of NBS. We find that the results do not have
essential change. Thus we do not report the results here.
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Table 1.5: Robustness analysis for the estimated coefficients in varying coefficient model
Coefficient
Estimated (Median) Value
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline
proxy123 (z, KY )
δg=0.095 2000-
model δk=0.095 2015
βg 0.109*** 0.119*** 0.108*** 0.097*** 0.083***
βk 0.238*** 0.237*** 0.248*** 0.242*** 0.262***
ϕ -0.283*** -0.338*** -0.188* -0.280*** -0.150**
θg -0.031 -0.029 -0.007 -0.026 -0.037***
θk 0.005 0.005 -0.007 0.003 0.010
σt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.578 0.594 0.628 0.573 0.569
Obs. 360 360 360 360 480
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All the reported values for varying coefficients are in the
median.
1.7 Conclusion
Our analysis has two main implications. First, the theoretical model of infrastructure invest-
ment shows that the investment efficiency and depreciation rate gap of different types of capital
should be considered in determining the optimal allocation between capital types. The invest-
ment efficiency and depreciation rate are widely ignored in literature. But they can be crucial
if the marginal products of capitals are low or close to each other. Our theoretical analysis
confirms the effort of estimating efficiency-adjusted public capital stocks across countries by
Gupta et al. (2014). All in all, more elements of the economy and further analysis can build
on our simple growth model and investigate the wedge between marginal products of public
capital and private capital.
Second, focusing on the objective of regional economic growth, the econometric estimation
indicates a space for investing more in infrastructure in most Chinese provinces, even though
the infrastructure stock has already increased grossly in recent decades. This proposes one
path for structural reform of improving capital product and towards internal rebalancing. When
recently it became difficult to maintain an economic growth rate above 7%, some began to
consider whether something is wrong with the government-led high investment rate. However,
our empirical finding supports the idea that the key issue facing China is the distribution of
capital and how it is used (Purdy and Qiu, 2014). Using a global computable general equi-
librium (CGE) model, Freestone and Horton (2014) show that even assuming in the future
10 years the investment ratio decreases by 10%, if the rise in productivity can be sufficiently
large, the growth rate of real GDP can still be around 6%. We think a more efficient allocation
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between infrastructure and non-infrastructure investment would greatly facilitate the favored
improvement of productivity.
Our paper has several shortcomings, which we cannot overcome at this stage but would like
to deal with in the future. The first is the short period of available time series sample. Since
the NBS reformed its statistical system in 2003, we currently can only work on the consistent
data series of about one decade. Considering that we intend to study the 30 (or 31) provinces in
mainland China, the sample period is clearly short. However this data limit seems insuperable.
What we can do in the future is inspecting the currently available data seriously and improving
the utilization of it.
Second, we failed to consider the region-specific rates of depreciation. The depreciation rate
is crucial for us, both in the empirical estimation of capital stocks and the theoretical criterion of
evaluating the tradeoff between infrastructure and non-infrastructure capitals. Wu (2009) esti-
mates the different depreciation rates in 31 provinces for 3 sectors (agriculture, manufacturing,
and services). But his result is not really helpful for us because we divide the production into
two sectors – infrastructure and non-infrastructure. Jia and Zhang (2014), and Wu (2009) find
that in general the depreciation rate is “high in the more developed regions and low in the less
developed regions”. For us, it is important to investigate the depreciation differences (δk−δg)
across different provinces. Also, in the long run we may also need to consider the time-varying
depreciation rates. We should do that if we can find a satisfactory way with sufficient data.
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Appendix
Appendix 1.A. Illustrating the importance of depreciation difference by a
numerical example with Cobb-Douglas production function
Here we use a simple numerical example to illustrate the importance of (δk−δg), while neglect-
ing the existence of investment inefficiency. We assume a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production
function Y = KαkKαgg L1−αk−αg . We set fixed labor input L= 1, and 1−αk−αg = 0.4 since the
estimated labor share in China is roughly 40%. Hence, the production function can be simply
written as Y = F(K,Kg) = KαkK
αg
g with αk+αg = 0.6.
1.A.1. Capital resource misallocation within one period
Figure 1.7: Capital resourcemisallocation in one period, with depreciation difference (δk−
δg) = 0.06
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First, we look at a one-period example to see how capital resource would be allocated. Suppose
that at the beginning of the period, the economy as a whole is endowed with 1 unit of resource
which can be allocated between private and public capital i.e. K+Kg = 1. Obviously, using
Fk = Fg will generate
Kg
K =
αg
αk . Also we numerically find the solution (K,Kg) for Fk = Fg+
(δk−δg) satisfying the resource constraint. Figure 1.7 displays the results in the case of (δk−
δg)=0.06 for parameter αk ∈ [0.2,0.45]. Particularly we find that misusing the formula Fk = Fg
39
results in a misallocation of average 7.36% of capital stock K. The misallocation would be
4.79% and 10.1% if the depreciation gap is 0.04 and 0.08.
1.A.2. Long-run dynamics and welfare loss
Now we turn to investigate the long-run dynamics of convergence toward the steady state.
Since if we use criterion Fk = Fg the balanced growth path (BGP) is not sustainable under
(δk−δg) 6= 0, we look at the situation before the economy reaches its BGP. Specifically, we let
the economy start at (0.5K¯,0.5K¯g) where K¯ and K¯g are the steady state capital stocks. Just for
illustrative convenience, we currently use a discrete-time version of endogenous growth model
in which the social welfare is ∑∞t=0β tU(Ct). We set quarterly discount rate β = 0.99 and
log-utility U(Ct) = ln(Ct). The capital stocks are accumulated according to Kt+1 = ωk,tYt +
(1− δk)Kt and Kg,t+1 = ωg,tYt +(1− δg)Kg,t . Here ωk,t and ωg,t are the fractions of output
used for private and public capital accumulation, respectively. Definitely, the proportion for
consumption is ωc,t = 1−ωk,t −ωg,t i.e. Ct = ωc,tYt . It is not difficult to calculate that the
welfare maximizing steady state private capital stock is K∗ =
[
(1+θ)δk
(αk+αg)Θαg
] 1
αk+αg−1 where Θ =
αg
αk
1
β−(1−δk)
1
β−(1−δg)
and θ = δgδkΘ. Accordingly, K
∗
g = ΘK∗ and Y ∗ = Θαg (K∗)
αk+αg . The steady state
fraction ωk = δkΘ−αg (K∗)1−αk−αg and ωg = θωk.
Now we would like to see how the economy gradually converges to the steady state from
the start point (0.5K¯,0.5K¯g). We consider three types of policy rules for resource allocation:
(i) always stick to ωk,t = ωk and ωg,t = ωg; (ii) ensure Fk,t+1 = Fg,t+1+(δk− δg); (iii) target
Fk,t+1 =Fg,t+1. In order to maintain the comparability of consumption process, we let ωc,t =ωc
under all three scenarios. We plot the first 80 periods (i.e. 20 years) of the economic evolution
in Figure 1.8. In the graph, we set αk = 0.33 and αg = 0.27 and the variables (Y,C,K,Kg) are
expressed in terms of the proportion of the steady state values.
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Figure 1.8: Evolution of (Y,C,K,Kg) as proportion of the steady state values, with
(δk,δg,δk−δg) = (0.12,0.06,0.06)
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From the figure, we see that the policy (i) and (ii) are almost overlapped while policy (iii)
results in a severe deviation from the optimal convergence path. As expected, the policy (iii)
results in a large welfare loss. We experiment on different values of (δk,δg,δk− δg) at (0.11,
0.07, 0.04), (0.12, 0.06, 0.06), or (0.13, 0.05, 0.08). Under these parameterizations, the welfare
loss of policy (iii) is equivalent to 2.40%, 5.54%, 10.3% permanent consumption reduction,
respectively. And the welfare difference between rule (i) and (ii) are completely negligible.
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Appendix 1.B. Two illustrative decentralized economy models
In Section 1.3.2, we already showed that in centrally planned economy the social welfare max-
imization requires φkFk = φgFg+(δk− δg). A further question is: does this criterion change
in a decentralized economy? Unfortunately a closed form solution for the corresponding cri-
terion is generally infeasible, especially when δg = δk = 0 does not hold, unless a set of strict
assumptions are imposed into the decentralized model. On the other hand, (as mentioned at
Section 1.3.1) several disadvantages of decentralized economy modeling tend to make the ef-
fort of finding decentralized solution meaningless in Chinese context. Therefore, in this section
we merely use two artificially simplified models to illustrate the form of criterion in a decen-
tralized economy.
Using the two illustrative models, we want to show that Fk = Fg+(δk−δg) can be a conve-
nient good benchmark for empirical policy analysis. We focus the macroeconomic dynamics
along the balanced growth path (BGP) (which indeed exists in our simple examples) in which
the consumption, capital stock and output grow at the same rate γ = C˙C =
K˙
K =
K˙g
Kg
= Y˙Y .
17 We
investigate one example of welfare-maximizing, and another of growth-maximizing tax policy.
These two models do not incorporate capital investment efficiency, since this feature compli-
cates the calculation while merely providing essentially analogous insights.
1.B.1. Example with welfare-maximizing tax policy
We look at a situation under welfare-maximizing tax policy through the len of a model with
basic setup from Fisher and Turnovsky (1998). The model is actually a simplified decentralized
counterpart of our socially planned economy model in Section 1.3.2.
Model setup
The representative private agent maximizes the life-time utility:
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtu(c, l)dt
subject to the flow budget constraint:
k˙ = (1− τ) f (k,Ksg, l)− s− c−δkk
where τ is the distortionary income tax rate and s the amount of lump-sum tax. Following a set
of literature (e.g. Turnovsky, 1997; Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998; Go´mez, 2004; Dioikitopoulos
and Kalyvitis, 2008) we assume the public service Ksg = Kg(
k
K )
ξ . The individual production
function is y= f (k,Ksg, l) = f (k,Kg(
k
K )
ξ , l). With homogeneous consumer-producers, in equi-
17The growth rate γ can be zero or strictly positive, depending on the specific model functional form and
parameterization. But we would not distinguish these two cases intentionally, since the value of γ is not really
important for our purpose in theoretical analysis.
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librium the aggregate and individual private capital stocks are related by K = Nk. With ψ =
N−ξ we get the aggregate production Y = Ny = N f (k,Ksg, l) = N f (KN ,K
s
g,
L
N ) = F(K,K
s
g,L) =
F(K,ψKg,L). The properties of the assumed individual and aggregate production functions
imply the following relationships:
Fk = fk; Fgs = N fgs; Fg = ψFgs; Fl = fl
where Fk,Fgs,Fg,Fl are the marginal products of Y with respect to the aggregate variables
K,Ksg,Kg,L, respectively. And fk, fgs, fg, fl are the marginal products of y associated with
k,Ksg,Kg, l. The government finances the public investment by either distortionary or lump-
sum tax. Considering the optimization behavior of agents in a decentralized economy, the
government intends to maximize the social welfare as the sum of all consumers’ utilities by
setting the policy instrument – taxation. Government’s budget constraint is:
K˙g = τF(K,ψKg,L)+S−δgKg
Equilibrium optimality conditions
Household’s optimization solves the Hamilton function:
H = e−ρtu(c, l)+λ
[
(1− τ) f (k,Kg( kK )
ξ , l)− s− c−δkk
]
taking the policy variables τ,s and aggregate variables K,Kg as given. Two of the first order
conditions are:
e−ρtuc = λ
(1− τ)
[
fk+ξ
(
k
K
)ξ−1 Kg
K
fgs
]
−δk =− λ˙λ
Plugging the relationships Fk = fk, Fgs = N fgs and Fg = ψFgs , we get an equation in aggre-
gate variables:
(1− τ)
[
Fk+ξ
Kg
K
Fg
]
−δk =− λ˙λ
The government flow budget constraint is just another way of writing the transition equation
for public capital:
K˙g
Kg
=
τY +S
Kg
−δg
Noting that in equilibrium C˙C =
c˙
c , obviously imposing several often used assumptions would
facilitate us to obtain some simple equations in the macroeconomic dynamic equilibrium.
[Assumption 1] We do not consider the variation of labor input by setting fixed l = l¯.
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[Assumption 2] We assume consumer has logarithm utility function u(c) = lnc. These re-
sult in C˙C + ρ =
c˙
c + ρ = − λ˙λ . [Assumption 3] We restrict that government only levies in-
come tax τY but no lump-sum tax. [Assumption 4] A Cobb-Douglas individual production
function f (k,Ksg) = k
αk(Ksg)
αg is imposed. Therefore, the aggregate production is F(K,Kg) =
N f (k,Ksg) = N
(1−αk)−ξαgKαk(Kg)αg which gives Fk = αk YK and Fg = αg
Y
Kg
. By combining all
these four assumptions (i.e. fixed labor input, log-utility, no lump-sum tax, and Cobb-Douglas
production function) and noting that C˙C =
K˙g
Kg
along the BGP, we immediately reach an equality
(1− τ)
[
Fk+ξ
αg
αkFk
]
−δk−ρ = ταgFg−δg. Rearranging it produces the simple formula:
Fk = Fg+(δk−δg)+
{
ρ+(
τ
αg
−1)Fg+
[
τ− (1− τ)ξ αg
αk
]
Fk
}
which can be further simplified if the tax rate τ is known.
It is well known that (e.g. Barro, 1990) under the key assumptions of full congestion ξ = 1
and αk+αg = 1, the welfare-maximizing tax rate is τ∗ = αg. In this case, we readily get:
Fk = Fg+(δk−δg)+ρ
As discussed in Appendix 1.C.1, in fact both the property of setup Ksg = Kg(
k
K )
ξ and empirical
evidence guarantee the reasonability to restrict ξ to be sufficiently close to value 1. Since,
fixing other parameters, τ would be a continuous function of ξ , the simple formula Fk = Fg+
(δk−δg)+ρ would be a good approximation for situation of ξ around 1.18 In the next step we
further simplify the model to exemplify what could happen when ξ < 1.
Under partial congestion, the public capital is no longer shared completely privately and
hence the government is able to use a tax rate τ < αg to finance public service. In order to
obtain a clear solution, we impose one additional assumption onto the previous four. [Assump-
tion 5] αk +αg = 1 in the production function. (Hereby, after adding these five assumptions
our model is analogous to that in Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis, 2008). Equalizing the growth
rate of aggregate consumption γc in decentralized economy and γSPc in social planner problem,
a necessary condition of welfare-maximizing income tax is attained: τ∗ = αgξαgξ+αk . In conse-
quence the simple formula can be written as Fk = Fg+(δk− δg)+
[
ρ− αk(1−ξ )αgξ+αk Fg
]
. As long
as ξ is sufficiently close to 1 (e.g. ξ = 0.95), the term ρ is already large enough to offset the
negative term −αk(1−ξ )αgξ+αk Fg. Accordingly we see again that the criterion Fk = Fg+(δk−δg) de-
rived from the central planner solution serves as a good benchmark. (Admittedly, if we suppose
that ξ is indeed not enough close to 1 by some reasons, we may get Fk = Fg+(δk−δg)+NT
with NT negative. Anyhow, we find the existence of a wedge between Fk and Fg disavows the
18Typically the value of time preference rate ρ is quite small, such as 0.02 in Barro (1990). For example, with
logarithm utility we have the relationship between ρ and steady state real interest rate r¯ that r¯ = ρ+ g¯r where g¯r
is the steady state economic growth rate. Let us assume r¯ = 4% and g¯r = 2%. We accordingly have ρ = 2%. The
Section 2 of Weitzman (2010) gives some normative justifications for setting ρ = 0.
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relationship of Fk = Fg.)
We already see that the degree of congestion impacts on the magnitude of wedge Fk−Fg,
notwithstanding the impact is small when ξ is close to 1. In different places and for different
public capital types, the degree of congestion could be dissimilar. Thus the empirical work can
be strengthened if we are able to measure the congestion parameter and determine the exact size
of optimal wedge. Howbeit this is a difficult work and is important for our empirical research
topic only when ξ is far from 1 which case is believed by us to be not. Moreover, it will be
promising if we can analyze a more elaborate congestion model beyond setting Ksg = Kg(
k
K )
ξ .
However, this likely renders the wedge to depend on the calibration of much more parameters
and make empirical research messy. Also, it is highly suspect whether a closed form solution is
available (while noting that we need five strict assumptions to get the abovementioned simple
formula for ξ < 1). Therefore we leave these aspects for work in the future.
1.B.2. Example with growth-maximizing tax policy
Economic growth is usually the main measurable merit of the government’s economic inter-
vention. And in China, the GDP growth rate is one of the crucial indicators determining the
political promotion chance of local officials. Hence it is useful to analyze the situation with
growth-maximizing tax policy. The intuition to answer what would happen is simple. (As usual,
we suppose that the government in a decentralized economy aims to maximize the economic
growth and needs to levy distortionary tax to finance its policy.) The distortions associated
with taxation discourage the accumulation of private capital. As a result the public to private
capital ratio zmax for growth maximization in decentralized economy is higher than (or in some
special case, equal to) the ratio zSP in the first-best social planner situation. Here z = Kg/K.
Note that the first-best ratio zSP is implicitly restricted by the criterion Fk = Fg+(δk−δg) with
usual concave production function. Thus zmax > zSP combining with the properties of concave
production function implies that the corresponding growth maximization criterion in a decen-
tralized economy would be Fk = Fg+(δk−δg)+PT where PT is some positive term(s).
Following the argument in Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis (2008), using the model in Ap-
pendix 1.B.1 with the abovementioned five assumptions it can be shown that τmax = αg and
Fk = Fg+(δk−δg)+ [ρ+αg(1−ξ )Fk]
accordingly. Clearly the term ρ+αg(1−ξ )Fk is positive. In fact, as in the welfare-maximizing
case, an explicit simple criterion under growth-maximizing tax policy is (perhaps more) seldom
available. But after we check several models it seems that the formula Fk = Fg+(δk−δg) really
serves well as the baseline. Here we would like to present another straightforward model for
illustrative purpose. A generalized research on growth-maximizing criterion may be done in
the future.
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The model is revised from Kamps (2005). We addtionally introduce the depreciations δg
and δk into the model. This model intentionally introduces government debt because this makes
the derivation of criterion very easy.
Model setup
The representative household maximizes the life-time utility
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt
c1−σ
1−σ dt
subjest to the budget constraint
k˙+ d˙+ c= (1− τ)y+ rd−δkk
with individual production function y = kαkkαgg with αk+αg = 1. This model is abstract from
the labor input choice and assumes full congestion of public capital. The household takes the
tax rate τ , and market interest rate r as given. Since government raises risk-free public debt
d at fair interest rate, household is willing to lend any amount of d to government (subject to
resource constraint, of course). Hence d is actually decided by government, not household.
Equilibrium optimality conditions
Household’s first order optimality conditions can be derived from the Hamiltion function:
H =e−ρt
c1−σ
1−σ +λ {(1− τ)y+ rd−δkk− c}
Combining ∂H∂c = 0 and
∂H
∂k =−λ˙ generates (1−τ) fk−δk = σ c˙c−ρ . Here fk is the marginal
product of y with respect to k. Along the balanced growth path (BGP) (which indeed exists
in this present simple model), the consumption, capital stock and output grow at the same rate
γ = c˙c =
k˙
k =
k˙g
kg
= y˙y . Thus:
γ =
1
σ
[(1− τ) fk−δk−ρ]
In the competitive equilibrium, it must be that:
r = (1− τ) fk−δk
(If r < (1− τ) fk−δk, household would not lend to government. If r > (1− τ) fk−δk, govern-
ment has no incentive to pay such a high interest rate since the interest payment comes from
distortionary tax revenue.)
Government’s flow budget constraint is:
D˙= rD+ K˙g− τY +δgKg
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It is assumed that the tax τY in each period is completely used to pay government debt interest
payment rD and compensate the public capital depreciation δgKg i.e. τY = rD+δgKg. Hence,
the net accumulation of public capital K˙g is fully financed by D˙ i.e. D˙ = K˙g. This means
D = Kg. The government is assumed to maintain a particular public to private capital ratio z
and maximize economic growth γ . Tax and debt are used to serve this purpose. It is obvious
that with identical agents under full congestion of public capital, we have Y = Ny = KαkKαgg
and thus Fk = fk. The equality τY = rD+δgKg and D= Kg give:
τ =
(r+δg)Kg
Y
= (r+δg)zαk
and
r = τz−αk −δg = ταgFg−δg
Now we nearly find the aimed criterion. On the one side, we get r = ταgFg − δg from
government budget constraint. On the other side, we have r = (1− τ) fk−δk = (1− τ)Fk−δk
by household’s optimization. Thus clearly:
(1− τ)Fk−δk = ταgFg−δg
But in this equation the tax rate τ is still unknown. In this illustrative example we focus on
the case of maximized growth rate γmax along the BGP. Appendix 1.C.2 documents the steps to
find the value of growth maximizing τmax which is αg.
Now we ultimately get the optimality condition assuming αk +αg = 1 in a decentralized
economy: (1−αg)Fk−δk = Fg−δg i.e.
Fk = Fg+(δk−δg)+αgFk
Comparing this with the first-best case criterion Fk = Fg+(δk− δg), we find the depreciation
wedge is increased in the decentralized economy. This is consistent with our intuition Fk =
Fg+(δk−δg)+PT with PT positive. This model presented above is extremely simplified and
only for illustrative purpose. Especially, the constant return to scale assumption αk+αg = 1 is
very helpful to get the simple criterion. In a more elaborate and realistic model, it is in general
very difficult to get the explicit expression of the PT term. We may, again, resort to simple
intuition to get some insights.
We consider two possible ways to extend the model – incorporating (i) the congestion of
public capital i.e. the negative externality of private capital accumulation, and (ii) maintenance
expenditure to reduce depreciation of public capital. In the decentralized economy, the growth-
maximizing tax rate will be positively related to the degree of public service congestion in the
economy because of the desirability of tax to mitigate the intensity of private capital’s negative
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externality. The growth-maximizing tax rate will be higher in the existence of public capital
maintenance, which needs to be financed to sustain the high usage or lower the depreciation of
public capital. So in both cases the growth maximization tax rate is likely higher. In conse-
quence the ratio zmax is probably larger; and the depreciation rate wedge between Fk and Fg may
increase. Admittedly, this intuition may not be correct in some circumstances. For example,
in the model of Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis (2008) in which congestion and public capital
maintenance are present together, they find the interaction of them may make the overall effect
of congestion on the growth-maximizing tax rate ambiguous, depending on the initialization
of congestion level and structural parameters. A detailed analysis is complicated and not our
concern here.
Although a detailed theoretical analysis based on a generalized decentralized economy
model would be beneficial, that is far beyond the scope of our current paper. Now we sum-
marize our finding from theoretical model briefly: the optimization in a centralized or decen-
tralized economy would always require a wedge between Fk and Fg as long as the condition
δg = δk = 0 does not hold; and the formula Fk = Fg+(δk− δg) is found to be a good bench-
mark criterion for policy analysis.
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Appendix 1.C. Supplement for Appendix 1.B
1.C.1. Argument for (nearly) full congestion (i.e. ξ close to 1) setup of public capital
(1) Property of of setup Ksg = Kg( kK )
ξ
Following a set of literature we assume the public service Ksg = Kg(
k
K )
ξ . For simplicity,
we focus on the Cobb-Douglas individual production function y = kαk(Ksg)
αg . In equilibrium,
the aggregate and individual private capital stocks are related by K = Nk. Thus we have the
aggregate production Y = Ny= N(1−αk)−ξαgKαkKαgg . As an example we restrict that αk+αg =
1. Then we get Y = KαkKαgg N(1−ξ )αg and accordingly YK = N
(1−ξ )αg
(
Kg
K
)αk
. Usually in real
economy, the value of N (i.e. the amount of economic units e.g. population) is very large.
Hence the term N(1−ξ )αg is large when ξ is not sufficiently close to 1. On the other hand,
we know if we count Y , K and Kg in the real world by monetary value, we should observe
that YK = O(1) and
Kg
K = O(1). This fact contradicts the situation that
Y
K = N
(1−ξ )αg
(
Kg
K
)αk
when N(1−ξ )αg is very large (compared to value 1). In other words, the setup of Ksg = Kg( kK )
ξ
naturally only allows the parameterization that ξ is sufficiently close to 1 i.e. (nearly) full
congestion.
In order to eliminate the scale effect related to large N, Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis (2008)
set up that y = kαk
(
Ksg
N1−ξ
)αg
. In this case, we get a very convenient aggregate production
function Y = KαkKαgg . But now the individual production itself is problematic. In equilibrium
of K = Nk, we have y = kαk
(
KgN−ξ
N1−ξ
)αg
= kαk
(
Kg
N
)αg
. The aggregate public capital stock is
equally divided by all N agents and each agent only takes the KgN piece of government capital
into account. This turns out to be the full congestion circumstance regardless of the value of ξ ,
which denies our attempt of using parameter 06 ξ < 1 to model non-full congestion situation.
So, whether eliminating the scale effect or not, we see that letting ξ to be close to 1 is the
reasonable setup of congestion model.
(2) Empirical evidence
Full congestion of public capital means that the public service enjoyed by a production unit
is proportional to its relative economic scale among all firms. In order to ensure the level of
public service available to the individual firm to remain fixed, when individual private capital
stock k is unchanged the aggregate public capital Kg should increase in proportion to the aggre-
gate private capital stock K. Those infrastructures such as transportation, energy used directly
in private production and input-output distribution may have this full congestion characteristic.
Also, in population dense area such as big cities the high degree of public service congestion is
often observed. Craig (1987) and Edwards (1990) discuss some evidences that the local public
goods could be quite congested. Recently, Breunig and Rocaboy (2008) use French data to
estimate the effect of municipality size on per capita public expenditure. They find the very
large population is associated with a severe congestion of public goods. This finding would be
quite probably applicable to China.
49
Furthermore, the local governments often pay much attention and is willing to incline public
policy toward the large firms located in the domain because of their crucial roles of taxpayer,
GDP creator and employer. In some developing countries without transparent politics, the
economic scale may be one-to-one or even one-to-more convertible to political influence. This
generates economic rent and enables the public capital congestion parameter ξ close or even
over 1.
1.C.2. Derivation of τmax=αg in the illustrative decentralized economy growth-maximizing
tax policy example
Plugging τ = (r+ δg)zαk into r = (1− τ)Fk− δk = (1− τ)αkzαg − δk, after arrangement we
express r in terms of z: r = αkz
αg−αkδgz−δk
1+αkz . Since we already have γ =
1
σ [(1− τ) fk−δk−ρ] =
1
σ [r− ρ], we now get γ as a function of z: γ = 1σ
[
αkzαg−αkδgz−δk
1+αkz −ρ
]
. Along the BGP, γ is
maximized with respect to z. Thus zmax is the solution to ∂γ∂ z = 0 which is equivalent to
α2k z
max− (δk−δg)(zmax)αk −αg = 0
This equation has no general closed form solution. Howbeit it is sufficient to help us obtain
growth maximization tax rate τmax.
We can write τ in terms of z. Plugging r = αkz
αg−αkδgz−δk
1+αkz into τ = (r+ δg)z
αk we have
τ = αkz−(δk−δg)z
αk
1+αkz . Rearranging this generates
(1− τ)αkz− (δk−δg)zαk − τ = 0
This apparently means that τmax = αg gives the desirable zmax.
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Appendix 1.D. Panel unit root tests for regression variables
Table 1.6 presents the panel unit root test result for variables of output, capital stock and skill-
adjusted labor amount. The sample period is 2004-2015. In the table we report 5 test statistics:
the LLC (Levin, Lin and Chu) t-, Breitung t-, IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin) W -, ADF-Fisher
χ2- and PP-Fisher χ2-Statistic. Intentionally, the Hadri test is not relied on because it is not
informative for our sample, as it always rejects the stationarity null hypothesis for all variables.
Table 1.6: Panel unit root tests for regression variables
Variable
Test Statistics Whether It is Stationary?
LLC Breitung IPS
Fisher-
ADF
Fisher-
PP
based on 5
tests
based on
Fisher-ADF
Levels
lnY 4.455 5.043 8.931 16.503 2.312 No No
lny 1.059 -2.597*** 5.205 28.856 29.490 No No
lnKg -1.211 5.668 2.517 59.411 75.518* No No
lnkg -0.679 9.318 2.365 63.627 73.656 No No
lnK -6.717*** 0.376 0.730 63.602 72.540 No No
lnk -4.167*** 2.302 1.432 57.213 46.498 No No
lnL -2.592*** 0.406 2.793 48.557 40.224 No No
First Differences
∆ lnY -8.400*** 1.007 -1.608* 86.703** 118.421*** Yes Yes
∆ lny -16.483*** -3.649*** -5.389*** 155.089*** 223.077*** Yes Yes
∆ lnKg -11.269*** -1.066 -4.405*** 124.412*** 171.421*** Yes Yes
∆ lnkg -10.932*** 1.062 -4.405*** 136.349*** 217.059*** Yes Yes
∆ lnK -12.500*** 1.834 -3.165*** 102.298*** 132.064*** Yes Yes
∆ lnk -10.150*** -0.853 -3.006*** 108.901*** 132.651*** Yes Yes
∆ lnL -19.740*** -2.584*** -7.606*** 187.351*** 301.163*** Yes Yes
Note: (1) */**/*** indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 10%/5%/1% signifi-
cance level, respectively. (2) An individual intercept and trend are contained in test equation. Lag length
is selected automatically based on Schwarz information criterion.
Furthermore, we report whether the variables are stationary based on the test statistics
at 10% significance level. Considering that sometimes different tests indicate distinct con-
sequences, the column “based on 5 tests” refers to the judgement depending on whether at least
3 tests reject/unreject unit root hypothesis. We also report the judgement using the Fisher-ADF
statistic in the column “based on Fisher-ADF”, as this test is most often used in literature. A
reading of Table 1.6 finds that all variables are I(1). This justifies our employment of first
difference to make variables stationary.
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Appendix 1.E. Misusage of ACF approach in Shi and Huang (2014)
First let us recall how SH use the ACF approach (by using the notation in SH paper and sup-
pressing the first difference operator without loss of generality). It is assumed that the TFP
shock εst can be decomposed into two components: εst =ϖst+µst where “ϖst is the part of the
TFP shock anticipated in advance” (by capital investors but unobservable to econometrician)
which affects lnki,st and lnkp,st , and µst is the part of the TFP shock unanticipated in advance
which is uncorrelated with lnki,st and lnkp,st . Then SH argue that the observable private con-
sumption per working resident lncst increases monotonically with the variable ϖst . Thus for
given (lnki,st , lnkp,st), lncst is a monotonic function of ϖst : lncst = φ(ϖst , lnki,st , lnkp,st) which
gives ϖst = φ−1(lncst , lnki,st , lnkp,st). “Assuming that ϖst follows a first-order Markov
process”, ϖst can be rewritten as ϖst = ρ(ϖst−1) = ρ
[
φ−1(lncst−1, lnki,st−1, lnkp,st−1)
]
=
ϕ(lncst−1, lnki,st−1, lnkp,st−1) where the function ρ governs the first-order Markov process of
ϖst and function ϕ is the composition of ρ and φ−1. Ultimately in the regression model the
coefficients for lnki,st and lnkp,st can be identified because the correlated term ϖst is proxied
by ϕ(lncst−1, lnki,st−1, lnkp,st−1).
Below we show that SH’s application of ACF approach is quite implausible from both
the aspects regarding “timing” and “Markov” assumptions (which are both crucial in ACF
approach). The original idea of ACF method refers to Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006).
Ornaghi and Van Beveren (2011) compares several relevant approaches, including ACF, of
using observable proxy variables to control for unobservables when estimating productivity.
1.E.1. Regarding “timing” assumption
In SH, ϖst is the part of the TFP shock anticipated in advance. Let us use another notation
to indicate the nature of “anticipation” and write it as E(ωst |It−1) where It−1 is the informa-
tion set at the start of period t. We use pst to refer to the selected proxy variable which is
lncst in SH. Under these notations we have pst = φt(E(ωst |It−1),ki,st ,kp,st). Without loss of
generality we assume the private capital stock kp,st has the timing analogous to infrastructure
stock ki,st . In period t, the infrastructure and non-infrastructure stock are not predetermined
and correlated to the anticipated TFP shock E(ωst |It−1). Without loss of generality we can
express that ki,st = gi(E(ωst |It−1),Plani,st) and kp,st = gp(E(ωst |It−1),Planp,st) where Plan
refers to some predetermined investment and production plans. In this way we actually have
pst = φt(E(ωst |It−1),Plani,st ,Planp,st). Since ki,st and kp,st is not predetermined, merely from
pst = φt(E(ωst |It−1),ki,st ,kp,st) and based on historical data of pst ,ki,st ,kp,st we can never know
a priori whether the proxy pst is really monotonic to E(ωst |It−1). Since we do not have the
knowledge about gi(·) and gp(·), we cannot infer the details of Plani,st and Planp,st and hence
cannot test a posteriori whether pst is a monotonic function of E(ωst |It−1).
Therefore, in SH we in fact can never assure that the selected proxy lncst is monotonic to
ϖst .
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1.E.2. Regarding “Markov” assumption
Even though we assume that pst is a monotonic function of E(ωst |It−1) and hence E(ωst |It−1)=
φ−1t (pst ,ki,st ,kp,st) holds, we still have the following problems. Under SH’s assumption that
ϖst = ρ(ϖst−1) we have E(ωst |It−1) = ρ [E(ωst−1|It−2)] in our notation. This means the agents
only form E(·|It) based on E(·|It−1) i.e. E(·|It) = ρ [E(·|It−1)] and never adjust the expectation
based on the realization of innovation in TFP observed in the last period. This is clearly not a
reasonable assumption.
Hence, it can hardly be true that ϖst = ρ(ϖst−1) as in SH.
1.E.3. Regarding “timing” assumption
Regardless of the reasonableness of ϖst = ρ(ϖst−1) assumption, we now check the timing of
the variables’ sequence in SH which is:
Period t−1 Period t Period t+1
... ⇒ yst−1 ⇒ E(ωst |It−1) ⇒ (ki,st ,kp,st) ⇒ pst ⇒ ωst ⇒ yst ⇒ E(ωst+1|It) ...
Under SH’s timing assumption, the TFP shock ωst realizes at last, after all other variables
except output (otherwise the proxy variable lncst should be a function of realized ωst rather
than the anticipated E(ωst |It−1)). This timing structure is obviously implausible.
1.E.4. Regarding “Markov” assumption
Perhaps when SH express “... ϖst is the part of the TFP shock anticipated in advance”, they
actually want to refer to ωst rather than E(ωst |It−1). However, using ωst does not improve the
plausibility of SH’s application of the ACF approach. Generally, in macroeconomic models
with the assumption that TFP shock ωst follows a first-order Markov process, we cannot write
ωst = ρ(ωst−1). In contrast, the true formulation of the process is ωst = E(ωst |It−1)+ ξst =
ρ˜(ωst−1)+ ξst (by noting that with Markov property the information set It−1 is ωst−1) where
ξst is the innovation to TFP, which is uncorrelated to (ki,st ,kp,st , pst).
In order to make SH’s argument working, it is required that ωst = ρ(ωst−1) for some certain
function ρ(·). But undoubtedly ωst 6= ρ˜(ωst−1) unless ξst = 0 ∀t (or likewise, ξst is a known
nonrandom function of some known variables) i.e. the whole TFP process is not stochastic.
This case is definitely not realistic. Even though we accept that the TFP process can be wholly
deterministic, we can never accept what is implied from this determinism. In the deterministic
case that ξst = 0 ∀t, we have ωst = E(ωst |It−1) = ρ(ωst−1) = ρ [ρ(ωst−2)] = ... = ρ t(ωs0).
Thus, (since the form of function ρ(·) can be estimated by some, for example nonparametric,
method) the whole path of TFP shock can be known as long as the initial value ωs0 or the value
ωst−n in a specific period is exactly measured. In this nonrandom circumstance, there is no
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reason why the econometrician cannot measure ωs0 or ωst−n and then get ωst directly (while
the government and private sector know it and adjust capital investment as a response).
Thereupon using the realized TFP shock ωst instead of E(ωst |It−1) in SH’s argument does
not help it work.
1.E.5. Short summary
Although we have not strictly proven the infeasibility of the application of ACF approach in
SH, we have shown logically that it stood on a set of unconvincing assumptions that should
be ruled out. The key problem is that in order to mitigate the endogeneity bias and estimate
the coefficients for (lnki,st , lnkp,st) directly, SH attempt to introduce the last period variables
(lncst−1, lnki,st−1, lnkp,st−1) to replace ϖst by assuming ϖst = ρ(ϖst−1) – but ϖst = ρ(ϖst−1)
does not depict the Markov process of TFP shock in a correct manner. (Even though assuming
that SH’s approach is without problem, we will face a difficulty to explain the regression result
since the time t − 1 capitals appear in the time t regression model. Thus, by construction
the capitals have one period lag impacts on production which make the definition of marginal
product ambiguous.)
In fact, if we tightly follow ACF’s original two-stage regression procedure (rather than
SH’s revised approach), it is still possible to get a relatively good estimator. However, we do
not do that because of the intrinsic charateristics of aggregate production function on which we
disscuss below. ACF (and several other relevant) approach was devised initially for firm-level
analysis. Since in firm-level production the inputs are often lumpy, it is much easier to find clear
timing structure and select suitable proxy. But in an aggregate economy the things differ. (1) At
macroeconomic level the input, output, investment and consumption happen every day. While
GDPmeasures a flow during a period interval, aggregate capitals which vary frequently are only
available in stock data at specific time points. So, using the start-of-the-year capital stock Kt
may underestimate the (average) input really utilized while using the end of year capital stock
Kt+1 (which is used in SH) may overestimate the real (average) input. A weighted average of Kt
and Kt+1 perhaps approximates the amount of input well but we do not know the proper weight.
(2) More importantly, the timing assumption of ACF approach requires that the selected proxy
variable should occur after the capital inputs were determined. There exist no such an aggregate
variable at all – the capital inputs actually vary all the year round. Thus, applying AFC method
restricts us to think the world in an unjustified way: aggregate capital stock is determined in one
specific moment and the proxy variable is produced after that. (3) Furthermore, we select to
use first differenced data to avoid spurious regression. The timing structure is disordered after
first differencing. Considering the reluctance of employing the method in aggregate production
model, we in practice do not fully rely on proxy variable to control for unobservable TFP shock.
We rely on the start-of-the-year capital stock as explanatory variable, and add time fixed effects
dummies. The details of our empirical approach are in Section 1.4.
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Appendix 1.F. Data source
We rely on the official data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China.
1.F.1. Capital
(1) Industry categorization
The infrastructure includes 4 industrial sectors: (i) production and supply of electricity, gas
and water, (ii) transport, storage and post, (iii) information, transmission, computer service
and software, (iv) management of water conservancy, environment, and public facilities. The
non-infrastructure contains all other industries except the abovementioned four infrastructure
industries. It is notable that we actually leave the investment in human capital (e.g. education
and health) and social administration (e.g. government) in the group of non-infrastructure.
Although these “social infrastructure” are different from the private capital, it is not necessary
to extract them as an independent category because (1) their capital stock size is really small,
and (2) the relevant information is implicitly utilized later when we adjust the level of labor by
human capital.
(2) Efficiency-adjusted investment flow
(i) Indicator selection The NBS reports three types of capital investment series that can
be used to construct capital stock data. One is “Gross Fixed Capital Formation”; another one
is “Total Investment in Fixed Assets”; the last one is “Newly Increased Fixed Assets”. We
follow Jin (2016) and Wang and Szirmai (2012) to use “Newly Increased Fixed Assets”, as
the definition of this statistical item is more consistent with what we need – the investment-
efficiency-adjusted capital investment flow data.
(ii) Available data We need the investment flow data of “Newly Increased Fixed As-
sets” for each single industry at province level, which is not fully reported by NBS. For each
province, NBS provides the total investment data for all industries as a whole. However, sep-
arately for each industry, NBS only reports a (major) part of the investment flow. (1) Mainly
used in the before-2003 statistics, by “Channel of Management” NBS divides the investment
into four types: “Capital Construction”, “Innovation”, “Real Estate Development”, and “Oth-
ers”. NBS only provides the data of “Newly Increased Fixed Assets” for the first two items
“Capital Construction” and “Innovation”, in China Statistical Yearbook 1994-2003. Although
these two items count for the major part (around 50%) of investment, we still need to estimate
the size of another two items “Real Estate Development” and “Others”. (2) Mainly used in
the after-2003 statistics, NBS groups the investment by “Urban Area” and “Rural Area”. NBS
only provides the data of “Newly Increased Fixed Assets” for “Urban Area”, in China Statisti-
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cal Yearbook 2004-2016. Although the “Urban Area” counts for the major part (around 90%)
of investment, we still need to estimate the size in “Rural Area”.
(iii) Estimating the missing data To estimate the missing part of the investment data at
industry level, we follow the approach in Jin (2016) by utilizing the reported data of “Newly
Increased Fixed Assets” for all industries as a whole in each province. (1) For the before-2003
statistics, we assume that in each industry, the ratio of total investment (as the sum of its four
sub-items) to the sum of its first two sub-items “Capital Construction” and “Innovation” is the
same. (Let us call it the “adjustment ratio”.) Hence, we calculate this ratio for all industries
as a whole, and then multiply the “Capital Construction” plus “Innovation” investment data
by this ratio to obtain the estimated total investment data for each single industry. (2) For the
after-2003 statistics, likewise, we assume that in each industry the ratio of total investment (as
the sum of urban and rural parts) to the investment in “Urban Area” is the same. Hence, we
calculate this ratio for all industries as a whole, and then multiply the “Urban Area” investment
by this ratio to obtain the estimated total investment of each industry.
The investment data is distributed in several kinds of statistical yearbooks. (a) The 1993-2002
investment data for “Capital Construction” and “Innovation” items and 2003-2015 data for
“Urban Area” at industry level is documented in China Statistical Yearbook 1994-2016. (b)
The data of “Newly Increased Fixed Assets” for all industries as a whole in year 1996-1998,
2002-2012, 2014-2015 is reported by Statistical Yearbook of the Chinese Investment in Fixed
Assets 1997-1999, 2003-2013, 2015-2016. This statistical yearbook series did not publish in
year 2000-2002 and 2014. The data of 1999 and 2000 can be found in China Real Estate Statis-
tics Yearbook 2000 and Report on the Chinese Investment in Fixed Assets 2001, respectively.
For the missing data of 2001 and 2013, we check the corresponding Statistical Yearbook of
each province and get the data of 18 provinces in 2001 and 20 provinces in 2013. (c) Now we
still lack the data for all provinces during 1993-1995 and some provinces in 2001 and 2013.
Since we only need the value of “adjustment ratio” which should not be volatile within a short
period, we can use the ratios in neighboring years to approximate. We use the ratio in 1996 to
approximate the value during 1993-1995. And we use the average of the ratio in the previous
and following year to approximate the value in 2001 and 2013.
(3) Investment efficiency
Because of the capital adjustment cost and waste, not all investment creates new capital. Since
“Newly Increased Fixed Assets” is a good measure of the efficiency-adjusted investment flow,
it is natural to calculate the investment efficiency through dividing “Newly Increased Fixed
Assets” by the amount of raw investment before efficiency-adjustment. The size of raw invest-
ment is measured by the statistical item of “Total Investment in Fixed Assets”.19 The ratio of
19Since NBS only reports the industry level “Newly Increased Fixed Assets” for the sub-item “Capital Con-
struction” plus “Innovation” in before-2003 data and for the sub-item “Urban Area” in after-2003 data, we also
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“Newly Increased Fixed Assets” to “Total Investment in Fixed Assets” is equal to the item “Rate
of Projects of Fixed Assets Completed and Put into Operation” reported by NBS. However,
direct using this rate to measure investment efficiency may have problem. The “Total Invest-
ment in Fixed Assets” reports the size of raw investment within the current period. While the
“Newly Increased Fixed Assets” measures the efficiency-adjusted investment that is completed
and put into operation in this period, the whole investment project may span several periods and
have been started before the current year. Thus, some of the “Newly Increased Fixed Assets”
may be the fruit of “Total Investment in Fixed Assets” in the past periods. Consequently, if the
investment has a sharp decline compared to last year, since some projects of the last period
are completed and put into work in this period the calculated investment efficiency would be
overestimated. Conversely, an abrupt growth of investment in a period tends to make the in-
vestment efficiency underestimated. Taking into account this problem, we use HP filter to get
the smooth trend of the estimated investment efficiency. This smoothed indicator better reflects
the investment efficiency over a long period.
(4) Capital price
NBS reports the price indices for investment in (i) “Construction and Installation”, (ii) “Pur-
chase of Equipment and Instruments”, (iii) “Others”, and calculates the “Price Index for Invest-
ment in Fixed Assets” as a weighted average of these three components. If infrastructure and
non-infrastructure have significantly different investment components, we should deflate them
using different price indices. Table 1.7 documents the investment components of infrastruc-
ture, non-infrastructure and all capitals as a whole based on the country-wide average during
2003-2015. It can be seen that the infrastructure has a higher share of building and lower share
of equipment, compared to non-infrastructure investment. However, the difference is actually
not large. In other words, the components of infrastructure and non-infrastructure are similar
to that of all capitals as a whole. Therefore, we can directly use the “Price Index for Investment
in Fixed Assets” for all capital types.
Table 1.7: Investment components of infrastructure and non-infrastructure
Investment component Building Equipment Others Estimated δ (a) Estimated δ (b)
All capitals 63.3% 21.1% 15.5% 9.4% 12.9%
Infrastructure 66.9% 17.6% 15.5% 9.1% 12.4%
Non-infrastructure 62.0% 22.4% 15.6% 9.5% 13.1%
Note: (1) The investment component data is based on the country-wide average during 2003-2015. (2)
“Estimated δ (a)” is based on the assumption that the depreciation rates of building, equipment and
others are 6.9%, 14.9%, 12.1%, respectively. “Estimated δ (b)” is based on the assumption that the
depreciation rates are 8%, 24%, 18%, respectively.
use the “Total Investment in Fixed Assets” data for these sub-items to calculate the investment efficiency.
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(5) Depreciation rate
The most debatable variable is the depreciation rate of capital. Wu (2009) briefly investigates
the literature and finds that “different rates of depreciation have been used, ranging from 3.6
to 17.0 per cent”. Essentially, the infrastructure may depreciate at a different rate than non-
infrastructure because they may have different capital components with dissimilar depreciation
rates. The column “Estimated δ (a)” of Table 1.7 calculates the depreciation rates based on
Zhang, Wu and Zhang (2004)’s assumption that the building, equipment and other capitals
have depreciation rates of 6.9%, 14.9%, 12.1%, respectively. The column “Estimated δ (b)”
calculates based on the assumption that building and machine’s depreciation rates are 8% and
24% (Bai, Hsieh and Qian, 2006) and other capitals have a rate of 18%. We see that though the
infrastructure has a lower rate than non-infrastructure, the difference is not large. This seem-
ingly contradicts what we discussed in Section 1.3.3 that the depreciation rate difference should
be substantial. However, we need to consider that the numbers of investment component shares
provided in Table 1.7 is only informative about the amount, rather than the property, quality
or utilization of infrastructure versus non-infrastructure. Especially it is possibe that the prop-
erty of infrastructure building makes it less depreciated than non-infrastructure building. For
instance, it is usual to find a bridge or road that was used for tens of years, rather than a house
in factory or ironworks. Furthermore, the maintenance spending on public capital can largely
extend the service life of infrastructure.
As a compromise between what we estimated in Table 1.7 and that discussed in Section
1.3.3, we choose a depreciation rate of 9.5% for non-infrastructure and 8% for infrastructure.
This selection is conservative. Later in the robustness check at Section 1.6.3, we also alter
our depreciation rates and redo our empirical procedure. The (not much different) results are
reported there.
1.F.2. Labor
Three different variables are usually used to represent the aggregate labor supply – population,
labor amount, and skill-adjusted labor amount. We follow Barro and Lee (2010) to calculate the
skill-adjusted labor amount. The formula is Lt = LABt ∗ADJt = (POPt ∗LABRATIOt) ∗ADJt
where Lt is the amount of skill-adjusted labor; LABt is raw labor amount; POPt is population;
LABRATIOt is the ratio of labor in population which is represented by fraction of people aged
15-64; ADJt is a coefficient used to adjust the labor according to the skill level. For POPt
we do not use the population data reported in China Statistical Yearbook directly. Instead, we
derive it by dividing nominal GDP by nominal GDP per capita as suggested in Li and Gibson
(2013). The data of LABRATIOt is easily calculated from China Population Statistics Yearbook
1994-2006 and China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook 2007-2016. Since there
are several unusual jumps in the LABRATIOt time series, which suddenly return to the original
trend in the following years and are obviously the result of sample error, we smooth the series
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by HP filter. We do not multiply the labor amount by employment rate because the reported
employment rate is often not regarded reliable.
It is assumed that ADJt =Φ(st) where st is a proxy variable for human capital. As in Barro
and Lee (2010), we use years of schooling of the worker st to proxy human capital, and we
further assume that Φ(st) = eθst . The parameter θ can be calculated from RS = LS ∗θ where
RS is the marginal rate-of-return to schooling and LS is share of labor in total output.
Chen and Hamori (2009), Zhu (2011) report the RS of 7%-8%, 9%-10% in China in recent
years. This magnitude is also supported by a series of research such as Ren and Miller (2012),
Zhang et al. (2005). Hence, we set RS=0.075. Admittedly, some studies (e.g. Li, Liu and
Zhang, 2012) report a lower level of RS around or even below 5%. We check the case of lower
RS, and find our estimation result is robust.
We also need to set the value of labor share parameter LS. It is widely found that the
labor share in China declined in recent decade, and is around 40%. Chi and Qian (2013),
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), Qian and Zhu (2012) among others discuss the associated
evidences. Following their findings, we set LS=0.4. Therefore we have θ=RS/LS=0.1875.
Of course it can be argued that the θ could be heterogeneous across different provinces, but
unfortunately we have no data about that and can only set it country-widely constant.
Figure 1.9 shows the average value of labor-skill-adjustment coefficients LABRATIOt ∗
ADJt and skill-adjustment coefficients ADJt for the eastern, central and western provinces. We
see that the labor markets in the three districts are obviously different. Both the labor-skill-
adjustment and skill-adjustment coefficients in the eastern provinces are highest. This is a
result of both highest labor proportion and most schooling years. The western provinces, with
the lowest level of labor ratio and schooling, have the smallest adjustment coefficients.
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Figure 1.9: Average skill-/labor-skill-adjustment coefficients for eastern, central and west-
ern provinces, 2003-2015
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Appendix 1.G. Evolution of K, Kg andY shares (as fraction of country-wide
sum) of eastern, central and western provinces, 1993-2015
A brief discussion on Figure 1.10 is at the end of Section 1.5.2.
Figure 1.10: Kg, K and Y shares of eastern, central and western provinces, 1993-2015
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Appendix 1.H. Test the monotonicity of proxy variable versus perceived
TFP shock
Figure 1.11 tests the assumed monotonicity between the (first differenced) proxy variable and
perceived TFP shock. The blue sample points plot the estimated ∆̂ωt = ϕ̂(zt)∆proxyt versus
∆proxyt . Clearly there is a monotonic negative correlation between proxy variable and esti-
mated TFP shock. Thus the use of proxy variable shows its merit to control for TFP shock.
Figure 1.11: Test the monotonicity of proxy variable vs. perceived TFP shock
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Appendix 1.I. Some supplementary support for our results in Section 1.6.2
Here we discuss some supplementary support for our argument that it is still desirable to invest
more in infrastructure in China.
1.I.1. Crowding-in effect of infrastructure investment
A potential criticism on our inference of underinvestment of infrastructure by comparing the
marginal products of capitals is that, we fail to fully consider the dynamic interaction of infras-
tructure and non-infrastructure investment. Public investment influences the private investment
mostly through two channels: first, the public investment could alter the productivities of rel-
evant industries and thus change the profitability of private investment; second, since public
investment also needs funds, it usually directly changes the financial conditions of private in-
vestment either by taxation or competing in capital market. In the previous part of this paper we
have already considered the marginal products of capitals and tax. But we assume the absence
of financial friction. Within this setup, an increase of one unit of money in public investment
accompanies the decrease of the exact amount of resource available for private investment (or
consumption, of course). But in reality when government competes with the private sector
in the capital market and tightens the budget of private investment, public investment tends to
crowd out private investment, as long as the improvement of productivity induced by more pub-
lic capital stock is not large enough to offset the deterioration of financial conditions. In China,
more than 80% of infrastructure investment is from governments or state-owned firms. And it
is widely observed that the banks in China rank the government-relevant investment as priority
when making loan decisions. So, it is serious to ask whether infrastructure investment crowds
out non-infrastructure investment in China. If the answer is true, our previous conclusion would
be suspect.
However, the empirical evidences support us. (i) The strongest support comes from the
results of SVAR analyses which directly find a net crowding-in effect of public infrastructure
investment. Using the country-wide annual data of 1980-2011, Xu and Yan (2014) suggest that
government investment in public goods and infrastructure in China crowds in private investment
significantly. Guo, Liu and Ma (2015) have similar finding based on an annual county-level
dataset for approximately 1800 Chinese counties over 2001-2009. Using quarterly data during
1995Q1–2009Q2, Hur, Mallick and Park (2014) find an increase of private investment both in
impact and long-run as a response to expansionary government expenditure shocks in China.
(ii) The indirect evidences concern a significant productivity enhancement in private sector by
investing infrastructure. For instance, Zhang, Wang and Chen (2013) based on an intertemporal
dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, show that higher infrastructure invest-
ment (financed by either foreign borrowing or production tax) substantially raises productivity
in all sectors and income in all household categories. Wu (2008), using stochastic frontier
approach, finds that capital efficiency (for all industries as a whole) is affected positively by
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the level of infrastructure development. (iii) We could also note the fact that the infrastructure
investmen in many less developed Chinese western provinces, where the infrastructure invest-
ment rate is relatively high while the private industries are less flourishing compared to the
eastern counterparts, is largely from the fiscal transfers by central government (with money
mostly originates from the eastern regions). This kind of infrastructure investment should have
no direct influence on the financial condition of, and thus should not crowd out local private
investment.
1.I.2. High return of capital in infrastructure-relevant firms
Another doubt on our finding perhaps comes from the impression of low efficiency of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. In recent years, more than 80% of investment of infras-
tructure industries comes from governments or state-owned firms. It is not unreasonable to
guess that the relatively less efficiency of SOEs possibly results in a low return of infrastruc-
ture investment, and thus contradicts our previous findings. But in contrast, we actually also
find firm-level evidence on our side. Ding, Guariglia and Knight (2012) investigate 2000-2007
data20 of over 100,000 firms. Amongst all 10 industries, they find the 2 infrastructure-relevant
sectors – electronic equipment industry and transport equipment industry – have the highest val-
ues of investment rate and “very high” return of capital (measured by both average and marginal
revenue product of capital). Although these two industries are mainly invested by governments
or SOEs, the inter-industrial efficiency difference crucially outweighs the average efficiency
gap between SOEs and other firms . (Admittedly, the efficiency disparity across industries may
be partially a result of market distortion – some economists warn that the government inter-
vention maintains the production cost (accounting rate of return) of several industries at an
artificially low (high) level. But inspecting this issue in detail is far beyond the scope of our
paper. Anyhow, at least we see that infrastruture investment indeed owns a high marginal return
of capital.)
20Using the data for more recent years could provide stronger support. But unfortunately, as far as we know
the corresponding dataset does not provide new data after 2009. In the dataset, only two (i.e. electronic and
transportation) of our previously defined infrastructure industries are documented. So we do not discuss another
two (i.e. telecommunication and water) infrastructural industries.
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Chapter 2
International financial liberalization and
decreased external public debt in
developing countries
This paper provides both empirical evidence and theoretical explanation that, international fi-
nancial liberalization was linked to the decrease of external public debt in developing countries
since the 1990s. It is often thought that financial globalization facilitates the international
borrowing of governments. However since the 1990s we have seen a significantly negative
comovement between increased financial globalization and decreased external public debt to
GDP ratio in developing countries. Using a panel dataset for 46 developing economies during
1990-2007, this paper empirically confirms that financial liberalization in the home country
was correlated with the retirement of external public debt. The estimated coefficient for fi-
nancial openness in other countries is not sufficiently robust. We rely on cointegrating regres-
sion methods of FMOLS and DOLS because of the nonstationarity (and cointegration) of the
relevant macroeconomic variables, which is often (incorrectly) ignored in previous empirical
works. Our estimation is robust as we carefully check different data sources, possible reverse
causality and omitted variable. We also provide a plausible theoretical argument why financial
liberalization can help reduce external public debt ratio. The main mechanism is that financial
globalization shrinks the interest rate differential between developing and advanced countries,
which reduces the government’s domestic financing cost and dampens its incentive to borrow
externally.
Keywords: financial liberalization, external public debt, developing countries, FMOLS, DOLS
JEL Classification: F34, F62, H63, N10, O50
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2.1 Introduction
Does financial globalization affect the public debt choice of a country? This is a practically
important question. On the one hand, government debt plays a role on both short-run busi-
ness cycle fluctuation (e.g. via country-specific interest rate premium) and long-run economic
development (e.g. via solvency of the public sector). On the other hand there are numerous
debates on the pros and cons of financial liberalization, which potentially affects every aspect
of the macroeconomy. This paper provides both empirical evidence and theoretical explana-
tion that public debt is indeed impacted by financial liberalization. We propose that the link
can be explained by the conventional demand and supply effect – the relative price of external
borrowing was changed by financial liberalization.
Over the past decades we have seen a significant rise of financial liberalization both in
advanced and developing countries.1 In developed economies that trend was especially accom-
panied with a raised government debt. Azzimonti, de Francisco and Quadrini (2014) (hence-
forth AFQ) among others provide empirical evidence and theoretical explanation for the link.
However, despite whether the literature offered sufficient arguments, the interesting thing is that
since the early 1990s such a positive comovement between public debt ratio and financial open-
ness disappeared. Even more surprisingly, if we focus on the developing countries we observe
a significantly decreased external (and total) public debt to GDP ratio.2 This phenomenon,
which is demonstrated by Figure 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 as below, cannot be explained by literature.
Our paper aims to inspect the relationship between financial globalization and public debt in
developing countries, and attempts to understand the underlying mechanism. (The domestic
public debt ratio only slightly increased since 1990s. Thus the whole public debt dynamics was
majorly driven by the change in external debt, see Figure 2.9 in Appendix 2.A.1. In this paper
we primarily focus on external public debt, and discuss domestic debt if necessary.)
1Throughout this paper we define “financial liberalization” in the international context, as the reverse to “capital
control”. In other words, the removal of any restriction on the international capital movement is considered as
financial liberalization. The terms of “capital account openness”, “financial openness”, “financial integration”,
“financial globalization” and “financial liberalization” all refer to the same thing in this paper. For the reduction
of restrictions on domestic financial system, we call it “financial development”. Financial liberalization is a
comprehensive concept which involves many aspects such as the management on exchange rate, international
capital inflow and outflow. Throughout the empirical part of this paper, financial liberalization is always measured
aggregatively by some certain de jure indicators.
2In fact, even for the sample of 22 OECD countries in AFQ’s study, except America the average public debt to
output ratio persistently declined (until 2008 crisis) after the peak around 1993. The literature review at Section
2.2.2 presents further discussion on AFQ paper.
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Figure 2.1: External public debt to GDP ratios in 46 developing countries using data from
two sources, 1970-2013
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Note: (1) Data sources are Panizza (2008) and WDI. (2) Weighted average is calculated using constant
2005 US dollar real GDP as weight. This holds throughout the whole paper, when “weighted average”
is mentioned.
Figure 2.2: Financial openness in 46 developing countries using data from three sources,
1970-2013
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Note: (1) Data sources are Chinn and Ito (2006), Ferna´ndez et al. (2015) and Abiad, Detragiache and
Tressel (2010). (2) FKRSU index is available only since 1995; ADT index gives the data for 1973-2005.
(3) The curves by ADT index are rescaled and shifted to improve its comparability with other two indices
in one figure. Figure 2.3 uses the rescaled curves as well.
67
Figure 2.3: Global financial openness using data from three sources, 1970-2013
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Fi
na
nc
ia
l o
pe
nn
es
s
Global financial openness
 
 
Financial openness
Financial openness - FKRSU
Financial openness - ADT
Financial openness (weighted)
Financial openness (weighted) - FKRSU
Financial openness (weighted) - ADT
Data source: Chinn and Ito (2006), Ferna´ndez et al. (2015) and Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2010).
Figure 2.1 displays the average external public debt ratios in 46 developing countries dur-
ing 1970-2013 using data from Panizza (2008) and World Development Indicators (WDI).34
Focusing on the period 1990-2007, the declining trend of external debt is obvious according to
both data sources.5 Figure 2.2 shows the de jure measurement of capital account openness in
3Similar figures, covering similar samples, about the dynamics of external debt ratio can also be found at e.g.
Figure 16.1 in Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2013), Figure 2 in UNCTAD (2015). In literature there are
three definitions for external (and correspondingly, domestic) public debt. (1) The first is based on the place of
issuance and the legislation that regulates the debt (i.e. external debt is debt issued in and under the jurisdiction
of foreign countries). Panizza (2008) data takes this definition. (2) The second is based on the residence of the
creditor (i.e. external debt is debt held by foreigners). WDI data uses this definition. (3) In the third definition
currency is the criterion (i.e. external debt is foreign currency debt). Data shows that the amount of external debts
defined based on the first and second definition are highly consistent.
4We would like to mention two points about the sample. (1) We select the set of developing countries simulta-
neously covered by Panizza (2008) public debt dataset, Chinn-Ito capital account openness dataset, and FKRSU
capital control dataset. We define “developing countries” as the countries not included in the list of “Advanced
Economies” in World Economic Outlook: Adjusting to Lower Commodity Prices by IMF, October 2015. We also
intentionally exclude some extremely debted, or petroleum exporting countries because they are outliers. The list
of sample countries is at Appendix 2.C.1. (2) A significant part of the data before 1990 is unavailable but we still
calculate the average value using the remaining samples. Admittedly, the curves before and after 1990 are not
completely comparable because of the sample difference. However the basic dynamics of the variables should be
clearly seen.
5It is notable that in the same period there existed some international debt reliefs, mainly through the Heav-
ily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), for some highly
indebted poor countries. Thus we need to concern whether the external debt declines in some countries were
partially artificial as the result of debt relief. But the data shows that debt relief only counts for a small fraction of
debt reduction, and further econometric analysis finds excluding some high debt relief countries does not alter our
estimation result.
The data shows that average annual debt relief counts for less than 0.6% as simple average and 0.1% as weighted
average of the GDP in our sample developing countries. (For more details about the debt relief please refer to the
Figure 2.10 in Appendix 2.A.2.) Thus the debt relief is not the major reason of the large decline of external debt as
observed in data. In the robustness analysis part in Section 2.3.3.2 we conduct the analysis excluding the countries
with high debt relief ratio, and the basic result does not change.
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those countries based on three data sources: Chinn and Ito (2006) (Chinn-Ito) capital account
openness index, Ferna´ndez et al. (2015) (FKRSU) capital control index and the measurement
of international capital flow liberalization by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2010) (ADT).
All indicators demonstrate a significant increase of financial openness. Figure 2.3 demon-
strates the average level of global financial openness approximated by the average value over
77 economies around the world.6 We see from the figure that before the 2008 financial crisis
there was a persistent growth of global financial openness.7 Combining Figure 2.1, 2.2 and
2.3, we can clearly see a negative comovement between external public debt ratio and financial
globalization during 1990-2007.
However these figures are not sufficient to assert a definite relationship between the global
financial liberalization and the dynamics of external debt, since the change of external debt
depends on both demand and supply sides of international capital flows. Intuitively, financial
globalization can both positively and negatively alter the international borrowing of govern-
ments. (1) With global financial liberalization it is easier to borrow from other countries (and
the interest rate in developed countries are often lower than that in developing countries), thus
the governments of developing countries would have incentive to hold more external public
debt if they need. (2) Financial liberalization can potentially promote (or hinder in some cases)
the growth of developing countries, and provide more channels to receive international capital
besides external public debt, thus external public debt ratio could decline. Furthermore, we
need to clearly distinguish between the financial liberalization within the “home country” and
in other countries. As discussed in AFQ, whether the government in one country can borrow
from foreigners is directly influenced by the financial openness in other countries. But the
financial liberalization within one country can have indirect effects on the willingness and ca-
pacity of external debt accumulation of its government. Therefore in our empirical analysis we
explore both of the financial liberalization in and out of each country.
Our econometric analysis finds strong evidence that financial liberalization negatively af-
fects the external public debt in developing countries. The estimated coefficients are robust as
we carefully check different data sources, possible reverse causality and omitted variable. In
contrast to the empirical finding of AFQ, we do not see robustly significant effect of financial
openness in foreign countries. After the econometric analysis we further provide a plausible
theoretical explanation why financial liberalization can help reduce external public debt ratio.
The main mechanism is that financial globalization shrinks the interest rate differential be-
tween developing and advanced countries, which reduces the government’s domestic financing
cost and dampens its incentive to borrow externally. The simulation of our theoretical model
6Besides the 46 developing countries aforementioned, most of the other samples among the 77 countries are
developed economies. And the 77-countries group counts for roughly 95% of global GDP and thus is a good
approximation of the whole world.
7A strange point is that, according to FKRSU data there is a sudden decline of global financial openness in
2005. But before that year the overall trend is increasing. In this paper we measure the financial liberalization
mainly based on the Chinn-Ito index, since it provides data during a longer period compared to the FKRSU and
ADT data.
69
generates results consistent with the stylized facts about the developing countries’ public debt
dynamics since the 1990s.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents a brief literature review. Sec-
tion 2.3 provides the core empirical evidence for the financial globalization and external public
debt nexus. Section 2.4 discusses intuitively how foreign-domestic interest rate differential can
be a possible reason why financial liberalization dampens external public debt. A theoretical
model formalizing this plausible mechanism is presented in Section 2.5. Finally Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 Literature review
This paper is mainly related to two streams of literature: the determinants of public debt, and the
macroeconomic consequences of financial globalization. There is a huge amount of literature
on the single topic of financial liberalization or public debt. But few of them intentionally
combine these two topics together.
2.2.1 Empirical literature
Based on the selection of dependent variable in regression analysis, relevant empirical literature
can be roughly divided into 3 groups. They investigate whether financial liberalization influ-
ences public debt component, fiscal deficit, size or growth of debt, respectively. The findings
are controversial.
Forslund, Lima and Panizza (2011) estimate the determinants of the composition of public
debt in 95 developing countries during 1994-2006. (Our current paper will utilize the same
dataset as they used.) In their result the fraction of domestic debt in total public debt is posi-
tively influenced by the existence of capital controls. However, the fraction of domestic debt is
the result of variation in both domestic debt and external debt. If we consider the domestic and
external debt separately (see Figure 2.9 in Appendix 2.A.1), we find that since the 1990s the
domestic public debt to output ratio increased but slightly, while the external pubic debt ratio
declined dramatically – it is actually the dynamics of external public debt rather than domestic
debt which is more important. (Moreover, their finding about capital control may need to be
reexamined as they do not take into account the nonstationarity of data, which may generate
largely biased estimation.)
In a sample of 94 countries for 1970-2010, Vuletin (2013) finds that capital controls, in the
form of dual exchange rate regimes, induce higher fiscal deficits. In line with this finding, we
may guess that capital liberalization helps reduce fiscal deficit and then the public debt. But as
that study is specific to dual exchange rate regime, perhaps the situation is different when we
consider more general forms of capital controls.
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Opposite findings exist in the literature. Arcalean (2017) finds that, in a sample of OECD
countries during 1980-2007, financial openness in other countries tends to increase fiscal deficits
in these OECD countries. But financial liberalization in the home country does not have any
significant effect. Investigating a sample covering 35 countries between 1993 and 2010, the
results by Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler (2007) suggest that countries with more capi-
tal account openness have lower domestic currency government bond to GDP ratio, but higher
foreign currency bond to GDP ratio and total government bond ratio. Liu and Sun (2016) em-
ploys a dataset for 206 subnational governments from 31 countries between 2004 and 2010.
They find that financial openness positively impacts the size of subnational obligations in de-
veloping countries. The findings of these three papers may not be used to answer our research
question because the subject and sample they studied are quite different. Arcalean (2017)
works on OECD countries while we focus on developing economies. Claessens, Klingebiel
and Schmukler (2007) also have a sample majorly including developed countries; and they
focus on government bond which counts for a minor fraction (roughly 20%-30%) within de-
veloping countries’ external public debt. Liu and Sun (2016) take a sample of subnational
governments. As remarked in their paper, most local governments included in that study are
capital cities or major economic centers of the country which may have special charateristics,
and the subnational-level government debt may not reflect the situation of aggregate or central
government debt. Moreover, they use 2004-2010 data where the 2008 financial crisis is just
located in between.
Agnello and Sousa (2015) use dummy variables to represent the re-regulation or liberaliza-
tion of international capital flows. In a sample of 89 countries over 1973-2005, they analyze
the (in)existence of impact on public debt growth rate. What they find is a “ratchet effect”: cap-
ital flow re-regulation contributes to a decline in public debt growth but liberalization does not
show a significant effect. As their sample is a mixture of advanced and developing countries,
and they do not distinguish external debt from total debt, it is unclear how their study helps
answer our research question.
Besides its theoretical explanation, the AFQ paper also provides empirical evidence that
global financial liberalization promotes the aggregate public debt growth in 22 OECD coun-
tries. But it seems that the findings are mainly driven by the data in the late 1980s and early
1990s. If we divide AFQ’s full sample of 1973-2005 into 3 subsample periods (1973-1983,
1984-1994, 1995-2005) and run the regression for each subsample using their econometric
model in the paper, we find that the coefficient for global capital mobility is insignificant for
both periods 1973-1983 and 1995-2005 (see Table 2.7 in Appendix 2.B for details). We also
collect the data for all 34 OECD countries during period 1993-2007 and run the regression (de-
tails not reported). That coefficient is again robustly insignificant. Thus the theory discussed
in AFQ, which claims a positve correlation between financial globalization and government
debt, loses its power after the early 1990s. A possible explanation is that AFQ’s theory mainly
states the situation of transition from financial autarky to financial openness, but in the early
71
1990s the financial liberalization was already at a high stage (which is around 0.8 measured by
Chinn-Ito capital account openness index). The development from high financial openness to
somehow higher openness does not make large change – after the 1980s the external financing
constraint of government was already sufficiently loose. Another possibility is that AFQ check
the degree of global financial liberalization but neglect the financial liberalization in the home
country, which may have strong or even dominant indirect effect.8 So, in order to investigate
whether the period since the 1990s is really special or AFQ theory has a problem, we turn
to consider the developing economies who were still at low openness in the early 1990s and
then became largely more open later on. We also distinguish between domestic and external
financial liberalization explicitly.
2.2.2 Theoretical literature
Financial liberalization can influence the willingness of government to borrow abroad. AFQ
theoretically show that financial globalization can contribute to the increase in public debt of
OECD countries. The key mechanism is as below. In the economy there are two types of agents
– workers and entrepreneurs. Workers who earn wage income are unable to hold assets or bor-
row, but entrepreneurs who face up to idiosyncratic production shock have access to financial
market by holding government bond. Since the population of workers is larger, the govern-
ment mainly cares about workers’ welfare. The government employs public debt to fund the
lump-sum transfers to workers. In financial autarky both workers and entrepreneurs support the
existence of a positive government debt, because the equilibrium interest rate is below the in-
tertemporal discount rate such that government’s borrowing improves workers’ lifetime utility,
and entrepreneurs can earn interest revenue and use financial asset to insure against the idiosyn-
cratic risk. When international asset markets are highly integrated, the elasticity of domestic
interest rate to government debt is small since the world interest rate equates. Compared to
financial autarky, in an integrated world workers want the government to borrow more because
the less elastic interest rate is still below the intertemporal discount rate. Although the domestic
entrepreneurs do not prefer a public debt increase since the benefit of interest revenue is shared
with foreign entrepreneurs, the government will still raise public debt because workers’ utility
has a larger weight. Financial liberalization can also influence the fiscal performance of gov-
ernment in a political-economic framework. Arcalean (2017) shows that financial liberalization
may result in strong tax competition, which leads to a fiscal deficit bias. This can further cause
high public debt. Both of AFQ and Arcalean (2017) work in the context of OECD countries
and try to explain the observed debt increase in these countries. What they attempt to explain is
in contrast to the trend of both decreased external and total public debt in developing countries.
8AFQ actually have talked about the possibility that “domestic liberalization can still affect domestic issuance
through an indirect channel”. But what they considered is whether in computing the global liberalization index
we should exclude the country of reference. This is different from our study as we consider the liberalization in
the home country as an independent explanatory variable, rather than just a part of world liberalization index.
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There exits a theoretical literature which argues along the reverse direction. In addition to
the empirical evidence, Vuletin (2013) uses a political-economic model to show that capital
controls, under dual exchange rate regimes, induce higher fiscal deficits. This is because the
government obtains utility from fiscal expenditure, which is easier under dual exchange rate
system. This implies that, ceteris paribus, capital controls (financial liberalization) would tend
to increase (reduce) the government debt level. But there are two weaknesses if we would like to
directly use similar model to explain empirical finding: (i) in the political-economic framework
the result is sensitive to the assumption on government’s preference; (ii) fiscal deficit is directly
linked to the level of total government debt but not the interaction between domestic debt and
external debt.
Reverse causality between public debt and financial liberalization can also exist. Aizenman
and Guidotti (1994) show that when public debt ratio is already high, it could be welfare-
improving to impose capital controls since they reduce tax collection cost. In this case, a high
(low) public debt ratio may induce capital controls (financial liberalization).
All in all, existing empirical and theoretical literature does not supply enough explanation
for the observed negative comovement between financial liberalization and external debt ratio
in developing countries. Regarding our research purpose, there are mainly four weaknesses in
previous literature. (1) The focus is not on the sample of developing countries. (2) The obvious
nonstationarity of data is not taken into account in the empirical analysis. (3) The literature does
not distinguish between domestic and external public debt, which may be important because of
potential tradeoff. (4) The effects of financial liberalization in home countries and in foreign
countries are not investigated in a common framework. We will avoid these weaknesses in our
study.
2.3 Empirical evidence
In this section, we formally demonstrate the empirical evidence that financial globalization was
linked to reduce external public debt. We will start from a simple linear regression model to
show that OLS estimation suffers from spurious regression problem, as the key variables are
nonstationary. Then we take some first differenced models from literature, which avoid the spu-
rious regression, to confirm that financial liberalization indeed matters for external public debt.
After that we check the existence of cointegration relationship among variables, and finally
report our estimations using FMOLS and DOLS cointegrating regressions and the associated
robustness analysis. Besides the core explanatory variables regarding financial liberalization,
our empirical analysis will take into account a relatively large set of control variables. In a
nutshell we will show that even though we change different model specifications and variables,
the claimed negative correlation between financial openness and external public debt ratio in
the developing world is not shaken.
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Our empirical analysis will utilize the data from many different sources. Regarding the
public debt data, we primarily use the dataset provided by Panizza (2008). We also use the
external public debt data from WDI for robustness check. For the indicator of of financial
liberalization, we take the Chinn-Ito capital account openness index as the primary data source
because it covers longer period and is widely used in literature. The data of (one minus) FKRSU
capital control index and (rescaled) ADT financial liberalization index are also relied on to
check the robustness. An advantage of using these de jure, rather than de facto, indicators is
that they are less sensitive to business cycle fluctuations and thus less suffered from endogeneity
problem. Because of the data availability from different datasets and for some other control
variables, we finally extract the data of an unbalanced panel covering 46 developing countries
during 1990-2007.
2.3.1 Model specification and variable
The baseline model specification is:
EDit = β1FinanOpenit +β2FinanOpenW it +θ ′X it + si+σt + εit (2.1)
where the dependent variable EDit is the public external debt to output ratio in country i at
period t. Among the regressors, FinanOpenit is the level of financial openness; FinanOpenW it
is the degree of worldwide financial liberalization i.e. the weighted average level of financial
openness over all other countries9; and Xit is a vector of control variables. We as well include
the time effect σt and section effect si. The error term εit is assumed exogenous and i.i.d.
By construction, the larger values of FinanOpenit and FinanOpenW it mean higher financial
openness i.e. less capital control. The vector of control variables Xit contains the indicators in
five aspects. (In fact, not all of these potentially relevant control variables would be used in our
baseline regression. The sample size of our highly unbalanced panel data and the fact that some
variables are I(1) but others are stationary, only allow us to contain part of these nonstationary
variables within the framework of FMOLS and DOLS cointegrating regression. For the list of
selected variables, see Table 2.2 which we will discuss later. The remaining variables would be
used in robustness analysis.10) Below we discuss these regressors briefly. The details about the
variable definition, data source and summary statistics are documented in Appendix 2.C.
9Since the main lenders to developing countries are those developed countries, we may construct FinanOpenW
only using the degree of financial openness in the developed world. We checked this possibility, and found that
our estimation results in this paper are robust to this alternative definition of FinanOpenW .
10Since some of the remaining control variables are stationary, putting them in the cointegration regressions
for robustness analysis may have problem. But this does not really matter, because we focus on the estimated
coefficients for financial liberalization rather than those control variables.
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(1) Public finance considerations
We first take into account the aspects of public finance including government domestic debt
to output ratio and fiscal balance (% of GDP) – [DD, FiscalBalance]. Government domestic
liability is a crucial control variable since government usually borrows both domestically and
abroad. Government budget balance indicates whether the government needs money and thus
directly affects public debt.
(2) General economic conditions
We consider the variables of logarithmic GDP per capita, M2 to GDP ratio, inflation, real inter-
est rate, interest rate in the rest of world, gross fixed capital formation rate (% of GDP), domes-
tic saving rate, and the occurence of economic and financial crisis in history – [GDPpc, M2,
In f lation, IR, IRrow, CapForm, SaveRate, Crisis]. Definitely, ceteris paribus an increased
GDP would reduce the external debt to GDP ratio. Moreover, the demand of external financing
may be different at the distinct stage of economic development. M2 ratio is related to both eco-
nomic growth and credibility of government policy, which are both relevant to external public
debt. Inflation could have similar influence. Domestic and world interest rate jointly determine
the burden of interest payment of public debt, which affects the willingness and ability of gov-
ernment to retire debt. Capital formation rate indicates whether capital investment is crucial in
the economy, which further indicates the demand for public financing. Domestic saving rate
indicates the intensity of the economies’ internal financing, which can be expected negatively
related to external debt. The history of crisis largely indicates the government’s ability of debt
repayment, which affects both the demand and supply sides of public borrowing.
(3) External payment variables
In this set we add the variables of trade balance (% of GDP), current account balance (% of
GDP), and real effective exchange rate index (2010 = 100) – [TradeBalance, CurrAcct, ER].
These three variables are directly associated with international capital flow. We expect the
estimated coefficients are negative for the first two, because they indicate the inflow of capital.
The coefficient for exchange rate is also expected to be negative, since the external debt is
majorly denominated by foreign currency while output is initially measured by local currency
– thus ceteris paribus an appreciation of domestic currency directly reduces the external debt
to GDP ratio. Moreover, exchange rate is related to several other key macroeconomic variables
and hence may have some important indirect effects on debt.
(4) Institutional and demographic characteristics
This set of control variables contains the legal institutional quality, age dependency ratio and
type of exchange rate regime – [Legal, DepenRatio, ERR]. A good quality of legal institu-
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tion may enhance the fiscal discipline and reputation of government. This can affect both the
demand and supply side of external debt. Different age dependency ratios represent distinct
demographic cohort structures, which influence the policy priority (such as pension) of govern-
ments. Exchange rate regime is potentially important since it influences both the fluctuation of
exchange rate and the implementation of capital control.
(5) Other variables linked to financial liberalization
Financial development and economic openness may be both tightly linked to financial liber-
alization. In the robustness analysis section we would like to check whether these two as-
pects change the relationship between financial globalization and government debt. We take
two indicators, one comprehensive index and one de facto indicator, for each of the aspects –
[FinanDev, Credit, Globaliz, TradeOpen] where FinanDev is the Svirydzenka (2016) finan-
cial development index;Credit is private credit by deposit money banks (% of GDP); Globaliz
is the KOF globalization index (Dreher, 2006); TradeOpen is the trade openness measured by
import plus export (% of GDP).
2.3.2 Econometric issues
Before we lay out our formal regression analysis, let us first consider several potential econo-
metric issues. We first check the nonstationarity of variables and confirm that spurious regres-
sion would exist if we directly use OLS estimator. Then we test whether these nonstationary
variables are cointegrating. If cointegration relation exists, we can use the FMOLS and DOLS
regression.
2.3.2.1 Nonstationarity and spurious regression
From a perspective of econometrics, both the variables of financial openness and external debt
ratio are nonstationary since they have clear trends. Then the seemingly negative correlation
as shown in Figure 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 may be just a “spurious regression”. Table 2.1 illustrates
the spurious regression problem regarding our variables. The formal test of nonstationarity is
discussed after that.
Spurious regression and preliminary analysis
Suppose that we naively put different variables together and run the OLS regression according
to baseline model (2.1), we will obtain the results in column (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) whose fi-
nancial liberalization variable is based on the Chinn-Ito, FKRSU and ADT index, respectively.
The control variable set X contains [DD, GDPpc, M2, CapForm, TradeBalance]. We see that
the estimated coefficients for FinanOpen are significantly negative. But we find the adjusted
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R2 is greatly larger than the value of Durbin-Watson statistic. This indicates the existence of
spurious regression. Thus we should not directly use model (2.1) without revision. In model
(1.4) we check the regression taking EDShare, the share of external debt in total public debt, as
dependent variable. This aims to compare with the result in Forslund, Lima and Panizza (2011)
where the dependent variable is the share of domestic debt (1−EDshare). Our estimation gen-
erates negative coefficients for financial integration again, but still subject to obvious spurious
regression problem.
Taking first difference on these variables (if they are I(1) processes) is able to make them
stationary. Column (1.6) is based on the first differenced one period lagged data with the
time-fixed effect model:
∆EDit = β1∆FinanOpeni,t−1+β2∆FinanOpenW i,t−1+θ ′∆X i,t−1+σt + εit (2.2)
where ∆ refers to the first differencing operator. In model (1.7) we also try a regression speci-
fication similar to that in AFQ:
EDgrit = β1∆FinanOpeni,t−1+β2∆FinanOpenW i,t−1 (2.3)
+α1EDi,t−1+α2EDSharei,t−1+α3GDPgri,t−1+θ ′∆Xi,t−1+ si+σt + εit
where EDgr is the growth rate of real public external debt stock (measured by constant 2005
US dollar) and GDPgr is the growth rate of real GDP. In model (1.8) we use dummy variables
to indicate the policy changes on financial openness. We regress according to a specification
similar to that in Agnello and Sousa (2015):
EDgrit = β1Regulationi,t−1+β2Liberalizationi,t−1+β3∆FinanOpenW i,t−1 (2.4)
+α1EDgri,t−1+α2GDPgri,t−1+θ ′∆Xi,t−1+ si+σt + εit
where Regulation and Liberalization are dummy variables such that
Regulation= 1, Liberalization= 0 if ∆FinanOpen< 0
Regulation= 0, Liberalization= 0 if ∆FinanOpen= 0
Regulation= 0, Liberalization= 1 if ∆FinanOpen> 0
and the last period value of EDgr enters the equation to capture the pesistence of external debt
growth. Similar to the model in level data, the estimated coefficients for home country financial
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liberalization FinanOpen in these first differenced models (1.6) - (1.8) are still negative. How-
ever, a disadvantage of taking first difference is that it may destroy the long-run relationship
among variables. In this case model (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) are not fully reliable for our research
purpose.
A useful alternative methodology is Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. It ex-
plicitly highlights both the long-run relationship and the short-run adjustment in the process.
Its validity is ensured no matter the variables are I(1) or I(0). Model (1.5) gives the estima-
tion result based on a simple ARDL regression where we select both 1 lag for the dependent
variable and dynamic regressors. The estimated coefficient for FinanOpen is still significantly
negative. But in practice on our data, a problem emerges when we use ARDL model: the
regressor matrix is easy to be nearly singular when financial openness variable is contained
(perhaps because the index for financial openness is often constant for several sequential years
in some countries, which makes the first differenced terms contained in ARDL framework have
many zero elements). When more control variables are introduced, this “near singular matrix”
problem is more severe. This phenomenon prevents us from using ARDL for more analysis.
Panel unit root test
Table 2.2 presents the panel unit root test result for variables of public external debt to GDP
ratio, index of financial openness, and other relevant variables. Since we have a sample with a
relatively large amount of sections where the cross-section heterogeneity would be important,
we include an individual intercept and trend in test equation. Lag length is selected automat-
ically based on Schwarz information criterion. Using other criteria would either give similar
result or more strongly support the nonstationarity of most variables. In the table we report
the results of 4 statistic tests: the Breitung t-, IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin)W -, ADF-Fisher χ2-
and PP-Fisher χ2-Statistic. Intentionally, the LLC (Levin, Lin and Chu) and Hadri test are not
relied on because they are not informative for our sample, as LLC almost always rejects the
unit root and Hadri always rejects the stationarity null hypothesis for almost all variables. It is
notable that given our relatively short sample period of 18-years , the power of unit root tests
may not be sufficiently strong. But the phenomenon of nonstationarity in most variables is
already clear.
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Table 2.1: Illustration of the spurious regression, ARDL and first differenced model
Spurious regression ARDL First differenced model
Baseline FKRSU ADT EDShare ED ∆ED EDgr EDgr
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8)
FinanOpen -0.058** -0.101*** -0.042 -0.050*** -0.242*** ∆FinanOpent−1 -0.090*** -0.141*
FinanOpenW 5.472* 6.827** -1.453 -2.146 0.725*** ∆FinanOpenWt−1 -4.933 -12.666 -6.987
DD 0.268*** 0.216*** 0.296*** -0.569*** 0.070 ∆DDt−1 0.074
GDPpc -0.392*** -0.595*** -0.369*** -0.285*** -0.274*** ∆GDPpct−1 -0.299***
M2 0.317*** 0.315*** 0.285*** 0.206*** ∆M2t−1 -0.100* -0.247 -0.189
CapForm 0.139 0.299* 0.523*** 0.361*** ∆CapFormt−1 -0.072 -0.002 -0.560
TradeBalance 0.683*** 0.606*** 0.819*** 0.328*** ∆TradeBalancet−1 -0.029 -0.480 -0.551
EDt−1 -0.370***
EDSharet−1 -0.197**
EDgrt−1 -0.058
GDPgrt−1 -0.965*** -0.861***
Regulationt−1 0.001
Liberalizationt−1 -0.049**
Other control var. No No No No No Other control var. Yes Yes Yes
Sample period 90-07 95-07 90-05 90-07 91-07 Sample period 92-07 92-07 92-07
Cross-sections 46 46 40 46 25 Cross-sections 46 46 46
Observations 746 562 597 746 372 Observations 562 564 568
Adjusted R2 0.846 0.863 0.785 0.916 - Adjusted R2 0.270 0.289 0.228
Durbin-Watson stat. 0.517 0.676 0.474 0.432 - Durbin-Watson stat. 1.990 2.039 2.006
Note: (1) */**/*** indicates the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively. (2) In order to avoid “near singular matrix” problem in the ARDL regression, we exclude 21
sample countries which have relatively small variation of financial openness level (i.e. if the standard deviation of FinanOpen during 1990-2007 is smaller than the mean value
over the full sample 46 countries). The regressors [M2,CapForm, TradeBalance] are not included for the same reason. (3) Compared to the elements in control variable vector
X of model (1.1) - (1.4), in order to improve the regression fitness in the vector ∆X of model (1.6) - (1.8) we additionally put (original level or first differenced value of) all other
control variables [∆FiscalBalance, In f lation, ∆IRrow, ∆SavRate, Crisis, CurrAcct, Legal, ∆DependRatio, ERR] mentioned in section 2.3.1 except exchange rate index ER
and domestic interest rate IR. Exchange rate and interest rate are not included to avoid collinearity and endogeneity problem, since they are highly correlated to several other
control variables and reversely affected by dependent variable. Nonstationary variables are first differenced to obtain stationarity; other stationary control variables are directly
used in levels.
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Table 2.2: Panel unit root tests for regression variables
Variable
Test Statistics
I(1)
Included in
Baseline
Regression?Breitung IPS Fisher-ADF Fisher-PP
Dependent variable:
ED -0.55 -2.93** 140.55*** 86.38
√ √
Key explanatory variables:
FinanOpen -2.08* -0.03 80.95 84.44
√ √
FinanOpenW 1.26 -9.50*** 232.17*** 115.26
√ √
Public finance considerations:
DD 1.57 -1.81* 139.25** 113.22
√ √
FiscalBalance 0.94 -1.59 126.79** 120.27*
√
General economic conditions:
GDPpc 2.52 -1.97* 128.82** 80.93
√ √
M2 5.70 0.33 117.20* 111.19
√ √
In f lation -1.64 -6.15*** 209.38*** 261.10***
IR -3.73*** -10.06*** 248.02*** 314.48***
IRrow -5.20*** 3.93 28.78 34.13
√
CapForm -0.50 -2.29* 131.88** 88.10
√ √
SaveRate 3.20 -1.63 118.90* 116.46*
√
Crisis -12.65*** -11.87*** 257.08*** 312.73***
External payment variables:
TradeBalance -0.12 -1.73* 109.33 101.62
√ √
CurrAcct 0.02 -4.93*** 175.42*** 189.24***
ER -1.18 -2.22* 80.73* 68.66
√
Institutional and demographic characteristics:
Legal -4.42*** -6.77*** 186.36*** 150.32***
DependRatio 4.03 2.18 142.04*** 68.95
√
ERR -3.06** -6.31*** 165.45*** 88.08
Further control variables for robustness analysis:
FinanDev -2.26* -3.66*** 143.52*** 155.21***
Credit 9.05 1.32 123.78* 61.74
√
Globaliz 2.79 -2.50** 139.05** 151.49***
TradeOpen 2.56 -0.91 108.39 103.40
√
Note: (1) */**/*** indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 5%/1%/0.1% signif-
icance level, respectively. (2) In column “I(1)”, “
√
” refers to the case that this variable is integrated
of order 1. Nonstationarity is judged by the criterion that at least 2 out of 4 tests do not reject unit root
hypothesis. (3) The column “Included in Baseline Regression?” documents the list of variables which
are included in the baseline regressions in Table 2.1, 2.4 and 2.5.
Considering that sometimes different tests indicate distinct consequences, we judge whether
the variable is stationary depending on whether at least 3 out of the 4 nonstationarity tests reject
unit root hypothesis. As clearly seen in Table 2.2, most of the variables listed in the table
cannot be regarded as stationary.11 If we test the first differenced series of the variables (not
11Some variables, such as ED, DD and FiscalBalance, should not be nonstationary in economic sense – other-
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shown in the table), we would find all variables are stationary after first differencing. Thus all
the nonstationary variables are I(1), as documented by the column “I(1)” in the table. This
property enables us to implement analysis for possible cointegration.
2.3.2.2 Cointegration
Now we test whether the I(1) variables have cointegration relationship. Given our sample size,
it is infeasible to put all the nonstationary variables listed in Table 2.2 into a single large group
for panel cointegration test. Thus we split them into five (overlapped) groups, and each time
only test the cointegration for one group. The first to fifth group contains the elements of [ED,
FinanOpen, FinanOpenW , DD, GDPpc], [ED, FinanOpen, FinanOpenW , M2, CapForm],
[FinanOpenW , DD,M2,CapForm, TradeBalance], [ED, FinanOpen, FiscalBalance, IRrow,
SaveRate] and [ED, ER, DependRatio, Credit, TradeOpen], respectively. Table 2.3 demon-
strates the results of cointegration test.
Table 2.3: Cointegration tests for groups of variables
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test
Weighted Statistic
Panel v-Statistic -3.07 -2.68 -2.40 -2.14 -5.31
Panel rho-Statistic 5.91 6.02 6.09 5.99 5.99
Panel PP-Statistic -2.90** -2.81** -3.45*** -5.63*** -9.30***
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.99*** -5.95*** -10.23*** -6.57*** -11.72***
Group rho-Statistic 7.91 8.29 8.67 8.43 7.80
Group PP-Statistic -6.79*** -5.18*** -6.56*** -10.67*** -21.63***
Group ADF-Statistic -5.74*** -5.66*** -12.08*** -6.99*** -13.31***
Kao Residual Cointegration Test
t-Statistic
ADF -4.46*** -2.54** -35.96*** -2.60** -1.39
Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Fisher Statistic (from trace test)
None 234.5*** 218.9*** 223.0*** 147.0*** 255.7***
At most 1 1179*** 1087*** 1202*** 488.7*** 1274***
At most 2 710.6*** 671.5*** 779.6*** 358.4*** 962.1***
At most 3 916.5*** 817.1*** 890.1*** 945.4*** 1313***
At most 4 170.0*** 153.5*** 175.9*** 104.8*** 281.2***
Note: */**/*** indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5%/1%/0.1%
significance level, respectively.
Most of the tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. In other words, the nonsta-
tionary variables that we would like to analyze indeed have cointegration relationship, and thus
could be investigated by methods of cointegrating regression.
wise they could be unbounded in the long run. But at least within our sample period, there is no problem to see
that they were nonstationary in statistical sense.
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2.3.2.3 Cointegration regression method: FMOLS and DOLS
With the nonstationary property of our variables, the usual OLS estimator can be largely biased
in finite sample. Therefore we rely on two cointegrating regression methods: Fully Modified
OLS (FMOLS) and Dynamic OLS (DOLS). Both these two methods have been widely used in
applied economic studies dealing with nonstationary and cointegrated data. The estimated co-
efficient by them reflects the long-run effect of variable. The FMOLS estimator is constructed
by making corrections for the potential endogeneity and serial correlation to the OLS estima-
tor. For a standard fixed-effect panel regression model: yit = β ′xit + si+σt +uit , the FMOLS
estimator is given by:
βˆFM =
[
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(xit− x¯i)(xit− x¯i)′
]−1[ N
∑
i=1
(
T
∑
t=1
(xit− x¯i)yˆ∗it−T ∆ˆ∗εu
)]
where the term yˆ∗it corrects for endogeneity, and ∆ˆ∗εu corrects for serial correlation. For more
details on FMOLS estimator, please refer to Pedroni (2000, 2001) among others.
DOLS estimator introduces the lead and lag differences of regressors to correct for possible
serial correlation and endogeneity of the errors. It actually runs regression on the following
model:
yit = β ′xit +
q2
∑
j=−q1
ci j∆xi,t+ j+ si+σt + vit
Kao, Chiang and Chen (1999), Kao and Chiang (2000) among others provide more details on
the implementation and properties of DOLS approach.
2.3.3 Cointegrating regression analysis
This subsection demonstrates the crucial empirical finding of this paper, which can be sum-
marized as follows: financial liberalization in the home country was linked to the decline of
external debt, but the liberalization in foreign countries had no sufficiently robust effect.
2.3.3.1 Regression result
Result by FMOLS
Table 2.4 shows the regression results by FMOLS. We use the pooled estimator with linear
trend in cointegration. As mentioned before, the sample size of our highly unbalanced panel
data only allows us to contain part of the I(1) control variables in cointegrating regression. As
documented in the last column of Table 2.2, the list of explanatory variables included in base-
line regression is: [FinanOpen, FinanOpenW , DD, GDPpc, M2, CapForm, TradeBalance].
These variables are selected because of their relatively high data availability, logical relevance
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with public debt and statistical significance in regression. Other nonstationary control vari-
ables, namely [FiscalBalance, SaveRate, ER, DependRatio, Credit, TradeOpen] (and those
stationary control variables) would be input in the robustness analysis later on.
The baseline result of FMOLS is listed in column (4.1) which is based on regression equa-
tion (2.1) with corrections according to FMOLS. Further results in model (4.2) - (4.9) are
checked for robustness analysis. The finding by (4.1) is that financial liberalization, both in
the home country (FinanOpen) and other countries (FinanOpenW ), contributed to the decline
of external debt ratio in developing countries. Hence the negative correlation between finan-
cial liberalization and external debt since 1990s is not just a coincidence. But it is not easy
to explain the underlying mechanism. We leave the analysis on the possible reason in Section
2.4 and 2.5. The positive coefficient for domestic debt DD is consistent with our expectation,
as high domestic debt level indicates a large government borrowing demand in which case the
government would also borrow externally. The coefficient for GDP per capita is significantly
negative which can be naturally expected, since ceteris paribus the debt to output ratio declines
when economy grows. The coefficients for M2 ratio, capital formation rate and trade balance
are all positive.
Model (4.2) - (4.9) differ from the baseline model (4.1) in some aspects. (1) We would like
to check whether the estimated coefficients of financial liberalization is biased by the existence
of other control variables. Model (4.2) and (4.3) are obtained by deleting some regressors from
(4.1). In them, domestic financial liberalization and foreign financial openness are separately
investigated. We see FinanOpen and FinanOpenW are still significant without depending on
the existence of another. Model (4.4) is derived by adding all the remained control variables
listed in Table 2.2 except [FiscalBalance, ER, ERR] into the regression. The fiscal balance
and exchange rate variables are excluded at this moment to enable that sufficient many sam-
ple countries can be included in our regression based on this highly unbalanced panel datset
– otherwise the amount of countries is reduced to only around 10 which makes the regression
less meaningful. We will leave the investigation on the effects of government budget balance
and exchange rate later on. (2) We further inspect whether alternative definitions of financial
liberalization and external public debt bring about distinct estimation results. In model (4.5) the
variables FinanOpen and FinanOpenW are constructed by FKRSU index instead of Chinn-Ito
index. In model (4.6) ADT index for capital openness is relied on. In model (4.7) the dependent
variable ED is calculated using WDI data. (3) We also examine the robustness of timing setup
in the regression model. Model (4.8) uses the same model as in (4.1) but with the one-period
lagged regressors. In this setup all regressors are predetermined. Under this model we do not
see large difference in the estimated coefficients. The last column (4.9) reduces the sample pe-
riod to 1994-2007 since there are many missing data in the sample of first several years. We still
obtain significantly negative coefficient for FinanOpen, while the coefficient for FinanOpenW
is with opposite sign. In a nutshell, the regression results in model (4.2) - (4.9) further confirm
that financial liberalization at home tends to reduce external debt. Regarding the financial lib-
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eralization in foreign countries, the estimated coefficient is found sensitive to sample period.
We would further check the strength of its robustness in the following sections.
Table 2.4: Regression result by Fully Modified OLS, ED as dependent variable
Baseline Alternative control variable FKRSU ADT WDI Lag 1 94-07
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) (4.8) (4.9)
FinanOpen -0.070** -0.079*** -0.199** -0.099** -0.068*** -0.092** -0.077** -0.130***
FinanOpenW -0.323 -0.410* -0.261 0.431 -1.005*** 0.131 -0.076 2.412***
DD 0.093 0.093 -0.253 0.249*** 0.262*** -0.033 0.097 0.080
GDPpc -0.691*** -0.728*** -0.761*** -0.509* -0.738*** -0.795*** -0.713*** -0.634*** -0.630***
M2 0.056 0.086 -0.089 -0.087 0.034 0.139* 0.087 0.028
CapForm 0.130 -0.262 0.611 0.726*** 0.836*** 0.296 -0.166 0.590***
TradeBalance 0.546*** 0.569*** 1.310** 0.858*** 0.676*** 0.547*** 0.187 0.748***
Sample period: 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 96-07 91-05 91-07 92-07 94-07
Cross-sections: 45 46 46 17 42 36 38 42 44
Observations: 691 719 707 282 480 513 579 608 616
Note: (1) */**/*** indicates the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively. (2) The estimated coeffi-
cients for M2, CapForm and TradeBalance are rescaled by multiplying 100 for better demonstration.
This rescaling also applies to other regression result tables throughout this paper.
Result by DOLS
Table 2.5 shows the regression results by DOLS. We use the pooled estimator with linear trend
in cointegration and data-driven automatic specification of leads and lags of regressors based
on SIC criterion. The model setup in each column is just similar to the counterpart in Table
2.4. Model (5.1) is the baseline setup. Column (5.2) and (5.3) are obtained by deleting some
regressors. In contrast, introducing more control variables produces (5.4). Model (5.5) and
(5.6) take FKRSU and ADT index to measure financial liberalization; and (5.7) takes WDI
data to measure external debt ratio. Lag 1 variables and 1994-2007 sample are used in model
(5.8) and (5.9) respectively. The DOLS regression results are consistent with what we find by
FMOLS: financial liberalization helps reduce external debt in developing countries. But just
like the result of model (4.9), we find in (5.9) the coefficient for foreign liberalization is positve.
In the next section where we conduct more robustness analysis, we attempt to understand more
deeply.
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Table 2.5: Regression result by Dynamic OLS, ED as dependent variable
Baseline Alternative control variable FKRSU ADT WDI Lag 1 94-07
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) (5.7) (5.8) (5.9)
FinanOpen -0.068** -0.089*** -0.070** -0.064 -0.007 -0.095** -0.047 -0.059*
FinanOpenW -0.726*** -0.233 -0.482* 0.656** -1.362*** 0.023 -0.092 1.969***
DD 0.037 0.184** 0.313*** 0.162** 0.397*** 0.108 0.133* 0.168**
GDPpc -0.807*** -0.856*** -0.922*** -0.568*** -0.724*** -0.307*** -0.654*** -0.590*** -0.788***
M2 0.135* 0.128* -0.073 -0.071 0.006 0.174** 0.066 0.131
CapForm 0.663** 0.139 -0.094 0.549***
TradeBalance 0.582*** 0.473*** -0.158 0.620*** 0.207 0.117 0.241*
Sample period: 91-07 91-07 91-07 90-07 95-07 91-05 91-07 92-07 94-07
Cross-sections: 23 39 41 26 46 23 24 26 29
Observations: 391 624 663 349 562 345 400 413 401
Note: (1) */**/*** indicates the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively. (2) In model (5.4) and
(5.5) the static OLS leads and lags specification is imposed instead of data-driven automatic specification
based on SIC criterion, because otherwise we do not have sufficient sample size to run regression. In
model (5.6) - (5.8) the variable CapForm is deleted from the regression specification to fit the use of
BIC, otherwise our sample size is not enough. Because of the same reason, model (5.9) deletes both
CapForm and TradeBalance.
2.3.3.2 More robustness analysis
In order to strengthen our empirical finding, we further take into account the effect of inter-
national debt relief, and the potentially omitted variables of financial development, economic
openness, fiscal balance, debt repayment ability, exchange rate, and foreign investor base. We
also try to extend the sample to start from 1970.
Exclude the influence of debt relief
During the sample period, some international debt reliefs were conducted to reduce the external
debt pressure on developing countries. The existence of debt relief may bias our estimation.
In our initial sample selection, we already intentionally eliminated some highly debted poor
countries who were also the most beneficiaries of international debt relief. But the potential
bias of debt relief was not cleaned out completely. In fact over the past decades most developing
countries, more or less, experienced some debt reliefs. In order to further exclude the impact of
debt relief, we check the annual debt relief to GDP ratio in each country and redo the regression
(4.1) and (5.1) excluding some sample countries with relatively large debt relief. To be precise,
we delete 20% of the sample – a group of 9 countries with average annual relief larger than
0.7% GDP during 1990-2007.12 After deleting them, the simple or weighted average annual
12The list of 9 countries is: Bolivia, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Moldova, Nigeria, Panama, Uganda, Zambia.
We have also tested the case of deleting more sample countries (not reported). With different samples, although
the exact coefficient from the regression varies, the negative sign of the coefficient for financial liberalization does
not change.
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debt relief to GDP ratio in the remaining 37 countries was below 0.1%. Thus the impact of debt
relief is negligible in this reduced sample. The column (13.1) in Table 2.13 and (14.1) in Table
2.14 at Appendix 2.D.2 give the FMOLS and DOLS regression result, respectively. The basic
finding remains unchanged: both FinanOpen and FinanOpenW negatively affect external debt
ratio.
Besides debt relief, we also consider that debt default and debt restructuring may also re-
duce the debt ratio. But the sample points accompanied with these default events, measured
by “sovereign debt crisis” or/and “sovereign debt restructuring” in Laeven and Valencia (2013)
dataset, only count for 4% of the full sample. Hence that is clearly not an important concern.
Exclude the influence of financial development and economic openness
As mentioned before, since financial development and economic openness may be both tightly
linked to financial liberalization, there is possibility that our estimated effect of financial glob-
alization is actually the effect of financial development or economic openness. Di Casola and
Sichlimiris (2015) use ARDL model and empirically find financial development can help ex-
plain the dynamics of external debt ratio. (There are many reversely directed studies on how
government debt affects the domestic financial development.) Baltagi, Demetriades and Law
(2009) provide some evidence that domestic financial development may be linked to liberaliza-
tion of capital account.
Thus we have to check the influence of financial development or economic openness. Table
2.12 in Appendix 2.D.1 documents the correlation coefficients between financial liberaliza-
tion, financial development, and economic openness in our sample. The correlations between
financial liberalization and other two factors are generally not too strong and sometimes con-
troversial in sign. We furthermore add the financial development and economic openness as
control variables and run the regression. The regression results are given in the column (13.2) -
(13.3) of Table 2.13 and (14.2) - (14.3) of Table 2.14. The estimated negative coefficients for fi-
nancial liberalization are hardly changed. Thus we can state that financial liberalization affects
external government debt not via the change in domestic financial development or economic
openness.
Investigate the influence of fiscal balance and repayment ability
Financial globalization may induce tax competition which has dynamic effects on public bud-
get deficit. The deficit would change the size of public debt. Arcalean (2017) further shows that
financial liberalization may have direct effects on the deficit besides tax competition. We con-
sider this possibility. Instead of introducing variables representing tax competition, we directly
consider the level of fiscal balance. We want to check whether the impact of financial openness
takes effect majorly via fiscal balance. The column (13.4) - (13.5) of Table 2.13 and (14.4) -
(14.5) of Table 2.14 show that, introducing fiscal balance in regression does not greatly change
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the coefficient for domestic liberalization, but makes oversea liberalization not significant. This
may be partially interpreted in the sense that financial openness in foreign (home) countries is
(not) largely linked to domestic budget deficit – the estimation result in Arcalean (2017) shows
that financial liberalization in the rest of world significantly increases budget deficit while the
effect of financial liberalization in the home country is insignificant.
Furthermore, we use the domestic saving rate and level of foreign currency reserve to con-
trol for the government’s ability to repay external liability. It is possible that financial liberal-
ization interacts with the state’s debt repayment ability, which influences both the demand and
supply of external financing. The column (13.6) - (13.7) of Table 2.13 and (14.6) - (14.7) of
Table 2.14 document the regression results with the control variable of domestic saving rate and
reserve as the ratio to GDP or total external debt. The estimated coefficients for FinanOpen,
FinanOpenW , DD and GDPpc are similar to that in baseline model. The coefficient for re-
serve to GDP ratio is positive, indicating that a country with higher repayment capacity is able
to borrow more from other countries.
Investigate the influence of exchange rate
The value of exchange rate directly changes the relative size of external debt which is majorly
denominated by foreign currency. Figure 2.11 at Appendix 2.A.3 shows the average real effec-
tive exchange rate index (2010 = 100) in developing countries. We see that during 1990-2007
the exchange rate fluctuated around the level of 90, and at 2007 it almost came back to the level
in 1990. Hence the substantial decline of external debt ratio is not the result of large exchange
rate change.
The regression results in column (13.8) - (13.9) of Table 2.13 and (14.8) - (14.9) of Table
2.14 investigate the influence of exchange rate. Regarding exchange rate, we consider the
type of exchange rate regime and the level of real effective exchange rate. We find that, after
introducing exchange rate as control variables, the estimated coefficient of FinanOpenW is no
longer significant. The coefficient of exchange rate is significantly negative. Hence, combining
with the previous finding that the estimated influence of FinanOpenW is sometimes positive
and sometimes negative, we will doubt whether foreign liberalization really has large and clear
effect. In contrast, under all cases the domestic financial openness generates robust negative
impact on external public debt ratio.
Investigate the influence of investor base
Financial globalization involves both the demand and supply factors on developing countries’
external borrowing. But the foreign creditors’ fund supply is less under control of home coun-
try. We use the private external debt, total external debt and FDI to proxy the foreign investor
base, and to some extent control for the supply factor. As displayed in the column (13.10)
- (13.11) of Table 2.13 and (14.10) - (14.11) of Table 2.14, the additional control variables
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for investor base make the estimated coefficient for foreign financial openness FinanOpenW
insignificant. This may not be surprising because investor base could cover the effect of
FinanOpenW , which is majorly linked to the supply of foreign fund. And the coefficient for
domestic liberalization FinanOpen is still significantly negative with a size close to the baseline
estimation.
Extend the sample to start from 1970
Our baseline sample spans between 1990 and 2007. This 18-years period is relatively short in
cointegrating regression, compared to the cross-section size of 46 countries. We also collect
the data from alternative sources and extend the sample to start from 1970 and end at 2012.
Particularly, the external debt, GDP per capita, M2, capital formation and trade balance data
are from WDI; financial openness again from Chinn-Ito index; domestic debt data calculated
from the total public debt by Abbas et al. (2011) minus external debt by WDI. Model (13.12)
and (14.12) repeat our baseline regression based on the extended sample (but we are unable to
implement more robustness checks because of the data lack on other control variables before the
1990s). We find foreign financial liberalization has a positive effect on external debt ratio. This
is in contrast with the case with 1990-2007 sample, and implies that the previously estimated
negative coefficient for FinanOpenW is not really robust. However the negative coefficient of
FinanOpen is still significant.
2.3.4 Further explorations: causality and the effect of financial liberal-
ization on domestic public debt
The reduced form regressions in Section 2.3.3, though strongly confirm the link between fi-
nancial liberalization and external public debt, are yet insufficient to assert the causality from
financial globalization to external debt. Appendix 2.E presents a discussion on the causality and
potential reverse causality effect. We will provide support for the causality using the Propensity
Score Matching (PSM) method. And we also check whether the reverse causality of the influ-
ence from external debt to financial liberalization exists. Additionally, we investigate whether
financial liberalization influences domestic public debt ratio. The findings can be summarized
as follows: (1) the PSM analysis supports our previous finding from reduced form regressions
that financial liberalization in the home country significantly reduces external debt ratio; (2) we
do not see the existence of severe reverse causality which biases our core empirical finding; (3)
financial globalization does not have evident influence on domestic public debt ratio.
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2.4 Possible reason why financial liberalization dampens ex-
ternal public debt
In this section we propose a plausible explanation why financial liberalization may help reduce
government external debt ratio in developing countries. It is regarding the financial market
separation and domestic-foreign interest rate differential. The intuition is as follows. (i) In
pre-liberalization period the domestic interest rate is higher than foreign rate, and then the fi-
nancial liberalization pushes capitals into the developing countries which reduces the interest
rate differential. (ii) In a largely separated domestic-international financial market, govern-
ment’s internal (external) borrowing cost is proportional to the domestic (foreign) interest rate.
(iii) In the post-liberalization era the relative cost of domestic financing is reduced as a result of
declined interest rate difference, then the government’s willingness to borrow internally rises.13
Figure 2.4: Commercial lending real interest rate differential between developing and
developed countries, 1990-2013
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Data source: WDI.
13An interesting empirical finding by recent studies (Andritzky, 2012; Arslanalp and Poghosyan, 2014; Ebeke
and Kyobe, 2015; Ebeke and Lu, 2014) is that the increase in the share of government debt held by foreign
investors would reduce the sovereign bond yield. In this way, financial liberalization can also reduce the govern-
ment debt burden (of both domestic and external debt) via a rise of foreign bond investors. This leaves us an open
question regarding how to consider the underlying mechanism in a theoretical model.
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Figure 2.5: Government bond interest rate differential between developing and developed
countries, 1990-2013
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Data source: IFS (IMF International Financial Statistics).
Figure 2.6: Share of external debt in total public debt in 46 developing countries,
1990-2012
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This argument is grounded on the hints from data. As indicated by Figure 2.4 and 2.5,
during the whole sample period, the interest rate (in terms of both commercial bank lending rate
and government bond yield) in developing countries is higher.14 Thus the cost of borrowing is
relatively lower if government borrows externally.15 But the global financial integration shrinks
the interest rate differential, by cross-border capital mobility such as the hot money and FDI. As
demonstrated by the figures, there was a huge decline in the domestic-foreign rate differential
and the absolute level of interest rate during the decades before 2008 crisis. (The figures show
the levels of interest rate in two country-groups. If we consider the dynamics of difference, the
curve is just very similar to that of interest rate in developing world. That is because the interest
rate in advanced economies is relatively stable and only declines slightly and smoothly.)
This means the governments of developing countries would find the cost of internal financ-
ing declined. This gives them stronger incentive to borrow from domestic residents. As shown
by Figure 2.6, the share of external debt in total public debt in developing countries declined
along with the decline of domestic interest rate. Furthermore, data shows that the domestic
public debt to GDP actually increased in the period (see Figure 2.9 in Appendix 2.A.1). In the
next section we will use a theoretical model to formalize our intuitive explanation. The model
is able to produce results consistent with the basic finding from Figure 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6.
14The data for many countries before 1995 is largely unavailable. Thus the shape of curves before 1995 may
not reflect the real dynamics exactly. For Figure 2.5, we only have the data for 22 developing countries and
28 developed countries (compared to 42 and 31 in Figure 2.4). But, after checking some other data sources for
several missing countries, we think the basic situation would not be largely different if we have a complete sample.
Empirical literature also confirms that the covered interest rate parity (CIP) generally does not hold in emerging
countries. Alper, Ardic and Fendoglu (2009) provide a comprehensive literature review.
15It is notable that in international market the developing country governments usually cannot borrow at devel-
oped country governments’ rate. In our Figure 2.4, the interest rate is the domestic rate. In Figure 2.5, the bond
rate is a mixture of both domestic and foreign borrowing cost. Hence, strictly speaking none of Figure 2.4 and
2.5 can explicitly validate our setup in theoretical model that the domestic borrowing cost of developing country
government is higher than its external borrowing cost. Unfortunately we did not find any reliable data source on
this issue. However, even though considering this point we can still justify our theoretical model based on the
following argument.
It may be argued that, government does not finance externally directly at the international interest rate since it
may be required to pay a risk premium – this premium would even make the government’s effective borrowing
cost at international market close to the internal borrowing cost. But as long as that premium is an increasing
function of public external debt ratio, the shrinkage of the domestic-foreign interest rate differential would still
reduce the government’s demand for external financing. In the next section, see Footnote 20, we will formally
show in a theoretical model that the existence of risk premium does not generate essentially different result.
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2.5 Theoretical model
In this section, we illustrate the mechanism discussed in Section 2.4 using a micro-founded
theoretical model. Our model is highly simplified and does not intend to precisely match the
data in any specific country. But it is enough to illustrate the mechanism how international
financial liberalization can contribute to reduce external public debt, via the decrease of finan-
cial market segmentation and interest rate differential. All the analysis is conducted in a real
economy model without concerns about inflation, price rigidity, and exchange rate fluctuation.
The model merely aims to provide an explanation how financial liberalization dampens external
public debt, rather than measuring the associated distribution and welfare outcome.
2.5.1 Model setup
2.5.1.1 International environment and existence of capital control
We consider the home country as a small open economy such that foreign variables would not
be affected by domestic dynamics. For simplicity we directly assume all foreign variables are
constant. In light of the fact demonstrated in Figure 2.4 and 2.5, we assume the (steady state)
domestic interest rate is significantly higher than the foreign interest rate. This can happen if
e.g. the resource in the home country is relatively scarce and thus generates a higher investment
return rate, or the domestic residents are less patient. As a result the domestic household
will attempt to borrow from international market and hold domestic asset to take advantage of
that domestic-foreign interest rate spread. But the government imposes capital controls on the
international mobility of money.16
Particularly we consider the capital controls which directly work on household’s collateral
constraint in international borrowing. We will use two policy variables to adjust the degree of
financial openness: (1) one is an international borrowing interest rate tax which alters the effec-
tive borrowing cost of domestic household; (2) another one is the LTV (loan-to-value) ratio in
collateralized borrowing contract which varies with the efficiency of international contract en-
forcement. Both of these two capital control instruments were discussed in previous literature,
such as Costinot, Lorenzoni and Werning (2014), Liu and Spiegel (2015) regarding the tax on
international asset return and Faia (2011), Faia and Iliopulos (2011), Pisani (2011) regarding
the LTV ratio in international collateral constraint. The details of these two instruments in our
model will be explained later.
16In the sense that foreign source of productive capital is not easily available, capital control tends to reduce the
domestic production efficiency (Abiad, Oomes and Ueda, 2008; Alfaro, Chari and Kanczuk, 2016; Larrain and
Stumpner, 2015). But the implementation of capital control has some plausible reasons. The main purposes of
capital control are majorly in four aspects: reducing the fluctuation and procyclicality of capital flow; reducing
real exchange rate pressures; enhancing the independence of central bank especially under pegged exchange rate
regime; reducing financial fragility by e.g. altering the capital flow composition toward longer maturity. However,
all in all the effectiveness and welfare outcome are largely controversial.
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In our model economy, the international financial market is highly segmented. Besides the
household’s foreign borrowing (private external debt), the only channel of international capital
flow is the government’s borrowing from foreign countries (public external debt). To simplify
the analysis, we directly rule out the possibility of cross-border purchase of government bond:
domestic residents are not allowed to buy foreign government bond or bond issued in foreign
countries; likewise, foreign residents are unable to buy domestic bond.17 In this way, the
government of the home country can borrow domestically and externally at different rates.
Throughout the model we focus on the case that government and agents never default on the
debt.
2.5.1.2 Household
There is a unit continuum of infinitely lived households. The representative household maxi-
mizes the life-time utility subject to intertemporal budget constaint and international borrowing
constraint. Household supplies labor to domestic firms to receive wage income. Besides that,
household is able to hold one-period risk-free domestic government bond, and can borrow from
foreign countries using domestic bond as collateral. The household’s problem is expressed as:
max
{Ct ,Lt ,Bt+1,BFt+1}
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t
[
C1−σt
1−σ +φg
G1−σgt
1−σg −φn
L1+ηt
1+η
]
st. (1+ τc)Ct +QtBt+1+ τt−1RFBFt +ACBt +ACBFt = Bt +BFt+1+(1− τw)WtLt
τtRFBFt+1 6 mtBt+1 (2.5)
where Ct , Gt , Lt , Bt+1 and BFt+1 denote the private consumption, government spending, labor
supply, holding of domestic government bond, and borrowing from foreign countries, respec-
tively. Qt gives the price of risk-free one-period government bond such that 1/Qt is the bond
gross interest rate. RF is the fixed foreign interest rate. Wt is the real wage. Parameters β ,
σ , σg and η are the discount rate, coefficient of relative risk aversion for private consump-
tion and for public consumption, inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply, respectively. φg
and φn measure the weights of government spending utility and labor disutility for household’s
welfare. τc and τw give the consumption tax rate and labor income tax rate. The variable τt−1
denotes a capital control tax instrument employed by the government to adjust the effective for-
eign interest rate faced by household: if (τt−1−1) is positive (negative), the government taxed
(subsidizes) and impedes (encourages) international borrowing. In other words, a reduction
of τt−1 represents the occurrence of financial liberalization. In order to reflect the time lag
between the announcement and implementation of legislation, we assume the capital control
17This assumption quite suits the case in the developing world. Empirical evidences show that in many de-
veloping countries the foreigners only hold a little part of domestic bond (e.g. the case of Mexico mentioned by
Kumhof (2010)), and the fraction of foreign asset in domestic residents’ portfolio is very small (e.g. home bias is
0.97 in emerging Asia, as mentioned in Chang, Liu and Spiegel (2015)).
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tax τt−1 is predetermined in t−1. The term ACBt and ACBFt refer to adjustment costs of bond
and borrowing. They are assumed to take the following quadratic forms:
ACBt =
ψb
2
(
Bt+1
Yt
− B
Y
)2
Yt
ACBFt =
ψb
2
(
BFt+1
Yt
− B
F
Y
)2
Yt
where BY and
BF
Y are the steady state debt to output ratios. From a purely technical perspective,
the adjustment cost terms ACBt and ACBFt (or other alternative setups) are indispensable in our
model since it helps maintain the model stationary. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) provide a
detailed and comprehensive discussion on the stationarity of small open economy model with
incomplete asset market. We will set the parameter value ψb small such that the adjustment
cost would not largely distort the equilibrium allocation in our model.
The international borrowing constraint, equation (2.5), reflects the typical imperfect con-
tract enforement in business lending. This collateral constraint is widely discussed in literature
(Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). In our model, the foreign lenders protect themselves by requiring
borrowers to collateralize their domestic assets Bt+1. The LTV (loan-to-value) ratio mt ∈ [0,1].
The value of (1−mt) is the proportion of collateral that needs to be paid as transaction cost
if domestic debtors default and foreign lenders liquidate the collateralized assets. Hence, this
proportion refects the severity of international contract enforceability problem, which can be
mitigated by financial liberalization such as the improved information transparency on inter-
national asset, enhanced institutional protection on cross-border property rights, and better in-
frastructure to reduce transaction cost. The higher the LTV ratio mt is, the more relaxed the
collateral constraint is. In other words, mt can measure the degree of financial liberalization.
The household is price taker in the competitive market. Hence, for each household the do-
mestic public bond’s price Qt and the wageWt are exogenous. It is notable that we assume the
government public spending Gt generates utility for households – this is the reason why gov-
ernment exists in this economy. But since the public spending is exogenous for each individual
household and not taken into account in household’s decision, we omit this part in household’s
optimization. We will discuss the behavior of government later. The first order conditions with
respect to consumption and domestic bond generate an expression linking Lagrangian multi-
pliers to domestic bond price :
µt
λt
=
1
mt
[
Qt−Et {Λt+1}+ψb
(
Bt+1
Yt
− B
Y
)]
(2.6)
where µt and λt are the Lagrangian multipliers with respect to collateral constraint and budget
constraint, respectively. The term Λt+1 = β λt+1λt = β
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
is the intertemporal stochastic
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discount factor. If the international borrowing constraint is not binding (thus µt = 0) and we
omit the adjustment cost of bond (thus ψb = 0), equation (2.6) just becomes the familiar Euler
equation: βEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
1
Qt
}
= 1. In contrast, with binding collateral constraint (µt > 0) the ex-
istence of external private borrowing introduces a wedge between Qt and Λt+1. The wedge also
depends on the LTV ratio mt . Following typical literature, we will set household’s discount rate
β sufficiently small such that the collateral constraint will always bind around a neighborhood
of the steady state.
The first order condition with respect to foreign borrowing is written as:
τtRF
(
µt
λt
+Et {Λt+1}
)
= 1+ψb
(
BFt+1
Yt
− B
F
Y
)
(2.7)
This equation tells us that the capital control (gross) tax τt , joint with foreign interest rate RF ,
affects the value of µt . This is because the effective gross foreign rate τtRF decides how rel-
atively cheaper the foreign borrowing is, and how profitable to borrow externally and invest
domestically. Combining equation (2.6) and (2.7), it is not difficult to see that the effect of
financial liberalization by changing τt−1 and mt will ultimately propagate to influence the equi-
librium price of domestic government bond. As a result the amount of public bond will be
affected.
As the last block of describing household’s behavior, we have a usual equation describing
the substitution between leisure and consumption:
(1− τw)
(1+ τc)
Wt = φnLηt Cσt (2.8)
2.5.1.3 Capitalist
The capitalist specializes in investment and accumulation of domestic private capital. The
income of capitalist comes from the rent revenue of capital stock. For simplicity, we assume
the population of capitalists is as the same as households. The representative capitalist’s utility
maximization problem is:
max
{Cc,t ,Kt+1}
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tc
[
C1−σc,t
1−σ +φg
G1−σgt
1−σg
]
st. (1+ τc)Cc,t +Kt+1+ACKt = (Rt−δ )Kt (2.9)
where Cc,t , Gt and Kt+1 denote the capitalist consumption, government spending and private
capital stock, respectively. Just like the case of household, we assume public spending is a part
of capitalist’s utility but is decided by government and out of capitalist’s direct control. The
new capital investment has quadratic adjustment cost ACKt :
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ACKt =
ψk
2
(
Kt+1
Kt
−1
)2
Kt
Living in a completely competitive market, the representative capitalist takes the gross rent
rate net of depreciation (Rt −δ ) as given. We assume domestic capitalist has no direct access
into international financial market – e.g. they cannot directly purchase foreign asset, borrow
overseas, or invest in foreign firm. The first order condition with respect to capital provides us:
Et
{
Λc,t+1
[
(Rt+1−δ )+ ψk2
[(
Kt+2
Kt+1
)2
−1
]]}
= 1+ψk
(
Kt+1
Kt
−1
)
(2.10)
where Λc,t+1 = βc
(
Cc,t
Cc,t+1
)σ
is capitalist’s intertemporal stochastic discount factor. In the case
of omitting capital adjustment cost (ψk = 0), equation (2.10) is nothing but an Euler equation:
βcEt
{(
Cc,t
Cc,t+1
)σ
(Rt+1−δ )
}
= 1.
2.5.1.4 Firm
The representative firm produces in a competitive market, using domestic capital stock sup-
plied by the capitalist and labor supplied by the household as input, according to the following
Cobb-Douglas technique:
Yt = AKtαL1−αt (2.11)
where Yt and Kt refer to output and aggregate private capital stock, respectively. We assume
a constant TFP A = 1 in all periods. Firms are price takers. It is obvious that, based on the
unit return to scale Cobb-Douglas production technique, the firm always earns zero profit:
Yt− rtKt−WtLt =Yt−αYt− (1−α)Yt = 0 where rt = Rt−1 is the return rate of rented private
capital. The production inputs are priced at their marginal products. Straightforwardly, we can
obtain the following equations:
Rt−1= αKtα−1L1−αt = α
Yt
Kt
(2.12)
Wt = (1−α)KtαL−αt = (1−α)
Yt
Lt
(2.13)
2.5.1.5 Government
The government’s role in the economy is to supply public consumption goods Gt which is
financed by the tax revenue [τc(Ct +Cc,t) + τwWtLt + (τt−1− 1)RFBFt ], domestically issued
bond QtBt+1 and external public debt BEt+1. In principle the government can also receive tax
revenue from corporate profit tax, but this is omitted in our model since the firms earn zero
profit. The tax rates are predetermined; domestic bond price is decided in equilibrium; and
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government borrows in international market at the constant interest rate RF .18 Issuance of
external public debt has an extra quadratic cost of ψg2
(
BEt+1
Yt
)2
Yt , as a function of the external
debt to output ratio. This cost comes from the disadvantages of external debt such as the
exchange rate risk (related to the so-called “original sin” literature), risk of maturity mismatch
when external borrowing is short-term, and external political pressure from creditor. Thus the
government’s budegt constraint is:
Gt +Bt +RFBEt +
ψg
2
(
BEt+1
Yt
)2
Yt
= [τc(Ct +Cc,t)+ τwWtLt +(τt−1−1)RFBFt ]+QtBt+1+BEt+1 (2.14)
In this equation, a positive value of Bt+1 and BEt+1 means the government borrows from the
domestic and foreign residents.
We consider the government as an independent actor who obtains utility from government
spending. The government’s problem is:
max
{Gt ,Bt+1,BEt+1}
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tg
[
G1−σgt
1−σg
]
subject to the budget constraint (2.14).19 Here the parameter βg and σg measure the govern-
ment’s discount rate and coefficient of relative risk aversion for fiscal spending, respectively.
The first order conditions with respect to Gt and Bt+1 generate:
1= βgEt
{(
Gt
Gt+1
)σg 1
Qt
}
(2.15)
Although there is extra holding cost of external debt, the government is still willing to borrow
externally because of the lower interest rate RF < 1Q . (The variables without time subscript
18In other words, in our model with separate financial market the government’s internal (external) borrowing
cost is proportional to domestic (foreign) interest rate. It may be argued that, government does not issue external
bond directly at the international interest rate RF since it is often required to pay a risk premium – this premium
would make the government’s effective borrowing cost at international market similar to the internal financing
cost. But later (in Footnote 20) we will show that an introduction of risk premium in the model does not gen-
erate essentially different result, as long as the financial liberalization shrinks the domestic-foreign interest rate
differential.
19It is notable that, though we model the government as a selfish utility-maximizer with its own objective
function for public spending, to a large extent its behavior can still be desirable from the perspective of social
welfare. Intuitively we can consider two points. (1) The selfish government’s utility function G
1−σg
t
1−σg is an additive
part of household and capitalist’s utility. This means that, ceteris paribus, an increase of government utility also
raises the welfare of household and capitalist. (2) Being limited by the budget constraint, government is willing to
ensure a high revenue which partly comes from the consumption tax τc(Ct +Cc,t). This term is proportional to Ct
and Cc,t which is also a part of agents’ utility. Of course, we need to check the whole genenral equilibrium effect
in order to understand how the selfish government’s behavior is consistent with a benevolent Ramsey planner who
maximizes the social welfare. Since this is not a straightforward task, we leave it for the work in the future.
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refer to the steady state values.) The benefit of lower interest payment will be surpassed by the
extra holding cost of external debt if the stock of external debt BEt+1 is too large. The breakeven
point is given by the first order condition with respect to BEt+1:
BEt+1
Yt
=
1
ψg
(
1
Qt
−RF
)
(2.16)
This equation, ceteris paribus, acts like the government’s demand function for external bor-
rowing. Here the “price” depends on the domestic-foreign government bond yield differential(
1
Qt
−RF
)
.20
The link between domestic interest rate (or government bond yield) and public debt ratio
is widely discussed in empirical literature (e.g. Alexopoulou, Bunda and Ferrando, 2010; Bal-
dacci and Kumar, 2010; Claeys, Moreno and Surin˜ach, 2012; Engen and Hubbard, 2005; von
Hagen, Schuknecht and Wolswijk, 2011; Perovic´, 2015). The general finding is that the link
between public debt ratio and interest rate is relatively weak in developed countries, but fairly
substantial in emerging economies. Later we will rely on the empirical literature to set the
parameter value of ψg.
2.5.1.6 Process of financial liberalization
As discussed in household’s problem, the international borrowing tax rate τt and LTV ratio
mt in household’s private external debt collateral constraint influence the degree of financial
openness. Therefore, we model the process of financial liberalization in the home country as
an exogenous reduction of tax rate τt or increase in LTV ratio mt . This opens the door to
allow larger volume of cheap foreign funds to come in, as now domestic household’s collateral
constraint is relaxed. Later we will investigate both the long-run consequences of permanent
financial liberalization, and the impulse responses to a transitory financial liberalization shock.
20There is another way, which is essentially equivalent in our model, to consider this equation (2.16) instead
of our assumption of holding cost. The key is about the risk premium on sovereign debt. Considering that
default risk increases with the degree of debtedness, potential foreign creditors on sovereign debt would require
a premium Φt as an increasing function of public external debt ratio
BEt+1
Yt
. Without loss of generality we assume
foreign creditors are risk-neutral. Then the non-arbitrage in international market requires the equality to hold that
RFΦt = 1Qt . We take the functional form similar to that in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) and Prasad (2014):
Φt = exp
[
ψg
(
BEt+1
Yt
− BEY
)]
where B
E
Y is the steady state external debt ratio. Thus the demand function of foreign
investors can be derived from:
1
Qt
= RFΦt = RFt exp
[
ψg
(
BEt+1
Yt
− B
E
Y
)]
i.e.
BEt+1
Yt
=
1
ψg
[
ln
(
1
Qt
)
− lnRF
]
+
BE
Y
In equilibrium the demand and supply of BEt+1 should be equal. In the case that interest rate is not too large, the
above demand function is almost equation (2.16) up to an additive constant and rounding error.
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In the case that we investigate the effects of permanent liberalization, we will make com-
parative static analysis to observe how steady state values are altered by a permanent change of
τt or mt . If we merely consider a temporary relaxation of capital control tax τt , we assume the
following AR(1) process:
logτt = (1−ρτ) logτ+ρτ logτt−1+ ετ,t (2.17)
where the persistence and size of relaxation are determined by parameter ρτ and scale of ετ,t ,
respectively. A negative shock of ετ,t means a reduction of τt and hence a decrease of capital
control. Similarly, for a temporary liberalization by raisingmt we assume the exogenous AR(1)
process:
logmt = (1−ρm) logm+ρm logmt−1+ εm,t (2.18)
For simplicity, we assume ετ,t
iid∼ N(0,σ2τ ), εm,t iid∼ N(0,σ2m) and there is no correlation between
ετ,t and εm,t .
2.5.2 Equilibrium
In equilibrium each market clears. The aggregate resource constraint is:
Yt = Ct +Cc,t +Gt +[Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt ]+ACKt +ACBt +ACBFt
+
ψg
2
(
BEt+1
Yt
)2
Yt +[RF(BFt +B
E
t )− (BFt+1+BEt+1)] (2.19)
The link between international trade balance and capital flow is embeded in this equation. Other
market clearing conditions were already expressed in the previous section implicitly.
The equilibrium of the economy consists of the allocations of variables {µt , Ct , Cc,t , Gt ,
Lt , Kt+1, Yt , Bt+1, BFt+1, B
E
t+1} together with a set of prices {Wt , Rt , Qt} and transversality
conditions, given the exogenous process for the financial liberalization {τt , mt}, satisfying
equations (2.5) - (2.19).
2.5.3 Parameterization
Table 2.6 gives the value and definition of the model’s parameters. We calibrate the model for
an “average” developing country. The model is set at annual frequency. Most parameters are
typical in literature and clearly readable from Table 2.6. The last rows of Table 2.6 document
the steady state values of some interested variables under our parameterization. We can see that
the capital and debt to output ratios locate in a reasonable range.
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Table 2.6: Value and definition of the parameters in the theoretical model
Para. Value Definition Source/Target
βc 1/1.08 capitalist discount rate annual capital return rate r−δ = 8%
β βc household discount rate the simplest case
βg Q government discount rate to satisfy equation (2.15) at steady state
σ 1 coefficient of relative risk aversion on private consumption typical value in literature
σg 1 coefficient of relative risk aversion on public consumption typical value in literature
η 1 inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply typical value in literature
φn
(1−τw)(1−α)
(1+τc)CY L1+η
weight parameter for labor disutility in household’s utility
function
steady state L= 13
δ 10% capital depreciation rate typical value in literature
τc 20% consumption tax rate close to the VAT rate in many countries
τw 10% labor income tax rate
jointly with τc to match a reasonable domestic public debt
level
α 0.45 income share of private capital in production
income share of labor in output is roughly 55%, according
to PWT 9.0 data
ψg 0.15
scale parameter for government’s holding cost of external public
debt
amid Alexopoulou, Bunda and Ferrando (2010), Claeys,
Moreno and Surin˜ach (2012) and Perovic´ (2015)
ψb 0.1ψg scale parameter for domestic household’s bond adjustment cost
set it small to avoid large distortion in equilibrium
allocation
ψk 2
scale parameter for capitalist’s capital investment adjustment
cost
Alvarez-Parra, Brandao-Marques and Toledo (2013)
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Table 2.6 (cont.): Value and definition of the parameters in the theoretical model
Para. Value Definition Source/Target
τ 1.03
steady state value of capital control tax rate on household’s
international borrowing
generate an intermediate level of domestic government
bond interest rate
m 0.5
steady state value of LTV ratio in household’s international
borrowing collateral constraint
Mendicino (2012)
ρτ 0.63 persistence parameter in the AR(1) process of financial
liberalization
within 5 years the influence of a one-shot temporary shock
declines to less than 10% of its initial valueρm 0.63
στ 1.0097% standard deviation of financial liberalization shock to τ τ changes 1 percentage point after a shock of 1SD
σm 2% standard deviation of financial liberalization shock to m m changes 1 percentage point after a shock of 1 SD
Some steady state values:
A 1 TFP level the simplest case
L 1/3 labor supply typical value in literature
1
Q −1 6.5% domestic government bond risk-free interest rate
roughly match data
r−δ 8% domestic capital return rate
rF 2% foreign risk-free interest rate
(C+Cc)/Y 59% consumption to output ratio
G/Y 15% government spending to output ratio
K/Y 250% capital stock to output ratio
BF/Y 9% private external debt to output ratio
B/Y 20% domestic public debt to output ratio
BE/Y 30% external public debt to output ratio
(B+BE)/Y 50% total public debt to output ratio
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The steady state capital control tax rate τ , for which there is no explicit counterpart in
real data, is simply set at 1.03. We set this value to generate an intermediate size of domestic
government bond interest rate, as 3% is the half of the gap between the domestic capital return
rate 8% and foreign interest rate 2% (discussed later). The steady state value of LTV ratio
parameter m in equation (2.5) is set at 0.5, which is close to the average international lending
LTV ratio for developing countries discussed in literature (see e.g. a review on the calibration
of this parameter in Footnote 2 of Mendicino (2012)).
We set the steady state interest rates in developing and developed countries by observing
Figure 2.4 and 2.5. At this moment we do not consider the interest rate data before 1995,
because the interest rates demonstrated an unreasonably large volatility and the data for a large
fraction of sample countries is unavailable during 1990-1995. In the theoretical model the
foreign interest rate is assumed fixed. Thus we calculate the developed world’s average interest
rate in period 1996-2007 (we first calculate the weighted average in each year, and then take
simple average over all years and over both commercial lending and government bond interest
rates), which is 4.5%. Then we simply assume the risk-free and risk premium components
of this interest rate are half-and-half, which gives us a risk-free foreign interest rate (RF − 1)
of roughly 2% for theoretical model setup. Regarding the steady state domestic capital return
rate (R− 1− δ ), we set it in the following way. We calculate the average interest rate for
period 1996-2000 in developing countries, which is 16.7%. Then we take the half of it which is
assumed as the risk-free component. That gives 8%. Consequently, given our parameterization
of τ = 1.03 and m = 0.5, we have the steady state government bond risk-free rate ( 1Q − 1) at
6.5%.
The parameterization for government’s external debt holding cost and household’s bond ad-
justment costs is not straightforward. We first think over the parameterψg in equation (2.16). In
our model this can reflect the price (interest rate) elasticity of public debt. Literature usually es-
timates the reverse relationship – the influence from government debt ratio DRt to government
bond yield R˜t = 1Qt :
R˜t = ψˆDRt +Control Variables
In our context of external public debt in equation (2.16), this effect can actually be regarded as
a premium on high sovereign debtedness. As mentioned before, the idea of risk premium can
equivalently generate our equation (2.16). Thus we can write down the following empirical re-
lationship: DRt =
BEt+1
Yt
= 1ψˆ R˜t+Control Variables. Claeys, Moreno and Surin˜ach (2012) obtain
an estimated value ψˆ of 0.22 for 17 emerging economies. Some literature gives lower estimates
for ψˆ such as 0.05 in Alexopoulou, Bunda and Ferrando (2010) for 8 new EU countries, and
0.04 in Perovic´ (2015) for 10 Central and Eastern European countries. We take a value of 0.15
in between. Given our steady state value of 1Q = 1.065 and R
F = 1.02, this implies an external
public debt ratio around 30% in our model. This is close to the level in real data at the 1990s.
Admittedly the exact value of ψˆ deserves more discussions, but the change of that value does
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not qualitatively alter our result. Regarding household’s bond adjustment cost parameter ψb,
we set it small at ψb = 0.1ψg such that it would not largely distort the equilibrium allocation.
The consumption tax rate τc is set at 20% which is close to the VAT (value added tax) rate in
many countries. Then the labor tax rate τw is set at 10% such that, according to the government
budget balance, a steady state domestic debt to output ratio is 20% – a value close to the real
data. Concerning the parameters (ρτ , ρm, στ , σm) for financial liberalization processes, we do
not have prior knowledge and can hardly find the empirical counterparts from real data. We
simply set the persistence parameter ρτ and ρm of AR(1) process at 0.63 so that within 5 years
the influence of a one-shot temporary shock declines to less than 10% of its initial value. We
set the standard deviation στ = 1.0097% and σm = 2% such that τ and m will both change 1
percentage point after a shock of 1 standard deviation.
2.5.4 Consequence of financial liberalization
In this section we investigate the consequences of financial liberalization in the home country.
We first focus on the long-run effect of financial liberalization, via the lens of different steady
states by varying the degree of financial openness. Then we discuss the economic dynamics if
a relaxation of capital control is temporary rather than permanent.
2.5.4.1 Long-run effect of financial liberalization
Over the past decades, many developing countries have greatly deregulated their capital ac-
counts and maintained the liberalization for a long period. Even after the 2008 financial crisis
because of which a set of countries intensified capital controls again, the overall financial open-
ness in developing world is still dramatically higher than the level in the 1990s. Hence it is
important to investigate the long-run effect of financial liberalization. We conduct a simple
comparative static analysis on how financial liberalization changes the steady state public debt
ratios.
Evaluating equation (2.7) and (2.6) at steady state entails us to write down the relationship
between financial liberalization variable (τ , m) and government domestic bond price Q:
µ
λ
=
1
τRF
−β
and
Q= β +
µ
λ
m
The implication of these two static equations is straightforward. (1) If capital control tax τ
decreases, the domestic household’s external borrowing cost declines and it is more profitable
to borrow overseas and invest in domestic government bond. This makes the (discounted)
shadow value of international collateral constraint, which is measured by µλ , larger. In this
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circumstance, domestic household have stronger incentive to purchase domestic public bond
and the demand is boosted, which pushes up the price Q. (2) If the collateral constraint’s
LTV ratio m is enhanced, the household is able to borrow more externally given any size of
collateralized domestic government bond. This situation stimulates the demand for domestic
public bond and raises its price Q.
Equation (2.16) gives us the steady state external public debt ratio depending on the domestic-
foreign interest rate difference:
BE
Y
=
1
ψg
(
1
Q
−RF
)
As we just discussed, after the financial liberalization in both cases of decreasing τ and in-
creasing m, the domestic bond price Q will be raised. Equivalently, the bond yield 1Q i.e. the
government’s internal financing cost becomes smaller. Given the fixed foreign financing cost
RF , this naturally dampens the government’s incentive to borrow externally and enhances the
willing to borrow domestically.
Figure 2.7: Steady state public debt ratios under different τ and m
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Note: In the left panel, τ varies within [0.98, 1.05] maintaining m = 0.5. In the right panel, m varies
within [0.1, 0.9] maintaining τ = 1.03.
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Overall, (given the initial state that domestic interest rate is higher than foreign rate) our
simple comparative static analysis demonstrates that permanent financial liberalization is able
to make the government’s domestic financing cost 1Q to decrease, which motivates the gov-
ernment’s external borrowing to decline. As the aggregate financing need of government is
basically unchanged, the government would issue more domestic bond and have higher domes-
tic public debt ratio. Figure 2.7 demonstrates the quantitative results on how financial liber-
alization, by decreasing τ or increasing m, depresses external public debt ratio B
E
Y and spurs
domestic public debt ratio BY in the steady state of our model economy.
2.5.4.2 Economic dynamics after temporary financial liberalization shocks
Although many developing countries have persistenly liberalized their capital accounts, some
countries such as China and India still maintained its capital openness at a low level and only
had some temporary regulation relaxation in some cases; some other countries such as Ar-
gentina and Brazil experienced frequent policy shifts between capital control and liberaliza-
tion. Thus it is also important to investigate the macroeconomic dynamics if the government
implemented a temporary (unexpected) financial liberalization.
Figure 2.8: Impulse responses to temporary financial liberalization shocks
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points. Other variables are expressed by percentage deviation as the ratio to steady state output.
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Negative shock to capital control tax τ
We first consider a transitory financial liberalization shock of exogenous reduction in capital
control tax τt , which is expressed by equation (2.17). We simulate a situation that, after a
negative shock of 1 standard deviation, τt temporarily declines by 1 percentage point from its
steady state value. The abatement of τt means a reduction of obstacle on households’ oversea
borrowing. The impulse responses of key variables after this kind of financial liberalization
are demonstrated by the red solid curves in Figure 2.8. It is clear to see two important results.
(1) Domestic government bond yield and interest rate decrease. The reason is obvious: the
surge of foreign funds BFt+1 after the reduction of τt expands the households’ investment in
domestic government bond Bt+1, which elevates its price Q and lowers its yield 1Q . In our
model, this lowered bond yield is further linked to a decline in capital marginal return rate
Rt , as the capitalists invest more productive capital and the aggregate domestic capital stock
increases. This happens because the households who are now richer supply less labor and
firms demand more capital input as a response to the raised wage cost. The decline of interest
rates in our model is consistent with Henry (2003) which finds empirical evidence that capital
account liberalization reduces the cost of capital in developing countries, though that paper
mainly focuses on stock market. (2) External public debt decreases and domestic public debt
increases. The reason is also transparent: the relative price between domestic debt and external
debt is altered. Since the external debt becomes more expensive in relative price, government’s
demand declines. Some external public debts are retired while the holding of domestic bond
increases.
Compared to the initial state, the economy with higher financial openness has a lower do-
mestic interest rate and lower external public debt share which is consistent to the stylized facts
in Figure 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6. Moreover, our model predicts that after financial liberalization do-
mestic government debt and private external debt ratio will be lifted. This prediction fits the
observed trend in real data over the past decades (see Figure 2.9 in Appendix 2.A.1 and Figure
2.12 in Appendix 2.A.4), though our model overstates the size of increase. In the future it
would be a promising extension to our model, if we can take into account other elements that
influence the domestic public debt and private external debt ratio.
Positive shock to LTV ratio m
Now we move to investigate the effect of a temporary positive 1 standard deviation shock to
LTV ratio mt , which is expressed by equation (2.18). The shock raises mt by 1 percentage point
from its steady state. The impulse responses are displayed by the blue dashed curves in Figure
2.8. It is clear to see that the dynamics of interest rates and debt ratios are similar to the case of
a negative shock to τt . This is unsurprising because, just like a decline of τt , an increment of mt
also loosens household’s international borrowing constraint. Then the household’s investment
in domestic government bond shoots up because it is profitable to borrow externally and invest
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domestically. The expanded investment demand boosts domestic public bond price and lowers
bond yield. Lowering domestic bond yield, the government’s cost of issuing domestic debt
declines and it would like to increase the share of domestic debt and reduce the fraction of
external debt.
Overall, our impulse response analysis shows how a temporary relaxation of capital control
on international capital flows can result in a decline of external public debt, via the change of
the interest rate. Like the steady state comparison in Figure 2.7, our impulse response figures
also indicate a quantitatively large effect of financial liberalization on the debt ratio.
2.5.4.3 Another possible link: sovereign default and sustainability of external debt
We have already discussed the consequence of financial liberalization on government debt, via
the channel of financing cost variation. In our model, we rule out the possibility of sovereign
default to make the analysis tractable. Some recent studies (e.g. Broner and Ventura, 2016;
Di Casola and Sichlimiris, 2015) consider the possibility of default on both domestic and ex-
ternal sovereign debt. Default may be linked to the relationship between external public debt
ratio and capital control. This stream of literature especially pays attention to the endogenous
default cost and default probability, which determines the sustainability of debt ratio. If we can
show that, a country with higher financial liberalization has larger motivation to default exter-
nal debt (e.g. the government’s default cost is lower in an integrated financial market), then
the sustained external debt should be lower. However this idea regarding debt’s sustainability
may be suspect, given our previous empirical finding at least in some regression specifications
that financial liberalization in foreign countries also tends to bring down external leverage. The
logic is as follows: foreign financial liberalization can make more oversea funds available to
domestic government and hence help sustain the external debt ratio – thus we should expect a
positive correlation between the foreign liberalization and the external public debt of the home
country, which contradicts our empirical finding. Admittedly, it may be possible that the effect
of domestic liberalization dominates and the mechanism regarding debt sustainability indeed
plays its role. We would like to check more evidences in the future.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper provides both empirical evidence and theoretical argument that, international fi-
nancial liberalization was correlated with the decrease of external public debt in developing
countries since the 1990s. We use the cointegration regression of FMOLS and DOLS to in-
spect the empirical links. Our estimation is robust under different model specifications and
with different control variables. After the empirical analysis, we propose a theoretical model
featured with the active government and capital controls, to show how financial liberalization
can dampen external public debt ratio. The main mechanism is that financial globalization
shrinks the interest rate differential between developing and advanced countries, which reduces
the government’s domestic financing cost and dampens its incentive to borrow externally.
At the end of this paper, we would like to give one additional remark on our finding. Al-
though financial openness tends to reduce external government debt, our result does not neces-
sarily mean financial liberalization helps developing countries obtain a better management on
external public debt. Our study only links financial openness to the amount of debt. But the
component of debt is also crucial. Mehl and Reynaud (2010) find that financial openness is
relevant to an increase in the riskiness of public domestic debt compositions. It is yet unknown
whether financial openness has similar effect on external debt.
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Appendix
Appendix 2.A. Dynamics of some relevant macroeconomic variables in de-
veloping countries
Our research topic – the link between financial liberalization and external public debt – is
relevant to many macroeconomic variables. Here we document the dynamics of public debt,
debt relief, exchange rate, private external debt and FDI in our sample developing countries.
Investigating these variables is helpful for a better undestanding on the context of this paper.
2.A.1. Dynamics of external, domestic and total public debt in developing countries
Figure 2.9: External, domestic and total public debt to GDP ratio in 46 developing coun-
tries, 1970-2013
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(b) External, domestic and total public debt ratio (weighted)
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Data source: Panizza (2008), WDI and Abbas et al. (2011).
Figure 2.9 shows the (simple and weighted) average external, domestic and total public debt
to GDP ratio in developing countries during 1970-2013 (also see Table 2 in Panizza (2008) or
Forslund, Lima and Panizza (2011)). The total public debt ratio decreased in the period, which
is mainly driven by the decline of external debt, as the domestic public debt to GDP actually
slightly increased. This point is very clear from the simple average value of debt (left panel in
the figure). For the weighted average (right panel), the fluctuation of total debt ratio is largely
influenced by the substantial fluctuation in domestic debt. But throughout the whole sample
period, total debt still displays a large decline which is the result of large decline of external
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debt ratio. The share of external debt in total public debt decreased evidently, as demonstrated
by Figure 2.6 in Section 2.4.
2.A.2. Dynamics of debt relief in developing countries
Figure 2.10 compares the volume of debt relief with the year-to-year change of external public
debt stock (both as ratio to GDP) in 46 developing countries, 1990-2013. It is obvious that the
size of debt relief was much smaller than that of external debt change. In Section 2.3.3.2 we
redo our regression excluding the countries with large debt relief, where our basic finding does
not change.
Figure 2.10: Year-to-year change of external public debt stock VS. debt relief to GDP ratio
in 46 developing countries, 1990-2013
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Data source: Panizza (2008) and WDI.
2.A.3. Dynamics of exchange rate in developing countries
Figure 2.11 shows the average real effective exchange rate index (2010 = 100) in developing
countries. The sample size is reduced to 28 countries because of the data availability.
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Figure 2.11: Real effective exchange rate index (2010 = 100) in 28 developing countries,
1990-2013
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Data source: WDI.
2.A.4. Private external debt and FDI net inflow in developing countries
Figure 2.12 shows that, during 1990-2007 the private external debt to GDP ratio merely in-
creased slightly and FDI expanded largely. (Here the volume of FDI is a flow data while debt
is a stock data.)
Figure 2.12: Total and private external debt to GDP ratio, and FDI net inflow (% of GDP)
in 46 developing countries, 1990-2013
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Appendix 2.B. A supplementary investigation on the empirical section of
Azzimonti et al. (2014) paper
Table 2.7 presents a supplementary investigation on the empirical section of Azzimonti et al.
(2014) paper. Particularly, we divide AFQ’s full sample of 1973-2005 into 3 subsample periods
(1973-1983, 1984-1994, 1995-2005) and run the regression for each subsample using their
econometric model in the paper (please refer to AFQ paper for details of the model). The
regression results show that the coefficient for global capital mobility (i.e. the row named “Lag
change/Change in financial index”) is insignificant for both periods 1973-1983 and 1995-2005.
Table 2.7: Regression results dividing AFQ paper’s sample into 3 subsamples
Comparable to Table O1 in AFQ Paper
1973-1983 1984-1994 1995-2005
Lag debt to GDP ratio -0.285* -0.315*** -0.035
Lag real GDP growth -0.554 -1.117 -1.145***
Lag change in financial index 0.094 1.848*** 1.185
Lag EMU dummy - - 0.007
Size * Lag change in FI -1.775 -5.383 -6.689
Change in dependency ratio 0.011 0.083* 0.005
Change in inequality 0.005 0.062** 0.047***
Observations 189 228 231
R-squared 0.036 0.102 0.078
Number of countries 21 21 21
Comparable to Table O2 in AFQ Paper
1973-1983 1984-1994 1995-2005
Lag debt to GDP ratio -0.320 -0.331** -0.023
Lag real GDP growth -0.517 -1.786 -0.798***
Change in financial index -0.101 0.291** -0.569
Lag EMU dummy - - 0.013
Size * Change in FI 0.198 -1.171 0.526
Change in dependency ratio -0.077** -0.025 0.104
Change in top 1 percent share 0.405*** 0.089 -0.011
Observations 116 164 155
R-squared 0.043 0.115 0.186
Number of countries 15 16 16
Note: */**/*** indicates the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively.
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Appendix 2.C. Definition of variable and data source in regression for ef-
fects of financial liberalization
2.C.1. List of sample countries
There are 46 developing countries and 31 developed economies in the sample, as listed in Table
2.8 and 2.9. We have an unbalanced panel using the annual data betweeen 1990 and 2007.
Table 2.8: List of 46 developing economies in the sample
Argentina Ecuador Kyrgyz Republic Peru Turkey
Bangladesh El Salvador Lebanon Philippines Uganda
Bolivia Ethiopia Malaysia Poland Ukraine
Brazil Georgia Mauritius Romania Uruguay
Bulgaria Guatemala Mexico Russia Venezuela
Chile Hungary Moldova South Africa Zambia
China India Nigeria Sri Lanka
Colombia Indonesia Pakistan Swaziland
Costa Rica Jamaica Panama Thailand
Dominican Republic Kazakhstan Paraguay Tunisia
Table 2.9: List of 31 developed economies in the sample
Australia Finland Israel New Zealand Switzerland
Austria France Italy Norway United Kingdom
Belgium Germany Japan Portugal United States
Canada Greece Korea, Rep. Singapore
Cyprus Hong Kong, China Latvia Slovenia
Czech Republic Iceland Malta Spain
Denmark Ireland Netherlands Sweden
2.C.2. A documentary error on the 2006-2007 GDP data of El Salvador in Panizza (2008)
dataset
In this paper, the public debt data used for graph demonstration and regression analysis is pri-
marily extracted from Panizza (2008) public debt dataset. Particularly, we calculate the public
debt to output ratio by dividing the number of public debt stock to the number of GDP docu-
mented in Panizza (2008) dataset. Compared to WDI dataset we find there is a documentary
error on the 2006-2007 GDP data of El Salvador. This error, for example, makes the calculated
external public debt ratio suddenly jumped from 29% in 2005 to more than 200% in 2006 and
2007. Hence we correct the number of GDP at these 2 sample points based on WDI dataset. In
fact, at the early stage of writing this paper we studied without correcting these 2 points (and
we also tried the case of simply getting rid of these 2 sample points). No finding of this paper
was changed.
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2.C.3. Summary statistics for external debt ratio and financial liberalization in the sample
Table 2.10 documents the summary statistics for external debt ratio and financial liberalization in our sample, 1990-2007. The correlation coefficient
between ED based on Panizza (2008) dataset and WDI is quite high, though their exact definitions of external debt are not the same. The level of
external debt and capital control in each country are generally not very stable during the whole sample period, as indicated by the nontrivial size in
“Avg. SD” column. The inter-country heterogeneity is large, as indicated by the large values in “SD”.
It is notable that the correlation between ED and FinanOpen can be positive, depending on which indicator of variable we use. This seemingly
contradicts what we read from Figure 2.1 and 2.2 along the time dimension. That positive correlation is mainly because along the cross-section
dimension the countries with high financial openness generally also have high external debt ratio. In our regression we will control for this
inter-country heterogeneity.
Table 2.10: Summary statistics for external debt ratio and financial liberalization in the sample, 1990-2007
Variable Min. Mean Med. Max. SD
Avg.
SD
Obs.
Correlation Coefficient with
ED1 ED2 FO1 FO2 FO3 FOW1 FOW2
ED (Panizza, 2008) 0.006 0.329 0.260 2.077 0.279 0.116 767 1
ED (WDI) 0.001 0.351 0.267 1.673 0.273 0.126 688 0.904 1
FinanOpen (Chinn-Ito) 0 0.463 0.411 1 0.331 0.186 794 0.017 0.025 1
FinanOpen (FKRSU) 0 0.548 0.550 1 0.351 0.101 598 0.208 0.181 0.712 1
FinanOpen (ADT) 0 0.625 0.667 1 0.346 0.219 631 -0.154 -0.160 0.555 0.317 1
FinanOpenW (Chinn-Ito) 0.777 0.846 0.855 0.897 0.027 0.027 828 -0.163 -0.160 0.148 -0.217 0.227 1
FinanOpenW (FKRSU) 0.765 0.799 0.805 0.852 0.017 0.016 598 0.051 0.103 -0.155 -0.139 -0.014 0.516 1
FinanOpenW (ADT) 0.855 0.921 0.938 0.973 0.028 0.029 736 -0.163 -0.160 0.218 -0.093 0.254 0.814 0.503
Note: (1) “SD” refers to the standard deviation over all samples. “Avg. SD” refers to the (unweighted) average value of standard deviation in each country.
“ED1”, “ED2”, “FO1”, “FO2”, “FO3”, “FOW1”, “FOW2” is short for the 1st to 7th variables in the column of “Variable”, respectively. (2) FKRSU data starts
at 1995. ADT data ends at 2005.
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2.C.4. Variable definition and data source
Table 2.11 lists the definition of variable and data source for our empirical study. The values of several variables are not directly provided in the
corresponding dataset, and hence are calculated using relevant variables. For example, the public external debt ratio (ED) from Panizza (2008)
dataset is obtained by foreign debt stock (debt for) divided by output (gdp).
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Table 2.11: Definition of variable and data source in regression for financial liberalization and external debt nexus
Variable Definition Data Source
Dependent variable:
ED Public external debt to GDP ratio Panizza (2008) (code debt for/gdp); or WDI (code
DT.DOD.DPPG.CD/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
Key explanatory variables:
FinanOpen Financial liberalization in the home country, ranges from 0 (lowest) to 1
(highest)
Chinn and Ito (2006) (code ka open); or Ferna´ndez et al. (2015)
(code 1 - ka); or Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2010) (code
intlcapital/3)FinanOpenW Financial liberalization in the rest of world (real GDP weighted average over
all other countries), ranges from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest)
Public finance considerations:
DD Public dometic debt to GDP ratio Panizza (2008) (code debt dom/gdp)
FiscalBalance General government budget balance (% of GDP) WEO (code GGR NGDP - GGX NGDP); or WDI (code
GC.BAL.CASH.GD.ZS)
General economic conditions:
GDPpc logarithmic GDP per capita (constant 2005 1000US$) WDI (code NY.GDP.PCAP.KD/1000)
M2 Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP WDI (code FM.LBL.MQMY.GD.ZS)
In f lation Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) WDI (code NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG)
IR Real interest rate (%), measured by lending interest rate adjusted for inflation
WDI (code FR.INR.RINR)
IRrow Real interest rate (%) in the rest of world (real GDP weighted average)
CapForm Gross fixed capital formation rate (% of GDP) WDI (code NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS)
SaveRate Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) WDI (code NY.GDS.TOTL.ZS)
Crisis Occurrence of “Systemic Banking Crisis”, “Currency Crisis”, “Sovereign
Debt Crisis”, or/and “Sovereign Debt Restructuring”
Laeven and Valencia (2013)
External payment variables:
TradeBalance Difference between exports and imports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI (code NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS - NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS)
CurrAcct Current account balance (% of GDP) WEO (code BCA NGDPD)
ER Real effective exchange rate index (2010 = 100) WDI (code PX.REX.REER)
Note: WDI, GFDD and WEO refer to World Bank World Development Indicators, Global Financial Development Database, IMF World Economic Outlook,
respectively.
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Table 2.11 (cont.): Definition of variable and data source in regression for financial liberalization and external debt nexus
Variable Definition Data Source
Institutional and demographic characteristics:
Legal Legal institutional quality, ranges from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) Kuncˇicˇ (2014) (code legal abs)
DepenRatio Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population) WDI (code SP.POP.DPND.OL)
ERR Classification of exchange rate regimes (fixed, intermediate, or floating) Shambaugh Exchange Rate Regime Classification (set value
1/2/3 for group peg/ nonpeg-softpeg/ nonpeg-nonsoftpeg)
Further control variables for robustness analysis:
DebtRelie f Debt forgiveness or reduction (% of GDP) WDI (code DT.DFR.DPPG.CD/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
FinanDev Comprehensive financial development index Svirydzenka (2016) (code FD)
Credit Private credit by deposit money banks (% of GDP) GFDD (code GFDD.DI.01)
Globaliz KOF globalization index Dreher (2006) (code index)
TradeOpen Sum of imports and exports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI (code NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS + NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS)
Reserve Foreign currency reserve (ratio to GDP, or % of total external debt) WDI (code FI.RES.TOTL.CD/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD; or
FI.RES.TOTL.DT.ZS)
PrivateED Private external debt to GDP ratio WDI (code (DT.DOD.DECT.CD - DT.DOD.DPPG.CD)
/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
TotalEDall Average total external debt to GDP ratio over all 46 sample countries (real
GDP weighted average)
WDI (code DT.DOD.DECT.CD/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
FDI FDI net inflow (% of GDP)
WDI (code BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS)
FDIall Average FDI net inflow into developing countries (% of GDP, real GDP
weighted average over all 46 sample countries)
Other variables discussed in the paper:
TD Total public debt to GDP ratio Panizza (2008) (code debt total/gdp); or Abbas et al. (2011)
- Total external debt to GDP ratio WDI (code DT.DOD.DECT.CD/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
- Government bond interest rate, percent per annum IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS)
- FDI stock in the host economy (% of GDP) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) Bilateral FDI Statistics (code instock)
- labor income share Penn World Table (PWT), version 9.0 (code labsh)
Note: WDI, GFDD and WEO refer to World Bank World Development Indicators, Global Financial Development Database, IMF World Economic Outlook,
respectively.
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Appendix 2.D. Regression results for more robustness analysis
2.D.1. Correlation coefficient between financial liberalization, financial development, and economic openness
Table 2.12: Correlation coefficient between financial liberalization, financial development, and economic openness
Corr(x, y)
FinanOpen
(Chinn-Ito)
FinanOpen
(FKRSU)
FinanOpen
(ADT)
FinanDev Credit Globaliz
FinanOpen (Chinn-Ito) 1
FinanOpen (FKRSU) 0.712 1
FinanOpen (ADT) 0.555 0.317 1
FinanDev -0.010 -0.307 0.256 1
Credit 0.110 -0.157 0.060 0.604 1
Globaliz 0.279 0.043 0.397 0.589 0.347 1
TradeOpen 0.188 -0.033 0.154 0.164 0.339 0.297
2.D.2. Regression results for more robustness analysis
Table 2.13 and 2.14 present the regression results for more robustness analysis, corresponding to section 2.3.3.2 in the main text. Model (4.1) and
(5.1) represent our baseline FMOLS and DOLS regression in Table 2.4 and 2.5. We rewrite them here to facilitate comparison. Column (13.1)
and (14.1) are obtained by running the model (4.1) and (5.1) excluding 9 high debt relief countries. Column (13.2) - (13.3) and (14.2) - (14.3) are
obtained by introducing control variables representing financial development and economic openness. Model (13.4) - (13.5) and (14.4) - (14.5)
are obtained by introducing control variable for government budget balance. Model (13.6) - (13.7) and (14.6) - (14.7) control for government
debt repayment ability. Model (13.8) - (13.9) and (14.8) - (14.9) control for exchange rate regime or exchange rate index. Foreign investor base
is introduced in (13.10) - (13.11) and (14.10) - (14.11). The last columns (13.12) and (14.12) display the regression results based on 1970-2012
sample.
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Table 2.13: Regression result for more robustness analysis by Fully Modified OLS, ED as dependent variable
Baseline
Debt
relief
Financial develop.
and eco. openness
Fiscal balance Repayment ability Exchange rate Investor base 70-12
(4.1) (13.1) (13.2) (13.3) (13.4) (13.5) (13.6) (13.7) (13.8) (13.9) (13.10) (13.11) (13.12)
FinanOpen -0.070** -0.058** -0.104*** -0.100*** -0.189*** -0.038 -0.098*** -0.108** -0.104*** -0.118*** -0.141*** -0.100*** -0.188***
FinanOpenW -0.323 -0.438** -0.138 -0.002 -0.247 -0.171 -0.330 -0.423 -0.033 -0.079 -0.164 0.256 1.094***
DD 0.093 0.064 0.106 0.085 0.122* 0.013 0.117* 0.031 0.093 0.455*** 0.232*** 0.052 -0.035
GDPpc -0.691*** -0.738*** -0.644*** -0.607*** -0.723*** -0.918*** -0.705*** -0.754*** -0.687*** -0.533*** -0.539*** -0.625*** -0.905***
M2 0.056 0.139** 0.055 0.105 -0.014 0.126 0.027 -0.046 0.056 -0.032 -0.202*** 0.040 0.374***
CapForm 0.130 0.412** 0.197 0.110 0.654*** 0.728** 1.332*** 1.452*** 0.188 0.066 0.439* 0.184 0.605***
TradeBalance 0.546*** 0.722*** 0.618*** 0.624*** 0.926*** 1.113*** 1.659*** 1.633*** 0.586*** 0.283* 0.691*** 0.565*** 0.469***
FinanDev -0.095
Credit -0.117*
Globaliz 0.001
TradeOpen 0.025
FiscalBalance1 -0.001
FiscalBalance2 0.003
SaveRate -0.011*** -0.012***
Reserve1 0.191*
Reserve2 -0.016
ERR 0.004
ER -0.120***
PrivateED 0.514***
TotalEDall -0.301*
FDI 0.027
FDIall -3.703***
Sample period: 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 71-12
Cross-sections: 45 36 43 42 43 28 41 34 42 25 32 42 37
Observations: 691 569 675 666 595 390 651 536 658 394 508 666 1172
Note: (1) */**/*** indicates the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively. (2) The estimated coefficients for FinanDev, Credit, Globaliz, TradeOpen,
Reserve2, FDI and FDIall are rescaled by multiplying 100 for better demonstration. This rescaling also applies to Table 2.14. (3) FiscalBalance1 and
FiscalBalance2 use the fiscal surplus data from WEO and WDI, respectively. Reserve1 and Reserve2 denote the foreign currency reserve as ratio to GDP and %
of total external debt. Table 2.14 also employs these variables.
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Table 2.14: Regression result for more robustness analysis by Dynamic OLS, ED as dependent variable
Baseline
Debt
relief
Financial develop.
and eco. openness
Fiscal balance Repayment ability Exchange rate Investor base 70-12
(5.1) (14.1) (14.2) (14.3) (14.4) (14.5) (14.6) (14.7) (14.8) (14.9) (14.10) (14.11) (14.12)
FinanOpen -0.068** -0.077** -0.068** -0.084*** -0.148*** -0.027 -0.072** -0.062 -0.082** -0.073** 0.007 -0.051 -0.159***
FinanOpenW -0.726*** -0.702*** -0.402 -0.290 -0.106 -0.117 -0.026 0.033 -0.176 -0.385 -0.478** 0.227 0.862***
DD 0.037 0.038 0.036 0.189** -0.048 0.267* 0.205** 0.096 0.239*** 0.580*** 0.292*** 0.241*** 0.149**
GDPpc -0.807*** -0.817*** -0.718*** -0.346*** -0.687*** -0.714*** -0.816*** -0.838*** -0.551*** -0.580*** -0.609*** -1.057***
M2 0.135* 0.132* 0.061 -0.010 0.369***
CapForm 0.663** 0.627** 0.914**
TradeBalance 0.582*** 0.542*** 0.150
FinanDev 0.352**
Credit -0.125
Globaliz -0.002
TradeOpen 0.140**
FiscalBalance1 -0.001
FiscalBalance2 -0.006
SaveRate 0.000 -0.001
Reserve1 0.012
Reserve2 -0.033
ERR 0.012
ER -0.167***
PrivateED 0.406***
TotalEDall -0.272
FDI 0.100
FDIall -4.644***
Sample period: 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 91-07 71-12
Cross-sections: 23 22 23 23 19 19 32 25 31 23 23 32 28
Observations: 391 374 391 391 308 291 529 413 505 371 381 529 870
Note: (1) */**/*** indicates the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively. (2) In model (14.2) - (14.11) a set of control variable (GDPpc, M2, CapForm,
TradeBalance) are deleted from the regression specification to fit the use of BIC, otherwise our sample size is not enough.
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Appendix 2.E. Further explorations: causality and the effect of financial
liberalization on domestic public debt
The reduced form regressions in Section 2.3.3, though strongly confirm the link between fi-
nancial liberalization and external public debt, are yet insufficient to assert the causality from
financial globalization to external debt. Here we present a discussion on the causality and po-
tential reverse causality effect. We will provide support for the causality using the Propensity
Score Matching (PSM) method. And we also check whether the reverse causality of the influ-
ence from external debt to financial liberalization exists. Additionally, we investigate whether
financial liberalization influences domestic public debt ratio. For simplicity, in the econometric
model we merely interchange ED with the new dependent variables but still regressing on the
same group of other explanatory variables.
2.E.1. Check the causality using Propensity Score Matching
Conventionally we can resort to the method of Difference-in-Difference (DID) to identify the
treatment effect of policy implementation. But in our application the DID is not highly suit-
able. (i) DID is typically grounded on the “parallel trends assumption”, which means in the
absence of treatment the average change of different samples’ outcome variables should be
similar. That may not be true when we consider public debt in distinct countries with many
heterogenous characteristics, even after we introduce some control variables in regression. (ii)
DID is well designed to evaluate the effect of “one-off” policy change. But financial liberaliza-
tion is usually a successive and long-run process, and sometimes with policy reversal. Hence
it is actually difficult to compare the “treatment” group with the “control” group, as it is often
ambiguous to point out which them are. Although we can look at the change of financial open-
ness indicator of each country at each period, it is not sufficient.21 In fact we have tried DID,
with a set of different model specifications. The result (not reported) shows negative estimated
coefficient (i.e. capital liberalization reduces external public debt) in almost all cases, but often
insignificant. On the one hand, we can negatively interpret it as a doubt on the effect of finan-
cial liberalization. But on the other hand, this is plausibly the result of the violation of “parallel
trends assumption” and the incapacity to identify where the policy implementation is.
Considering the potential difficulty to utilize DID, we turn to the method of Propensity
Score Matching (PSM) which is increasingly popular in recent years. This method, different
from typical reduced form regressions but to some extent similar to DID, is powerful to help
identify treatment effect and infer causality. Using PSM we find financial liberalization indeed
has treatment effect to reduce external public debt. The basic idea of PSM is as follows. It
21For example we can consider such a case: country A’s financial openness index increases sequentially from
year t to t+3; and country B’s index increases from t to t+1, keeps that level at t+2 and then increases again at
t+3. It may be unreasonable to assert that in period t+2 sample A is the “treatment” and B is “control”, since B’s
economic response to liberalization in t may be lagged and then quickly affected by the subsequent policy change.
121
first “matches” units that experience an intentional intervention (such as a treatment or policy
change like financial liberalization in our case) with those “similar” units without a treatment,
where the “similarity” is measured by the socalled “propensity score”. Then it uses information
from these “matched” units to identify the treatment effect i.e. what would have happened to
treated samples in the absence of intervention. In our application, we estimate the Average
Treatment Effect (ATE):
ATE = E(∆EDi|Ti = 1)−E(∆EDi|Ti = 0)
where Ti = 1 means a policy change and Ti = 0 means no change.
Results summary
The use of PSM enables us to mitigate the potential difficulties to employ DID. (i) Since
PSM compares treatment group with “similar” control group, it tends to reduce the violation of
“parallel trends assumption”. (ii) Regarding the identification of “treatment group”, we check
two different strategies. In the first situation, we just assume the financial liberalization in one
year can be independent of the other years. That means we directly consider the year-to-year
change of capital account openness index as an occurrence of “treatment”. Secondly, observing
that the change of liberalization index often lasts for 3 to 5 years, we consider 5-years is a
period of policy change completion. Thus we inspect whether a 5-years difference in financial
openness affects the 5-years difference in external debt. The details and primary results of
our PSM analysis are documented in Table 2.15 which, from a more clear way of causality
inference, supports our previous finding from reduced form regressions: financial liberalization
in the home country significantly reduces external debt ratio.
Implementation details
There are several different softwares, with different default procedures, to implement PSM.
We select the “teffects psmatch” command in Stata. (1) We first examine the “treatment”
of year-to-year change of financial liberalization i.e. how ∆FinanOpent−1 impacts ∆EDt . We
study two directions of policy intervention: “financial liberalization” which means ∆FinanOpen
> 0; and “financial re-regulation” which means ∆FinanOpen< 0. The control group consists of
the samples with ∆FinanOpen= 0. As the first step of PSM, we estimate the propensity score
(not reported here) using the explanatory variable set of [GDPpc, CapForm, TradeBalance,
FinanDev, CurrAcct]. (Our PSM result is not very sensitive to the selection of explanatory
variables.) In the second step, we match sample units and estimate treatment effect based on
the estimated propensity score in the first step. In order to ensure the robustness of PSM, we
consider 5 model variants. (a) The “Default” model use logit regression to estimate propensity
scores, with one-to-one match with nearest neighbour algorithm and with replacement. (b) Ac-
cordingly, the model of “Probit” uses probit regression. (c) “nn(2)” matches two controls to one
treatment sample. (d) “More var.” adds [M2, GovSize] into the propensity score explanatory
variable set. (e) Finally, the model “Large change” only considers the treated sample with large
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policy change, which is defined as an absolute value of ∆FinanOpen larger than one standard
deviation of ∆FinanOpen i.e. 0.11. (2) Then we investigate the “treatment” as 5-years liber-
alization process i.e. how (FinanOpent −FinanOpent−5) impacts (EDt −EDt−5). Because
an invariability of financial openness over 5-years period is relatively scarce, we take 1SD of
∆FinanOpen i.e. 0.24 as threshold of policy change. The “Large change” is defined as 1.5SD
which is 0.36.
The estimated average treatment effect (ATE) and associated robust standard error are re-
ported in Table 2.15. It shows that financial liberalization significantly reduces external public
debt ratio. As expected, a 5-years liberalization has much larger effect than 1-year liberal-
ization. This result strengthens our finding in Section 2.3.3. On the other hand, financial re-
regulation does not generate significant influence. It seems that a “ratchet effect” of financial
liberalization on the external debt reduction exists. Given the overall trend of financial liberal-
ization and external debt reduction in the past decades, this “ratchet effect” does not contradict
our basic finding.
Table 2.15: Result of using Propensity Score Matching to check causality
Treatment
Estimated Average Treatment Effect (ATE) Coefficient
Liberalizationt−1 Liberalization5year Regulationt−1 Regulation5year
Default -0.024* -0.058** -0.002 0.017
[0.013] [0.028] [0.022] [0.025]
Probit -0.024** -0.047 0.009 0.018
[0.012] [0.031] [0.022] [0.026]
nn(2) -0.019 -0.064*** -0.003 0.016
[0.012] [0.024] [0.022] [0.023]
More var. -0.032** -0.024 0.007 0.024
[0.015] [0.037] [0.023] [0.022]
Large change -0.023* -0.092** 0.001 0.046
[0.013] [0.040] [0.020] [0.035]
Total obs. 509 472 436 380
Matched treatment 125 (58) 141 (79) 52 (28) 49 (14)
Note: (1) */**/*** indicates the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively. (2) The number in “[ ]”
provides the “AI Robust SE” which is the robust standard error of the estimated coefficient, based on the
method of Abadie and Imbens (2012). (3) The amount of matched treatment samples is documented in
the row “Matched treatment”. Number in “( )” indicates the amount in model “Large change” i.e. when
we only consider the sample with large policy change.
2.E.2. Check the (in)existence of reverse causality effect
We investigate whether external debt ratio influences the government’s decision of capital ac-
count openness. Particularly we use the following model specification:
FinanOpenit = α1FinanOpenWit +α2EDit +θ ′X it + si+σt + εit
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with the corresponding corrections with respect to FMOLS or DOLS. In the regression it is
also important to control for domestic debt ratio. For example, a country with public debt as
100% of GDP in which 30% is external debt may not concern the external debt much, since the
majority of its liability comes from domestic pressure. In contrast, a country with public debt
as 30% of GDP which is all external debt definitely can behave differently (on e.g. the default
decision), as all its liability is connected to foreigners.
We conjecture that the coefficient α2 could be negative, since when the government sees
a high external debt ratio it has the incentive to implement capital control and want to retain
financial resources domestically. And we expect the coefficient α1 is positive since the global
trend of financial openness would impose pressure on the countries who is still financially
closed. The original data of financial liberalization index is bounded between 0 and 1. This
raises problem when FinanOpen is taken as dependent variable in the regression. Following
von Hagen and Zhou (2005), we transform the financial liberalization data x using the formula
x∗ = log( x1−x) after replacing 0 with 0.01 and 1 with 0.99.
Results summary
Table 2.16 as below gives the regression result if we take the transformed financial open-
ness index FinanOpen−Trs as dependent variable. There is no much evidence that external
debt ratio ED significantly explains the financial liberalization in the home country. Table
2.17 gives the Granger causality test results for the variable ED vs. FinanOpen as well as
FinanOpen−Trs. While there are evidences that FinanOpen or FinanOpen−Trs Granger
causes ED, the support for the reverse Granger causality is very weak. In short, we do not
see the existence of severe reverse causality which biases our core empirical finding that finan-
cial globalization dampened external public debt in developing countries.
Implementation details
Table 2.16 gives the regression result if we take the transformed financial openness in-
dex FinanOpen−Trs as dependent variable. In most cases the estimated coefficient for ED is
not significant. Table 2.17 presents the Granger causality test results for the variable ED vs.
FinanOpen as well as FinanOpen−Trs. The result strongly rejects the null hypothesis that
financial openness does not Granger cause external debt change. In contrast, the inexistence of
reverse Granger causality is not rejected in most cases. Although the reverse Granger causality
is found in the case of 4 lags, logically we can rule out this possibility since it is obviously
unreasonable to believe that financial liberalization policy reponses to the external debt ratio
four years ago.
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Table 2.16: Regression result by FMOLS and DOLS, FinanOpen−Trs as dependent vari-
able
FMOLS DOLS
Base-
line
FKRSU ADT WDI
Base-
line
FKRSU ADT WDI
(16.1) (16.2) (16.3) (16.4) (16.5) (16.6) (16.7) (16.8)
FinanOpenW 3.699 1.002 16.607** 1.884 4.263 0.503 20.058* 1.954
ED -1.487** -0.517 -4.156*** -0.934 -1.135 -0.091 -3.303 -0.851
DD 0.856 -0.516 0.715 1.756** 1.677 -0.880 -0.862 3.139**
GDPpc -1.158 0.075 -2.956 0.264 -1.816 -0.572 -0.859 0.477
M2 -0.697 -0.792 -0.031 0.615 -1.559 -0.623 -1.800
CapForm 0.877 -1.895 12.901** -0.059 -0.971 -1.921
TradeBalance -2.252 -0.014 3.688 -1.302 -2.494 7.505 -2.941
Sample period: 91-07 96-07 91-05 91-07 91-07 96-07 91-05 91-07
Cross-sections: 46 44 38 39 26 36 27 22
Observations: 703 503 544 589 442 427 405 374
Note: (1) */**/*** indicates the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively. (2) FinanOpen−Trs is
the after-transformation financial openness index. (3) In model (16.6) the regressors [M2, CapForm,
TradeBalance] are deleted from the regression specification to fit the use of BIC, otherwise our sample
size is not enough. Similarly, in model (16.7) the regressorCapForm is excluded.
Table 2.17: Granger Causality Tests: ED vs. FinanOpen
Null Hypothesis:
F-Statistic
Lags: 1 Lags: 2 Lags: 3 Lags: 4
ED does not Granger Cause FinanOpen 1.885 1.089 0.590 4.323***
ED does not Granger Cause FinanOpen−Trs 0.690 0.336 0.361 4.665***
FinanOpen does not Granger Cause ED 1.417 6.484*** 5.083*** 6.072***
FinanOpen−Trs does not Granger Cause ED 1.308 3.034** 2.381* 3.695***
Note: (1) */**/*** indicates the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively. (2) Following von
Hagen and Zhou (2005), we transform the original financial liberalization data x using the formula
x∗ = log( x1−x) after replacing 0 with 0.01 and 1 with 0.99. FinanOpen−Trs is the after-transformation
variable. (3) Different VAR lag order selection criteria imply different lag selections for the Granger
causality test. We report the cases from lag 1 to lag 4 in the table.
2.E.3. The effect of financial liberalization on domestic public debt
In Section 2.3.3 we found that financial liberalization is linked to the decrease in external public
debt in developing countries. Then a correlated question is whether domestic public debt can
also be impacted by financial liberalization.
Results summary
Table 2.18 demonstrates the regression result for domestic public debt DD as dependent
variable. It is clear from the regression result that financial globalization does not have evi-
dent influence on domestic public debt ratio. Under different econometric specifications, the
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estimated coefficients for variables FinanOpen and FinanOpenW are genenrally statistically
insignificant and uncertain in sign. On the contrary, domestic economic characteristics have
relatively strong affect. GDP growth reduces domestic debt ratio. Capital formation rate is also
relevant to reduce domestic debt, which may happen if high capital formation rate is associated
with high economic growth or the priority to borrow externally.
The regression result here shows the importance to distinguish between domestic debt and
external debt, when we explore the potential influence of financial liberalization on government
liability. If we further regress taking total public debt ratio TD as dependent variable, as in Ta-
ble 2.19, we would obtain significantly negative coefficient of home country financial openness
just like for external debt. This confirms that financial liberalization affects public debt majorly
via external debt.
Implementation details
Table 2.18 and 2.19 demonstrate the regression results taking domestic public debt DD and
total public debt TD as dependent variable, respectively. The econometric model specification
in each column is similar to its counterpart in Table 2.4 and 2.5. In Table 2.19 we do not have
ED or DD as explanatory variable, because they are a part of the dependent variable TD. For
the model (19.4) and (19.8), the total public debt data from Abbas et al. (2011) is used.
Table 2.18: Regression result by FMOLS and DOLS, DD as dependent variable
FMOLS DOLS
Base-
line
FKRSU ADT WDI
Base-
line
FKRSU ADT WDI
(18.1) (18.2) (18.3) (18.4) (18.5) (18.6) (18.7) (18.8)
FinanOpen 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.070** 0.004 0.005 -0.031 0.051
FinanOpenW 0.054 0.669** -0.659** -0.009 0.229 0.322 0.632 0.356
ED 0.103** 0.185*** 0.199*** -0.002 0.024 0.205*** 0.417*** 0.091
GDPpc -0.308*** -0.041 -0.226** -0.337*** -0.519*** -0.399*** -0.398*** -0.387***
M2 0.027 0.206*** 0.034 0.022 -0.046 -0.213*** -0.097
CapForm -0.149 -0.337* -0.545*** -0.111 -0.556**
TradeBalance 0.134 -0.054 -0.362*** 0.150 0.143 -0.316* 0.170
Sample period: 91-07 96-07 91-05 91-07 91-07 95-07 91-05 91-07
Cross-sections: 45 42 37 39 23 31 23 26
Observations: 693 481 522 593 391 368 345 431
Note: (1) */**/*** indicates the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively. (2) In model (18.6)
the variables [M2, CapForm, TradeBalance] are deleted, and in model (18.7) and (18.8) the variable
CapForm is deleted from the regression specification to fit the use of BIC, otherwise our sample size is
not enough.
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Table 2.19: Regression result by FMOLS and DOLS, TD as dependent variable
FMOLS DOLS
Base-
line
FKRSU ADT ABEH
Base-
line
FKRSU ADT ABEH
(19.1) (19.2) (19.3) (19.4) (19.5) (19.6) (19.7) (19.8)
FinanOpen -0.056 -0.102 -0.074** -0.267*** -0.100** -0.004 -0.072* -0.300***
FinanOpenW -0.402 1.391*** -2.102*** 0.419* -0.032 1.822** -1.338** 0.151
GDPpc -1.111*** -0.964*** -1.359*** -1.300*** -1.179*** -1.366*** -1.374*** -1.228***
M2 0.094 0.168 0.083 0.541*** 0.112 0.313** -0.131 0.717***
CapForm -0.005 0.494 0.612* 0.460* -0.713** -0.795* 0.504*
TradeBalance 0.739*** 0.967*** 0.530*** 0.536*** 0.291 -0.754*** 0.687***
Sample period: 91-07 96-07 91-05 71-12 91-07 96-07 91-05 71-12
Cross-sections: 46 42 37 44 33 32 25 36
Observations: 707 483 528 1435 546 379 375 1231
Note: (1) */**/*** indicates the 10%/5%/1% significance level, respectively. (2) In model (19.6) the
variables [CapForm, TradeBalance] are deleted from the regression specification to fit the use of BIC,
otherwise our sample size is not enough.
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Chapter 3
Financial development and output
volatility nexus: Industrial heterogeneity
matters
Is financial development positively, negatively, or not linked to the aggregate output volatil-
ity? Very controversial debates exist in both empirical and theoretical literature. This paper
argues that financial development can either exacerbate or dampen output volatility, depending
on the type of industry whose credit access is expanded. Using a two-sector real business cycle
model augmented with the collateral constraint a` la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), we show that if
the borrowing constraint is relaxed in the consumption goods sector, macroeconomic volatility
will rise. On the contrary, if the financial friction is lessened in the capital goods sector, output
volatility may decline or be roughly unchanged. The underlying intuition is that the sensitivity
of output to economic shocks crucially depends on the intensity of firms to adjust their produc-
tion inputs, which relies on the marginal products of capital and labor. Financial development
increases the labor marginal product, but alters the overall capital marginal product through two
opposite effects on the capital allocation dynamics. Credit expansion mainly causes an inter-
industry capital reallocation if it occurs only in consumption industry, while the reallocation
effect is dominated by the economy-wide capital expansion if the financial development occurs
in capital industry. In the latter case the overall marginal product of capital decreases, but in the
former case no substantial change is induced. Therefore, the industrial heterogeneity and the
associated capital allocation are crucial, in order to analyze the effect of financial development
on aggregate output volatility.
Keywords: financial development, collateral constraint, output volatility, developing countries
JEL Classification: E23, E44, G20
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3.1 Introduction
A strong argument supporting financial development is that the reduction of financial frictions
will dampen macroeconomic volatility. However, empirical literature investigating the effect
of financial development on economic volatility is highly controversial, inconclusive and even
confusing. While some research shows that financial development is linked to a decline of
output volatility, a set of studies explicitly deny the existence of significant negative correlation.
Even worse, a positive relationship can be found by some literature. Concerning the possible
nonlinear effects, some studies reckon upon a U-shaped relation while an inverse-U-shaped is
supported by some other studies.
Along with the indeterminacy in empirical evidence, the theoretical literature does not
present explicit guidelines either. Throughout this present paper, we stick to using the avail-
ability of lending credit as the proxy of financial development.1 To be more precise, “financial
development” refers to an increase of LTV (loan-to-value) ratio in collateralized borrowing a`
la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (KM henceforth). Following the KM modelling approach, some
theoretical literature demonstrates that financial development can induce lower output volatil-
ity. But in the literature we can also find the contrary arguments elsewhere.
Considering the confusing controversy in the existing literature, it is natural to conjecture
that the underlying relation may be conditional on one certain factor which was overlooked
before. Our paper demonstrates that the industrial heterogeneity matters in the story. Our paper
is different from the previous studies mainly in the following aspects. (1) We do not focus on
the degree of economy-wide credit access per se. Instead, we distinguish the different types
of firms who can borrow in the financial market. (2) Moreover, rather than focusing on the
inter-firm heterogeneity (e.g. public/private firms, small/large firms) mainly because of the
difference in ownership or TFP level, we discuss the industrial distinction. We construct a two-
sector model with one consumption goods production sector and one capital goods production
sector, and study the interaction between the two industries.
Our model shows that if domestic financial friction is reduced in the consumption goods
sector, macroeconomic volatility will rise. On the contrary, if financial friction is lessened for
capital goods producers, output volatility may decline or be roughly unchanged. Obviously,
the output volatility effects would be dissimilar if the “financial development” in two coun-
tries occurs in different industries, though the degrees of “financial development” measured
by the traditional credit to GDP ratio indicator are alike. Our finding will contribute to the
literature mainly in two aspects. (1) Relevant to the policy analysis, we emphasize the indus-
trial heterogeneity as a crucial factor which may change the effect of financial development on
macroeconomic volatility. Thus our finding calls for a better measurement of financial devel-
opment, which identifies the type of credit owner rather than an overall ratio of credit access.
1Undoubtedly, the concept of “financial development” contains numerous other elements which are far beyond
the current paper. A more comprehensive analysis on financial development, including the access, depth, and
intermediation efficiency, is presented by Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) among others.
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(2) We add new condiment into the KM type financial friction literature, as we show that a one-
sector (representative or heterogeneous) firm model is not sufficient to unfold the full picture
of output dynamics.
A potential criticism on our study is that the degree of credit access may exhibit no signifi-
cant difference across industrial categories. Our study argues that rather than only caring about
the degree of economy-wide credit access per se, we should inspect the type of industry whose
credit is expanded. However, if there is no industrial heterogeneity of financial development
level in reality, or there is no way to discriminate against different industries in commercial
lending practice, the practical value of our analysis would be gravely weakened. Although we
do not have data at hand regarding the exact degree of financial development in consumption
industry and investment industry, we have some indirect supportive materials that the industrial
heterogeneity of financial development level indeed exists. Our arguments are from three as-
pects. (1) First, the typical firm size is dissimilar across industries. Since big firms usually have
better access to market credit than small firms, the industries typically with large firms possibly
have looser borrowing constraint. (2) Second, some industries are more closely linked to the
government, which may facilitate the borrowing of those industries at the cost of depressing
other business sectors. (3) The external financing dependence of distinct industries can greatly
differ. This implies that an economy-wide financial development faintly affects the credit avail-
ability of some industries, while largely improves the credit access of some other industries. A
more detailed discussion on the difference of financial development level across industries is
documented in Appendix 3.A.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents a brief literature review.
Section 3.3 provides a two-sector real business cycle model calibrated to a typical developing
country. Section 3.4 demonstrates the model simulation results and discusses how the effect of
financial development depends on the industrial heterogeneity. Finally Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
Our paper is primarily linked to the literature on the effect of financial frictions and financial
development on macroeconomic volatility. Although our paper is theoretical, we first briefly
discuss the empirical literature as the indeterminacy in empirical evidence is the main motiva-
tion of our paper.
3.2.1 Empirical literature
As already summarized in the introduction section, there is no consensus in empirical studies.
In Table 3.3 at Appendix 3.B, we list some recent empirical findings and mark how different
they are. Some empirical studies, e.g. Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013), Denizer, Iyigun and
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Owen (2002), Ferreira da Silva (2002), Larrain (2006), Mallick (2014), Manganelli and Popov
(2015), Raddatz (2006), Raheem, Bello Ajide and Adeniyi (2016), Xu (2009), find that finan-
cial development is associated with the decrease of output volatility. But the robustness of that
negative correlation is yet doubtful. The studies by Acemoglu et al. (2003), Beck, Degryse
and Kneer (2014), Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2006), Ferreira Tiryaki (2003), Fidrmuc and
Scharler (2013), Hahn (2003), Levchenko, Rancie`re and Thoenig (2009), Tharavanij (2007) do
not confirm the existence of significant correlation. Based on a firm-level dataset, Dodonov
(2009) finds that financial development may significantly raise volatility in construction and
manufacturing sectors. Regarding the possible nonlinear effects, Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz
(2000), Ibrahim and Alagidede (2016) and Yang and Liu (2016) show a U-shaped relationship,
which implies that financial development may be helpful in developing countries but unpleasant
in developed economies. Those findings are, however, in constrast with the inverse-U-shaped
relation found by Alatrash et al. (2014) and Kunieda (2008).
On the one hand, the controversy may emerge because different studies employ distinct
samples, econometric methods, and definitions of the core variables. On the other hand, it
is possible that the essential relation is conditional on one certain factor which can largely
influence, or even drive the result, but is not taken into account by these studies. Our paper
attempts to illustrate the industrial heterogeneity as a candidate.
3.2.2 Theoretical literature
The financial friction in our paper takes the form of the well known collateral constraint mech-
anism a` la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Hence we neglect the bulk of the literature on the other
financial accelerator mechanisms, primarily the BGG (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999)
literature. KM show that if the debt needs to be secured by collateral, even a small economic
shock may cause large and persistent economic fluctuations. Following the KM modelling ap-
proach, a set of studies investigate whether the financial development, proxied by the LTV ratio
in collateral constraint, helps reduce macroeconomic volatility.
Although some theoretical literature, e.g. Mendicino (2007), Mitra (2012), Wang and Wen
(2010), Wang, Wen and Xu (2016), show that financial development can cause a decline of out-
put volatility in certain circumstances, Jensen et al. (2017), Jensen, Ravn and Santoro (2016),
Mendicino (2012) and Pinheiro, Rivadeneyra and Teignier (2016) demonstrate that an increase
of volatility can be the direct result of a raised LTV ratio unless its value is unusually high.2 A
closer inspection on these theoretical models seemingly exhibits that the result is sensitive to
2To be precise, some theoretical literature actually argues that financial development can generate an inverse-U-
shape effect on output volatility: financial development increases volatility if the degree of financial development
is below a certain threshold; and it decreases the volatility once the threshold is exceeded. However, in those
studies the threshold measured by the LTV ratio in borrowing constraint is rather high, e.g. around 0.8 (Jensen
et al., 2017; Jensen, Ravn and Santoro, 2016), 0.9 (Mendicino, 2012) or even higher (Pinheiro, Rivadeneyra and
Teignier, 2016), and only few advanced countries (if any) have a level close to the threshold. In other words, the
implication for developing countries is actually that financial development increases macroeconomic volatility.
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the exact way of model setup.
Here we try to compare most of these models in a unified framework. The basic ideas of
them can be summarized as follows. Financial development (FD) affects the output volatility
because it changes the responsiveness of the credit constrained firms to economic shocks. And
after a shock this “Aggregate Output Responsiveness” depends on the size of “MPK·∆K·Weight”
where MPK is the marginal product of capital of credit constrained firms (or the MPK gap be-
tween constrained and unconstrained firms, if the latter exist in the model); ∆K is the amount
of capital redistributed to the constrained firms; Weight measures the importance such as the
output share of the constrained agents. The models of Jensen et al. (2017), Jensen, Ravn and
Santoro (2016), Pinheiro, Rivadeneyra and Teignier (2016) emphasize the mechanism that FD
may increase output volatility by expanding the term ∆K. Mendicino (2012) notes that FD de-
creases the MPK gap but increases theWeight measured by the output share. Since the rise of
Weight dominates in her model, FD overall raises output volatility if the degree of FD is not suf-
ficiently high. In constrast, FD can dampen output volatility as in Mendicino (2007), where FD
greatly decreases the MPK gap between constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs. Some-
how departing from the idea of “MPK·∆K·Weight”, Mitra (2012), Wang and Wen (2010),
Wang, Wen and Xu (2016) show how FD reduces the aggregate output volatility by consid-
ering the possibility that low productivity firms may not produce at all. In an economy with
heterogeneous firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, only highly productive firms
produce and those low productivity firms lend. FD makes the output correlation between high
and low productivity firms more negative (Mitra, 2012); or renders the firms’ investment de-
cisions less dependent on their own internal cash flows and thus less responsive to aggregate
shocks (Wang and Wen, 2010; Wang, Wen and Xu, 2016). These studies that we just discussed
all take into account some certain important parts of the economy. However, based on the ex-
isting models we cannot yet explain why some empirical works find that FD decreases output
volatility but some others do not.
Several recent studies attempt to resist against this arbitrariness by investigating the differ-
ent stories among heterogeneous firms. Thesmar and Thoenig (2011) and Mitra (2016) demon-
strate that financial development can increase public firms’ output volatility and decrease pri-
vate firms’ volatility. Focusing on labor market dynamics, Epstein and Shapiro (2016) find that
unemployment and wage volatility will drop if only small firms have improved credit access,
which is not the case if financial development occurs only for large firms. Regarding aggregate
output volatility, they find financial development in either firm group only results in slightly
lower output volatility, with the development for small firms has a relatively stronger effect.
In line with the heterogeneous firm literature, our model also pays close attention to dif-
ferentiate diverse firms. But we do not categorize them based on whether they are public or
private, big or small. Instead, we group them into either consumption goods industry or cap-
ital goods industry. Our study shows that credit expansion in the two industries has disparate
implication on the aggregate output volatility.
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3.3 Theoretical model
In this section we lay out our real business cycle model with KM type collateral constraint in a
closed economy. The model is extremely simple but powerful to demonstrate our core idea. The
model consists of three types of representative agents: (1) housesholds who supply labor, save
and lend to domestic entrepreneurs (firms); (2) consumption goods production entrepreneurs
who own the consumption goods firms, make production decisions, and borrow from house-
holds conditional on collateralizing capitals; (3) capital goods production entrepreneurs who
specialize in capital reproduction, sell capitals to the households and entrepreneurs in consump-
tion industry, and also borrow from household savers. The government and external sector are
not assumed in our model economy.
The key feature of our model is that we divide production into two distinct industries: con-
sumption goods and capital goods. Consumption goods are used up in each period to directly
generate utility for the entrepreneurs and households, while capital goods are stored and utilized
for production input in the future.3 This type of two-sector model has long history, stretching
back to Uzawa (1961). Although the two-sector model was originally designed to analyze eco-
nomic growth, it has been shown to also be powerful for business cycle analysis (e.g. Jaimovich
and Rebelo, 2009; Buera, Kaboski and Shin, 2011). However the employment of a two-sector
model is not typical in theoretical literature on KM type financial frictions, which usually as-
sumes a one-to-one convertibility between consumption and capital goods (perphaps subject to
an investment adjustment cost).4 Our analysis below will demonstrate that in an environment
with heterogenous industries together with the consumption-capital inconvertibility, the tradi-
tional measurement of financial development by an economy-wide credit to output ratio fails
to differentiate the impacts of different credit expansions on output volatility.
3An explicit categorization regarding which industry in the real economy should belong to consumption goods
sector or capital goods sector is sometimes ambiguous. A simple, though not completely rigorous, criterion to
categorize is that the consumption goods sector refers to the industries that produce items purchased by individ-
uals rather than by manufacturers and industries. The consumption sector includes the companies involved with
food, clothing, beverages, automobiles for household, sport, entertainment, services and so on. The investment
goods sector includes the enterprises for cement, machinery, building, industrial energy equipment, raw material,
pollution and waste management and so forth.
4Of course, we do not mean that our paper is the only one using a two-sector model to study financial frictions.
For example, the two-sector model is used by von Hagen and Zhang (2014) to explain the patterns of international
capital flows, and by Alvarez-Parra, Brandao-Marques and Toledo (2013), Monacelli (2009) to study the large
volatility of durable spending. But on our research topic i.e. the effect of financial development on aggregate
output volatility, the employment of the two-sector model is relatively novel. It is notable that Mendicino (2007)
also analyzes the financial development and output volatility nexus based on a two-sector model (whose basic
framework can be found in Cordoba and Ripoll (2004)). But our model differs from hers in several key aspects.
(1) Ownership relation between consumption and capital goods sectors. In her model each entrepreneur owns both
consumption and capital sectors simultaneously, and thus capital will be reallocated between sectors to maximize
overall output in each period. In our model the two industries are completely separate such that the two sectors
cannot control each other directly. (2) Source of lending. In her model the credit constrained entrepreneurs
borrow from those unconstrained entrepreneurs. In our model all entrepreneurs borrow from households such that
all entrepreneurs are credit constrained. (3) Result. The result of her model is that financial development reduces
output volatility monotonically. In our model financial development can either increase or decrease volatility,
dpending on which industry obtains credit expansion.
134
3.3.1 Consumption goods entrepreneur
3.3.1.1 Agent’s optimization problem
The consumption goods entrepreneurs maximize their life-time utility by making decisions
about employing production inputs and borrowing domestically. The optimization problem is
expressed as:
max
{C1t ,K1t ,L1t ,B1t}
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t1
C1−ϕ1t
1−ϕ
subject to the flow budget constraint:
C1t +Qt [K1t− (1−δ )K1,t−1]+B1,t−1Rt−1 = Y1t−WtL1t +B1t (3.1)
and the collateralized borrowing constraint:
RtB1t +ΩWtL1t ≤ γ1tEt {Qt+1K1t} (3.2)
where β1, ϕ , δ are the discount rate, coefficient of relative risk aversion and capital depreciation
rate, respectively. C1t is consumption; B1t is the borrowing from domestic household savers.
Consumption goods production Y1t employs labor L1t and capital K1,t−1 as inputs. Wt is the
real wage; Qt is the price of capital relative to consumption goods; Rt is the interest rate. In
a competitive environment, the wage, capital price and interest rate are all taken as given and
endogenously determined in equilibrium.
To insure themselves against the default risk, household creditors require the entrepreneurs
to collateralize their capital K1t . This is reflected by the borrowing constraint (3.2). Within
this constraint, the term ΩWtL1t represents a working capital requirement in production. That
means a share of wage bill, whose size is determined by the parameterΩ, should be paid before
the creditors receive the interest payment.
In the borrowing constraint, the value of γ1t ∈ [0,1] gives the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
in a debt contract. The value of (1− γ1t) measures the proportion of collateral that needs to
be paid as transaction cost if the lenders liquidate the collateralized assets in the case that
debtors default. Accordingly this proportion reflects the severity of the contract enforceability
problem, which can be mitigated by financial development such as the enhanced institutional
protection on property rights, and improved information transparency on collateralized asset.
The higher the LTV ratio γ1t is, the higher the degree of financial development is. Throughout
this paper, if not particularly specified we always refer to an increase of the LTV ratio when we
mention “financial development”. In the empirical literature, financial development is mostly
measured by the indicator of “credit to GDP ratio”. Our model entails a direct correspondence
between the LTV ratio and credit to output ratio, and thus can be directly linked to the empirical
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literature.
Following the recent literature (e.g. Iacoviello, 2015; Nolan and Thoenissen, 2009) which
emphasizes the importance of financial shocks for business cycles, we assume γ1t is not con-
stant. Instead, it follows an exogenous AR(1) process as follows:
lnγ1t = (1−ργ) lnγ1+ργ lnγ1,t−1+ εγt (3.3)
where the LTV ratio shock εγt
iid∼ N(0,σ2γ ).
3.3.1.2 Production technique
The entrepreneurs own the firms which produce in a completely competitive market using the
following Cobb-Douglas technique:
Y1t = A1tK
α1
1,t−1(XtL1t)
1−α1 (3.4)
where A1t denotes the TFP level, which follows an exogenous AR(1) process:
lnA1t = (1−ρa) lnA1+ρa lnA1,t−1+ εat (3.5)
with the technology shock εat
iid∼ N(0,σ2a ). The variable Xt is used to represent an economic
growth trend. We use gt to denote the economic growth rate. Then Xt evolves according to
Xt
Xt−1 = e
gt with:
gt = g (3.6)
Recent literature (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007) argues that the exogenous shock to economic
growth trend may be important for business cycles, especially in emerging economies. But
the validity of introducing this shock into model is yet suspect, as analyzed by Garcı´a-Cicco,
Pancrazi and Uribe (2010) among others. We test whether a possible “trend shock” largely
alters our result in the robustness analysis at Section 3.4.4, and find no much difference.
3.3.1.3 First order conditions
The first order conditions with respect to C1t and K1t give us the following equation:
Qt
Cϕ1t
= β1
1
Cϕ1,t+1
[
α1
Y1,t+1
K1t
+Qt+1(1−δ )
]
+µ1tγ1tQt+1 (3.7)
where µ1t is the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to the borrowing constraints (3.2). The
optimal choice of B1t requires the following condition:
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1
Cϕ1,t
= Et
{
β1
Rt
Cϕ1,t+1
}
+µ1tRt (3.8)
Although the labor market is completely competitive, the wage is not exactly priced at labor’s
marginal product because of the working capital requirement in entrepreneur’s borrowing con-
straint. That introduces a wedge between wage and labor’s marginal product:
(1−α1)Y1tL1t −Wt =Ωµ1tWtC
ϕ
1t (3.9)
3.3.2 Capital goods entrepreneur
The capital goods entrepreneurs’ problem is analogous to that of its counterpart in consumption
goods industry. The main difference is that their output is capital, which is an intermediate input
for consumption goods production. Of course, the capital goods sector’s production technique
can be different from that in consumption goods industry. The capital goods entrepreneurs sell
their newly produced capitals to the consumption goods industry and households (who need
e.g. residential house or durable goods in consumption bundle), and use the sale revenue to buy
consumption goods which generate utility. Since the equations for capital goods entrepreneurs
are quite similar to those in another industry, we only briefly write down those equations with-
out much detailed interpretation below.
3.3.2.1 Agent’s optimization problem
The optimization problem is:
max
{C2t ,K2t ,L2t ,B2t}
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t2
C1−ϕ2t
1−ϕ
subject to the budget constraint:
C2t +Qt [K2t− (1−δ )K2,t−1]+B2,t−1Rt−1 = QtY2t−WtL2t +B2t (3.10)
and borrowing constraint:
RtB2t +ΩWtL2t ≤ γ2tEt {Qt+1K2t} (3.11)
The LTV ratio γ2t ∈ [0,1] evolves according to an exogenous AR(1) process:
lnγ2t = (1−ργ) lnγ2+ργ lnγ2,t−1+ εγt (3.12)
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with εγt as the same as in equation (3.3). The value of γ2t represents the degree of financial
development in capital goods industry.
3.3.2.2 Production technique
The capital reproduction firms employ the labor L2t and old capital stock K2,t−1 to manufacture
new capital Y2t , based on the following Cobb-Douglas technique:
Y2t = A2tK
α2
2,t−1(XtL2t)
1−α2 (3.13)
where A2t denotes the TFP level, which follows an exogenous AR(1) process:
lnA2t = (1−ρa) lnA2+ρa lnA2,t−1+ εat (3.14)
with εat as the same as in equation (3.5). The economic growth trend Xt is as the same as in
consumption goods industry. Thus the equation (3.6) also applies.
3.3.2.3 First order conditions
The optimization generates the following first order conditions:
Qt
Cϕ2t
= β2
1
Cϕ2,t+1
[
Qt+1α2
Y2,t+1
K2t
+Qt+1(1−δ )
]
+µ2tγ2tQt+1 (3.15)
1
Cϕ2,t
= Et
{
β2
Rt
Cϕ2,t+1
}
+µ2tRt (3.16)
Qt(1−α2)Y2tL2t −Wt =Ωµ2tWtC
ϕ
2t (3.17)
3.3.3 Household
The households obtain utility from consumption, capital goods (e.g. house or durable goods)
utilization, and leisure. Their income comes from labor wage and interest payment from firms’
borrowing.
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3.3.3.1 Agent’s optimization problem
The representative household solves the following intertemporal problem:
max
{C3t ,K3t ,L3t ,B3t}
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t3
[
C1−ϕ3t
1−ϕ + jt−1 lnK3,t−1− τ
L1+η3t
1+η
]
subject to the following budget constraint:
C3t +Qt [K3t− (1−δ )K3,t−1]+B3t =WtL3t +B3,t−1Rt−1
where C3t , K3,t−1, L3t are consumption, capital goods stock and labor, respectively. τ is the
weight parameter for labor disutility, and η is the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The term jt represents the weight of household residence utility, which is possibly subject to
an exogenous house demand shock in AR(1) process:
ln jt = (1−ρ j) ln j+ρ j ln jt−1+ ε jt (3.18)
with ε jt
iid∼ N(0,σ2j ). The shock to house demand may be potentially important in explaining
macroeconomic fluctuations, as paid attention by Iacoviello (2005), Liu, Miao and Zha (2016)
among others.
3.3.3.2 First order conditions
The first order conditions give us the following relationships:
Qt
Cϕ3t
= Etβ3
{
(1−δ ) Qt+1
Cϕ3,t+1
+
jt
K3t
}
(3.19)
1
Cϕ3t
= β3Et
{
Rt
Cϕ3,t+1
}
(3.20)
τLη3t =
Wt
Cϕ3t
(3.21)
3.3.4 Market clearing and equilibrium
The population of consumption goods entrepreneur, capital goods entrepreneur, household is
set to ω1, ω2, ω3, respectively. The economy-wide resource constraint on consumption goods
is given by:
ω1Y1t = ω1C1t +ω2C2t +ω3C3t (3.22)
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The term ω1Y1t represents the aggregate consumption in the country. In each period, the newly
produced capital goods Y2t are distributed to replace the depreciated old capital and for net
investment. We define the aggregate capital stock in the economy as:
Kt = ω1K1t +ω2K2t +ω3K3t (3.23)
Then Kt evolves according to:
Kt− (1−δ )Kt−1 = ω2Y2t (3.24)
Labor market clearing gives:
ω1L1t +ω2L2t = ω3L3t (3.25)
Debt market clearing gives:
ω1B1t +ω2B2t = ω3B3t (3.26)
The aggregate output, which is the main variable of interest in our paper, is the sum of
output in both industries. Normalizing the price of consumption goods as unit, it is notable that
the capital goods’ relative price Qt is variable. Thus we need to distinguish the real output and
nominal output, though they do not differ too much when the economic fluctuation is not huge.
The real output Yt is:
Yt = ω1Y1t +ω2QY2t (3.27)
where Q is the capital price at the steady state.5 The nominal output YNt is:
YNt = ω1Y1t +ω2QtY2t (3.28)
In the case that the mean economic growth rate g is not zero, in order to obtain a stationary
model we should detrend the variables. That can be done if variables are divided by Xt . Ulti-
mately, the equilibrium consists of 28 variables: {C1t , C2t , C3t , K1t , K2t , K3t , L1t , L2t , L3t , B1t ,
B2t , B3t , Qt , Rt , Wt , µ1t , µ2t , Y1t , Y2t , Kt , Yt , YNt , gt , jt , A1t , A2t , γ1t , γ2t} satisfying equations
(3.1) - (3.28).
5Here we follow the idea of “Laspeyres index” to calculate the real GDP by fixing the price at its value in
the base period (i.e. steady state in our model). This approach is just one of several different ways for GDP
accounting. In national accounting practice this approach is usually infeasible because we cannot check the exact
price level and production amount of every type of good and service. Instead, a compromise “deflation” method
is often employed. In this case we first calculate the nominal GDP and a weighted average price index, and then
deflate the nominal GDP by the price index. In our model the price index can be Pt = w1 + QtQ (1−w1) where
w1 =
ω1Y1
ω1Y1+ω2QY2
is the steady state share of consumption output in GDP. Then real GDP is Yt =
YNt
Pt
. We compare
the value of real GDP calculated in this way with that by equation (3.27), and find only negligible difference.
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3.4 Simulation
3.4.1 Parameterization
We list the parameterization details in Table 3.1 and 3.2. Without any specific country in our
mind, the model is calibrated at quarterly frequency matched to the general case of a developing
country.
The discount rate of household is set at β3 = 0.99 to generate an annual saving interest
rate around 4%. The entrepreneurs have lower discount rates at β1 = β2 = 0.97. Hence in
the neighborhood of steady state the borrowing collateral constraints will bind, as long as the
economic shocks are not huge. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at a typical value
ϕ = 1, which makes the consumption utility logarithmic. We use a typical value in literature
η = 0.5 for the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Then, with weight parameter for
labor utility τ = 3, the steady state labor supply is around 1/2. The capital depreciation rate
δ = 0.025 is typical. The capital share in consumption goods production function is α1 = 0.45
to match the labor income share of 55% for typical developing countries, according to the Penn
World Table (PWT) 9.0 dataset. The capital share parameter in capital goods industry is set at
a lower value α2 = 0.35. In the robustness analysis section, we will test whether our model is
sensitive to the values of α1 and α2. Following Finocchiaro and Mendicino (2016), we assume
the working capital requirement in the borrowing constraint consists of all the wage payment
and hence set Ω = 1. Later we will change its value for robustness check. Regarding the
population share of different agents in the economy, we do not have prior knowledge. Typical
literature, for the purpose of simplicity, just assumes a uniform population share for all agent
types. But that is no very reasonable in our model, because we expect the scale of investment
industry should be smaller than the consumption industry. We set ω1 =ω3 = 0.4 and ω2 = 0.2.
The robustness of the values is tested later. The mean economic growth rate is g= ln1.01 such
that the economy is corresponding to a developing country with optimistic growth prospect
of annual growth rate around 4%. The steady state value of the weight parameter for house
residence utility is j = 0.1, to simply follow the setup in Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and
Minetti (2006). The steady state TFP level, for convenience, is normalized to unit A1 = A2 = 1.
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Table 3.1: Parameterization (and some steady state values) of the model
Para. Value Definition Target/Source
β1 0.97 discount rate of consumption goods entrepreneur annual capital return rate ≈ 12%, in the case without financial
frictionβ2 0.97 discount rate of capital goods entrepreneur
β3 0.99 discount rate of household annual saving interest rate ≈ 4%
ϕ 1 coefficient of relative risk aversion typical value in literature
τ 3 weight parameter for labor disutility in steady state L3 ≈ 1/2
η 0.5 inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply typical value in literature
δ 0.025 capital depreciation rate typical value in literature
α1 0.45 capital share in consumption goods industry labor share is 55%, matched to data for developing countries
according to PWT 9.0
α2 0.3 capital share in capital goods industry lower than the capital share in consumption goods industry
Ω 1 intensity of working capital requirement Finocchiaro and Mendicino (2016)
ω1 0.4 population share of consumption goods entrepreneur there is no prior knowledge, we will change the values in
robustness analysis section later
ω2 0.2 population share of capital goods entrepreneur
ω3 0.4 population share of household
g ln1.01 mean economic growth rate annual growth rate ≈ 4%
j 0.1 steady state value of weight parameter for utility from house residence Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Minetti (2006)
A1 1 steady state TFP level in consumption goods industry for convenience
A2 1 steady state TFP level in capital goods industry for convenience
γ1 0.45 steady state LTV ratio for consumption goods entrepreneur generate an annual credit to GDP ratio of 65%, which is the 75%
quantile value of 50 developing countries data during 2010-2014γ2 0.45 steady state LTV ratio for capital goods entrepreneur
Some steady state values:
ω1B1/Y 53% annually consumption goods entrepreneur debt to output ratio
roughly match data
ω2B2/Y 12% annually capital goods entrepreneur debt to output ratio
ω3B3/Y 65% annually total debt to output ratio
K/Y 141% annually total capital to output ratio
ω1Y1/Y 71% total consumption to output ratio (= output share of consumption goods
sector)
ω2QY2/Y 29% total investment to output ratio (= output share of capital goods sector)
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The LTV ratios γ1 and γ2 are the key parameters in our model. Although the realistic
counterpart of the LTV ratio parameter is clear, the exact calibration in literature locates within a
wide interval. Taking the US for instance, some studies use high value such as 0.89 in Iacoviello
(2005), but there also exists much lower estimation such as 0.189 by Catherine et al. (2017).
In literature, one way to estimate γ1 and γ2 is that we check the fraction of firm’s value that is
lost in debt enforcement process. But that is practically hard because we do not have data for
different industries. For simplicity we assume in our baseline economy the steady state LTV
ratio γ1 in consumption industry and γ2 in investment industry are the same, and we match the
private credit to output ratio to the 75% quantile value of 50 developing countries data during
2010-2014. The list of those countries is at Appendix 3.C. The matched annual credit ratio is
around 65%. That gives us the steady state LTV ratio in borrowing constraint, i.e. γ1 and γ2, at
0.45. This value is roughly consistent with the finding by Djankov et al. (2008) that an average
48% of a firm’s value is lost in debt enforcement worldwide. Later in order to investigate the
effect of financial development, we conduct counterfactual experiments to vary the LTV ratio.
Table 3.2: Parameter for shock process in the model
Shock type Persistence para. Standard deviation
TFP ρa = 0.9 σa = 0.5%
LTV ratio ργ = 0.9 σγ = 1%
House demand ρ j = 0.9 σ j = 5%
As expressed in Section 3.3, we suppose that there are 3 types of shocks in the economy:
TFP, LTV ratio, and house demand shock. In literature it is popular to utilize real macroeco-
nomic data to calibrate the shock processes based on GMM or Bayesian estimation. However
the calibration of shock processes is quite subtle, as different methods produce very distinct
results and the results even depend on how many shocks we assume at the beginning. Actually
we find the key results of our paper are robust to the assumption of shock processes. Hence
at this moment we set these parameters in an ad hoc manner, and demonstrate the robustness
later. As documented in Table 3.2, we assume the autocorrelation coefficients for all shocks’
AR(1) processes are just 0.9. In this way, the remaining size of a shock after 5 years is less than
10% of its initial scale. The standard deviation of TFP shock is 0.5%. The LTV ratio shock and
house demand shock have standard deviations of 1% and 5%, respectively. The TFP shocks
in two industries are perfectly correlated. And the same LTV ratio shock hits both industries
simultaneously. We simply set the covariance among different types of shocks at zero. With
the assumed shock processes, each shock counts for roughly 20%-50% of aggregate output
variance according to the variance decomposition (not reported) in our model simulation.
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3.4.2 Impulse response
We obtain impulse responses of different variables to transitory technology shock, financial
shock and house demand shock. Figure 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrate the impulse responses to 1
standard deviation positive TFP shock, LTV ratio shock, and house demand shock, respectively.
Besides the economy with baseline parameterization, in each figure we also plot the dynamics
in an economy with a higher financial development level in either consumption goods sector or
capital goods sector. Particularly we consider two cases. In the first experiment, γ1 is increased
to 0.6 while γ2 is unchanged. In the second experiment, γ1 is kept constant while γ2 rises to 0.9.
In both cases the annual credit to GDP ratio increases to the level of 90%. In Figure 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3, the green solid curves are for the baseline calibration, blue dashed curves for financial
development only in consumption industry (with γ1 increased from 0.45 to 0.6), and red dotted
curves for that only in capital industry (with γ2 increased from 0.45 to 0.9). In the figures the
green and red curves are almost mutually overlapped such that it is not easy to distinguish them.
If we sufficiently amplify the figures, we will actually observe that the red dotted curves are
generally closer to the steady state lines than the green solid curves. Below we briefly discuss
the economic dynamics after different shocks.
Note that in this subsection we will merely discuss how the existence of collateral constraint
amplifies the effects of economic shocks, without concerning the difference when the LTV ratio
in the borrowing constraint has a different value. In other words, we will analyze why the curves
have the demonstrated shapes, but will not analyze why the blue and red curves are (or are not)
different from the green curves. In fact, analyzing the effect of varying LTV ratio is not a
straightforward task.6 We postpone our analysis on the effects of changing parameter γ1 and γ2
to Section 3.4.3.
3.4.2.1 TFP shock
After one positive TFP shock (Figure 3.1), the production in both industries is more profitable.
Thus, the demand for physical capital rises and the firms borrow more to expand investment
and production. Because borrowing requires collateral, the capital price is pushed up. The
raised capital price, via the KM type financial accelerator effect, generates positive feedback
effect on firms’ borrowing and production capacity. This accelerator effect is the reason that
the aggregate output increases more than the original size of TFP shock.
6As mentioned in the previous literature review at Section 3.2, no much regularity is found in literature. Some
nonlinear effects, contributed to different reasons, are discussed in literature. For instance, the reason can be the
occasionally binding borrowing constraint in Jensen et al. (2017) and Jensen, Ravn and Santoro (2016), the relative
importance of output share versus productivity gap in Mendicino (2012), and the relative importance of durable
input reallocation effect versus intermediate input demand effect in Pinheiro, Rivadeneyra and Teignier (2016).
The mechanism in our model is not linked to the occasionally binding constraint as we rule out this possibility by
assumption, but is more or less related to Mendicino (2012) and Pinheiro, Rivadeneyra and Teignier (2016). See
Section 3.4.3 for details.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses to 0.5% positive TFP shock
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3.4.2.2 LTV ratio shock
Figure 3.2: Impulse responses to 1% positive LTV ratio shock
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After one positive LTV ratio shock (Figure 3.2), the constrained firms suddenly have more
ability to borrow money. Thus the borrowing, capital investment, production and capital price
are all substantially enhanced in the first several periods. Some periods later, the borrowing
constraint gets tighter as the LTV ratio decreases along with the extinction of shock. Thus we
observe that the sectoral and aggregate output are slightly below the steady state levels, during
some periods before the macroeconomy completely returns back to the steady state.
3.4.2.3 House demand shock
One positive house demand shock (Figure 3.3) pushes up the household’s desire to purchase
house (which is the physical capital from the persepective of firms). Then household rebates
lending in order to procure some houses from the production sectors. Consequently the bor-
rowing and capital stock in two industries both decline temporarily. To satisfy the risen capital
demand, the output of capital industry grows. In constrast the output of consumption goods
sector is relatively lower. The total output as the sum of two sectors increases during the initial
periods but is then slightly below the steady state level for a while, as the consumption goods
production is low.
Figure 3.3: Impulse responses to 5% positive house demand shock
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3.4.3 Quantitative analysis
In this subsection we quantify the influence of financial development on output volatility. We
first document our quantitative result from model simulation, and explain the underlying mech-
anism and economic intuition afterwards.
First let us have a look back at the impulse response figures in Section 3.4.2. Paying partic-
ular attention to the quantitative difference among green, blue and red cuves, the key findings
can be summarized as follows. (1) The larger credit access in consumption goods industry
(displayed by blue dashed curves) makes the response of output to economic shocks stronger;
while the higher credit access in capital goods industry (displayed by red dotted curves) has
tiny effect on volatility. (2) That phenomenon is prevalent, no matter which kind of shock hits
the economy. Thus it is straightforward to expect that if only consumption industry obtains
enlarged credit access the output volatility will be larger, and if only capital industry obtains
larger borrowing credit the volatility is barely changed.
Figure 3.4: Output volatility vs. credit to GDP ratio
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This expectation is confirmed by Figure 3.4, which plots the relationship between simu-
lated output volatility and credit to GDP ratio in our model economy. The output volatility is
calculated by the standard deviation of HP-filtered (with smoothing parameter 1600) logarith-
mic output series from the model simulations. The blue solid curve is obtained by varying the
degree of financial development in the consumption industry, while maintaining the LTV ratio
in the capital industry at its baseline value. The red dashed curve is obtained by changing the
LTV ratio only in the capital goods sector. The figure clearly demonstrates our core argument:
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Industry heterogeneity matters in financial development and output volatility nexus. An overall
measurement of “credit to GDP ratio” may have either positive or negative correlation with
output volatility, depending on the certain industry where financial development occurs. If a
higher credit ratio results from larger credit access in the capital industry, output volatility can
decrease as shown by the red dashed curve. (The magnitude of volatility change along the red
curve is much smaller compared to that along the blue curve. Hence in this figure we assign
different scale to the left and right y-axis.) In contrast, larger credit access in the consumption
industry results in a substantial expansion of output volatility as shown by the blue solid curve.7
3.4.3.1 Intuititive explanation
Given the complexity of our model, it is impossible to obtain an analytical expression on the re-
lationship between financial development and output volatility. But we are still able to explain
intuitively why industrial heterogeneity matters for the volatility effect of financial develop-
ment. The interpretation is inspired by the idea of “input reallocation effect” of financial devel-
opment as discussed in Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), Mendicino (2012), Pinheiro, Rivadeneyra
and Teignier (2016).8 First we notice that, with the financial amplification mechanism of the
KM type borrowing constraint, the response of macroeconomic variables in the first several
periods (especially the impact effect), is crucial to determine the size of output volatility. This
can also be observed from the impulse responses in Figure 3.1, 3.2, 3.3. If an economic shock
initially causes a large production reaction, the binding credit constraint plus the change of col-
lateral asset price make the large deviation from the steady state persistent for several periods.
The resulting output volatility is sizable.
The next step is to consider what factor drives the agents’ initial production reactions. The
answer is that the sensitivity of output to economic shocks crucially depends on the intensity
of firms to adjust their production inputs, which relies on the marginal products of capital and
labor. In the credit constrained economy, firms are always willing to expand the production as it
is still profitable. They are restricted to do so, because the borrowing constraint is binding. The
higher the marginal products of inputs are, the more profitable a potential production expansion
is, and the more actively the firms will employ new inputs and produce if a positive shock makes
the production expansion feasible. Consequently the output’s deviation from its initial steady
7Based on our parameterization, the borrowing constraints in the model are always binding as long as the
economic shocks are not too large. If we consider the possibility of “occasionally binding constraint”, as in
Jensen et al. (2017), Jensen, Ravn and Santoro (2016), the volatility along the blue curve may decrease in a certain
region of high credit ratio. For simplicity we do not consider this possibility, because (1) the threshold of financial
development, above which the “occasionally binding constraint” phenomenon is substantial, is probably quite
high and most developing countries are far below that threshold; (2) taking into account the “occasionally binding
constraint” does not alter the core argument of our paper that industrial heterogeneity matters.
8But our explanation is quite different, though our paper and these studies have the same focus on the allocation
of inputs. (1) They work on the allocation between different firms in a homogenous industry while we discuss
different firms in two heterogenous industries. (2) The economy-wide capital expansion effect does not stand out
in their models as they do not feature an independent capital production sector. (3) The change of firms’ output
shares caused by financial development plays a key role in their models, but is not important in our economy.
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state level will be larger. Therefore, we need to inspect how financial development changes the
marginal benefit of employing new inputs. Financial development increases the labor marginal
product, but alters the overall capital marginal product in an ambiguous way.
In the context of our two-sector economy, the key point is that financial development in-
duces two effects on capital dynamics: inter-industry capital reallocation, and economy-wide
capital expansion. The capital reallocation effect means that as the two industries compete
in the input market, the larger credit access in one sector increases its share of capital hold-
ing, decreases its own capital marginal product but increases the marginal product in the other
sector. The capital expansion effect means that financial development stimulates a larger de-
mand of capital and encourages capital producers to produce more, which finally increases the
total capital abundance and decreases the capital marginal product in all sectors. Since the
consumption goods industry does not produce capital, it can only procure that from the capital
goods industry. Thus the capital reallocation effect plays its role and barely alters the overall
capital marginal product, if larger credit access occurs in consumption industry. In contrast, an
expanded production in capital goods sector renders more capital available for both industries.
Hence the capital expansion effect dominates and decreases the overall capital marginal prod-
uct, if credit expansion occurs in investment industry. Taking into account the increase of labor
marginal product no matter financial development takes place in which sector, the sensitivity of
output to economic shocks crucially depends on how financial development alters the overall
capital marginal product. This mechanism explains why industrial heterogeniety is crucial, in
order to analyze the effect of financial development on aggregate output volatility.
3.4.3.2 Quantitative formalization
Next we formalize our intuitive explanation. We use EYZ to denote the elasticity of output Y to
exogenous economic shock Z. This elasticity is directly linked to output volatility, measured
by the standard deviation of output percentage deviation. In our economy aggregate output is
the sum of consumption sector output Y1 and capital sector output QY2 i.e. Y =Y1+QY2. Then
the elasticity EYZ can be approximated as the weighted average of output elasticities in two
sectors:
EYZ ≈ s1EY1Z +(1− s1)EY2Z
where s1 is the share of consumption goods sector’s output in aggregate GDP. (In this equation
the capital price Q does not appear because it was already cancelled out.) At this stage we have
seen that the effect of financial development depends on how it influences two factors: one is
the industrial output share s1, and another is the industrial output elasticities to shocks (EY1Z ,
EY2Z). Next we further decompose the term EY1Z and EY2Z .
The production uses capital stock and labor as inputs. Thus for the consumption sector
we can write EY1Z = EY1K1EK1Z +EY1L1EL1Z where the definitions of elasticities EY1K1 , EK1Z ,
EY1L1 , EL1Z are self-explanatory. As we assume Cobb-Douglas production functions, we know
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EY1K1 = α1 and EY1L1 = 1−α1. As a consequence, we have:
EY1Z = α1EK1Z +(1−α1)EL1Z
Likewise, for the capital production we obtain:
EY2Z = α2EK2Z +(1−α2)EL2Z
Since the parameters α1 and α2 are constant, what we concern is how financial development
affects the the elasticity terms EK1Z , EL1Z , EK2Z , EL2Z . These terms reflect the strength of input
employment response to shocks. Obviously, the more productive the production inputs are, the
more profitable the entrepreneurs’ employment of these inputs is, and the larger demand for
these inputs the firms have. That is linked to the larger values of those elasticity terms. In other
words, the elasticity terms crucially depend on the marginal products of the correpsonding
production inputs: MPK1, MPL1, MPK2, MPL2.
Overall, the financial development changes the intensity of output response to shocks be-
cause it alters the industrial output share s1 and inputs’ marginal products (MPK1, MPL1,
MPK2, MPL2). We write this relationship, in an unrigorous manner, in equation (3.29):
EYZ = F (s1,MPK1,MPL1,MPK2,MPL2;α1,α2) (3.29)
where F(·;α1,α2) is a nonlinear function. It depends on the industrial output share s1 as weight,
and is increasing with the marginal products (MPK1,MPL1,MPK2,MPL2).9 This logic enables
us to understand why financial development in distinct industries have different effects. Below
we conduct a quantitative comparison based on our model.
9In the previous literature review on the existing theoretical models, we summarized that the “Aggregate Output
Responsiveness” depends on the size of “MPK·∆K·Weight” (see Section 3.2.2). Our equation (3.29) is in fact
consistent with that idea. (i) The output share s1 corresponds to “Weight”. (ii) The parameters (α1, α2) measure
the output effect of additional production input using the concept of elasticity, while “MPK” directly measures the
level. (iii) The terms (MPK1,MPL1,MPK2,MPL2) affect the firms’ responsiveness of employing new inputs. This
responsiveness is captured directly by “∆K”. Although equation (3.29) is conceptually similar to the expression
of “MPK·∆K·Weight”, we do not use that instead. This is because the marginal product of input also affects the
volume of input redistribution in our two-sector model. Thus we cannot separate the components “MPK” and
“∆K”.
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3.4.3.3 Quantitative comparison
Figure 3.5 demonstrates the relative intensity of potential input reallocation effect versus capital
expansion effect under different financial development levels. The curves in the figure show
the steady state values of several variables contained in equation (3.29).
Figure 3.5: The intensity of input reallocation effect vs. capital expansion effect
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(b.3) Output share change by FD in capital industry
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Note: (i) The black dotted vertical line corresponds to the baseline case of credit ratio at 65%. (ii) In
subfigure (a.1) - (b.2) the MPKs and MPLs at different financial development stages, are displayed as
the ratios to the steady state levels in baseline model. This facilitates our comparision of different cases,
as the benchmark marginal product level is unit.
(1) We first look at the left panel which corresponds to the case of raised LTV ratio only
in consumption goods industry. (a) The financial development greatly raises the demand for
capital in consumption sector. Thus, compared to the baseline economy in steady state a larger
share of capital is held by consumption goods sector. Then the marginal production of capital
MPK1 in consumption industry declines as its capital stock increases; the MPK2 in capital
industry increases as its capital to output ratio declines. As demonstrated by subfigure (a.1),
the size of MPK1’s increase and MPK2’s decrease are similar. Hence by inter-industry capital
reallocation the changes of capital marginal product in two sectors offset each other. (b) As
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displayed by subfigure (a.2), the marginal product of labor MPL1 and MPL2 increase in both
industries. This is because the capital stock is increased while the total supply of labor is barely
affected by financial development. In the figure the curves of MPL1 and MPL2 are mutually
overlapped. The strong correlation of MPL1 and MPL2 is a natural result of the full mobility
of labor, as they are tightly linked to the economy-wide wage. (c) The subfigure (a.3) indicates
that financial development does not largely change the output share s1 of the industry. In sum,
we find in an economy with higer financial development in consumption industry compared
to the baseline case, the changes of MPK1 and MPK2 offset each other, MPL1 and MPL2
both increase, and output share s1 is almost unchanged. According to equation (3.29), the
output response intensity EYZ increases. That makes the output dynamics after shocks more
volatile. In a nutshell, if higher access to credit only occurs in consumption goods sector,
the inter-industry capital reallocation effect plays its role as the two industries compete in the
production input market.
(2) The story differs if financial development only occurs in investment industry. The right
panel shows the steady state consequences of capital industry financial development. (a) On the
one hand, the capital industry produces more capital which decreases its own MPK2. On the
other hand, since more capital is available also for the consumption goods industry, theMPK1 in
that sector also declines. Therefore, in the case that financial development occurs in investment
industry, the economy-wide capital expansion effect dominates over the inter-industry capital
reallocation effect and induces an overall decline of capital marginal product. The situation is
clear in subfigure (b.1). (b) However, the marginal product of labor MPL1 and MPL2 increase
in both industries, as shown by subfigure (b.2). But the increase of labor marginal product
does not exceed the magnitude of capital marginal product’s decline. (c) The subfigure (b.3)
exhibits that the output share of capital industry does not change a lot. As a whole, the lower
capital marginal product, partly offset by the higher labor marginal product, along with a stable
output share, results in a slightly decreased or roughly unchanged output response intensity
EYZ according to equation (3.29).
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3.4.4 Robustness analysis
We conduct several robustness analyses as follows. (1) We change the value of capital share
parameters (α1, α2) in production function. (2) We change the population share parameters
(ω1, ω2, ω3). (3) We change the working capital requirement parameter Ω. (4) We modify the
shock processes. The robustness check results are shown by Figure 3.6. We see the core point
of our paper is qualitatively unchanged. We describe our exercises briefly as below.
3.4.4.1 Production function
The production technique may be different across countries. That can be partly reflected by the
values of capital share parameters (α1, α2). A change of their values also changes the steady
state output share of the two industries. In subfigure 3.6(a), the output volatility is calculated
by simulating a model with α2 = 0.5, rather than the baseline value of 0.3. Clearly the increase
of output volatility after a credit expansion in consumption sector is still outstanding. The
decrease of output volatility caused by a credit expansion in capital industry is slight. Setting
other alternative values of (α1, α2) does not qualitatively alter our finding, whose result is not
reported here.
3.4.4.2 Population share
The population share of different agent types may shape the relative size of sectors in the
economy. In our baseline setup the values are ω1 = 0.4, ω2 = 0.2 and ω3 = 0.4. Now we
follow most previous studies which assume an equal weight for all sectors, and set ω1 = ω2 =
ω3 = 1/3. In subfigure 3.6(b), we do not see obvious change compared to our baseline result.
3.4.4.3 Working capital requirement
As discussed by Finocchiaro and Mendicino (2016) the assumption of working capital require-
ment in borrowing constraint is potentially important for the business cycle fluctuations, be-
cause it allows a direct interaction between financial friction and labor demand. In literature,
there are alternative ways to set the working capital requirement. As an extreme example,
Ye´pez (2017) assumes that the working capital is equal to the whole output value. In order to
inspect whether our model is sensitive to the size of working capital requirement, we set Ω= 0
instead of the baseline value Ω = 1. Numerically we find that deleting the working capital
component greatly reduces the volume of output volatility variation, especially when LTV ratio
is high. However, as shown in subfigure 3.6(c) the main finding of our model has no essential
change anyway.
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3.4.4.4 Shock process
Finally we modify the shock processes. We try several experiments. (i) In the first exercise, we
no longer assume that the economic growth rate gt = g is constant as in equation (3.6). Instead,
we introduce the growth trend shock such that:
gt = (1−ρg)g+ρggt−1+ εgt
where εgt
iid∼ N(0,σ2g ) with the persistence parameter ρg = 0.9 and standard deviation σg = 5%.
We see from subfigure 3.6(d) that though the exact size of output volatility depends on the
assumed shock process, the financial development in the two industries always demonstrates
difference. (ii) In the second exercise, we modify our previous assumption that the TFP shock
εat and LTV ratio shock ε
γ
t are identical in both industries. Now we use εa1t and ε
a
2t to re-
place εat in equation (3.5) and (3.14), and use ε
γ
1t and ε
γ
2t to replace ε
γ
t in equation (3.3) and
(3.12), respectively. The correlation in the two sectors can be assumed relatively low such as
corr(εa1t ,ε
a
2t) = 0.3 and corr(ε
γ
1t ,ε
γ
2t) = 0.3. The simulation results are similar to our baseline
model, and hence we do not report here. (iii) In the third experiment we change the relative
size of different types of shocks. For instance we depress the relative importance of TFP shock
by doubling the standard deviations of LTV and house demand shocks such that σγ = 2% and
σ j = 10%. The alternative setup of shock process does not bring about any qualitative changes.
Figure 3.6: Output volatility vs. credit to GDP ratio (robustness analysis)
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper argues that financial development can either exacerbate or dampen output volatility,
depending on the type of industry whose borrowing constraint is relaxed. Using a two-sector
real business cycle model augmented with the collateral constraint a` la Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), we show that if domestic financial friction is reduced in the consumption goods sector,
macroeconomic volatility will rise. On the contrary, if the borrowing constraint is lessened in
the capital goods sector, output volatility may decline or be roughly unchanged. The key to
understand the difference is the relative importance of the inter-industry capital reallocation
effect versus the economy-wide capital expansion effect induced by financial development. The
finding of our paper implies that an explicit discussion on the industrial heterogeneity is crucial,
in order to analyze the effect of financial development on macroeconomic volatility.
The extension of our work can go along several promising directions. (1) A direct exten-
sion is to investigate how the industrial structure of a country influences the effects of financial
development. Our model argues that consumption goods production sector and capital goods
sector play different roles. Thus it is natural to ask, e.g. whether an economy with more out-
put share of heavy industry performs dissimilarly from another country which produces higher
share of final consumption goods. (2) Alternative possibility is to extend our model in a small
open economy setup. Our closed economy model rules out the connection with international
borrowing and international trade. In many developing countries the open economic connec-
tion plays a substantial role in macroeconomic dynamics. But obviously a small open economy
setup will heavily complicate our analysis, especially considering that agents can lend and
borrow both domestically and overseas. Actually we feel it tricky to separate the impact of
international financial liberalization from domestic financial development. (3) Another poten-
tial is to differentiate credit in other ways, such as household-firm credit, tradable-nontradable
firm credit, or even private-government credit. For example, Bahadir and Gumus (2016) em-
ploy a small open economy model matched to Turkey, and show that the change in household
credit is more correlated with major macroeconomic variables than tradable and nontradable
firm credit. This will inspire us to consider whether household credit is also more relevant to
macroeconomic volatility. We leave this question in the future work.
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Appendix
Appendix 3.A. On the industrial heterogeneity of financial development
level
Here we discuss the industrial heterogeneity of financial development level from three aspects:
firm size, closeness to government, and external financing dependence.
3.A.1. Firm size
The industrial characteristics (e.g. production technology, economies of scale, market compet-
itiveness) make the average firm size largely varies across industries. In some network indus-
tries like transportation and telecommunication the firm size is usually huge. In the retail, food,
clothing industries there exist a great amount of small enterprises. Kumar, Rajan and Zingales
(2011) find that “capital-intensive industries, high wage industries, and industries that do a lot
of R&D have larger firms”. It is not unreasonable to conjecture that the industries consist of
mainly large firm possibly have better credit access than others, taking into account the finding
by firm-level studies that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) often face difficulty in bor-
rowing. The situation in China could be marked. The SMEs in China face large challenges in
accessing bank credit (Tsai, 2016). These SMEs are mostly located in the consumption goods
sector. The lack of bank loan pushes many of them to resort to informal financial sector, which
proceeds along another path disparate from the official financial development.
The credit expansion effect of financial development is uneven, conditional on the firm size.
O’Toole and Newman (2017) find that in Vietnam financial development reduces financing
constraints for small firms, and has no effect on medium firms. Based on a cross-country
study, Arellano, Bai and Zhang (2012) find that as financial development improves, the leverage
difference between small and large firm rises (where small firms have lower leverage). Thus, we
may guess an economy-wide financial development probably causes uneven credit expansion
across industries.
3.A.2. Closeness to government
The closeness to government may facilitate the acquirement of loan for some industries. A
remarkable example is the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector. In many countries the SOEs
remain significant in the aggregate economy, and they are increasingly concentrated in a few
“strategic” sectors such as the infrastructure industries of transportation, water and energy.
(See Christiansen (2011) for a review on the SOEs in OECD countries, and a lot of studies
on the Chinese case.) The industries mostly occupied by the SOEs are often in the category
of investment goods industry. Benefiting from a good relationship with the government, those
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SOEs are often less constrained for bank credit access. (One reason is that the banking system
is largely controlled by the government.) In the case that bank loan is not readily available, the
government may provide some other financing aids. Some industries’ closeness to government
may even impair the financing availability for the others. For example, O’Toole and Newman
(2017) find that in Vietnam the financing constraint of private firms is increasing in the use of
finance by SOEs.
3.A.3. External financing dependence
Different indusries show dissimilar dependence on external financing. Typically, the more capi-
tal or technology intensive industries are more reliant on access to external borrowing. Suppose
that one economy enhances the bank loan availability, from a stage with universally low finan-
cial development level for all industries. Then some industries would significantly benefit from
this kind of financial development, while some industries are unaffected because they seldomly
rely on external financing. Since some industries may benefit more than others from financial
services, even though the financial development does not discriminate on industries ex ante, the
influence on different industries may differ ex post. For example, Ilyina and Samaniego (2011)
show that “well-functioning financial markets direct resources toward industries where growth
is driven by R&D”.
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Appendix 3.B. List of relevant empirical literature
Table 3.3 is a non-exhaustive list for the relevant empirical literature about the effect of financial development on output volatility. In order to focus
on the recent studies and experience, we only document the literature published after year 2000.
Table 3.3: List of relevant empirical literature about the effect of financial development on output volatility
Literature Sample countries Sample
period
-/+ effect of financial
development on vol(y)
Definition of output
volatility
Definition of financial development Econometric
method
Acemoglu et al.
(2003)
61 ctr. 1970-1997 insignificant overall or 5Y SD of pc y
gr
(log of) the ratio of real M2 to GDP 2SLS
Alatrash et al.
(2014)
103 ctr. 1981-2010 +/- (inverse-U-shaped)
for ctr. with high-quality
fin. sectors;
insignificant for ctr. with
low-quality fin. sectors
5Y SD of pc y gr private credit to GDP ratio difference
GMM
Beck, Degryse and
Kneer (2014)
77 ctr. 1980-2007 insignificant overall or 5Y SD of pc y
gr
intermediation: log(credit to GDP
ratio); size: value added share of the
financial industry in GDP
OLS
Beck, Lundberg
and Majnoni
(2006)
63 ctr. 1960-1997 insignificant (depends on
type of shock)
13Y or 9Y SD of pc y gr private credit to GDP ratio OLS
Dabla-Norris and
Srivisal (2013)
110 ctr. 1974-2008 - (only up to a threshold) 5Y SD of pc y gr
(Robust: HP-filtered)
private credit by deposit bank and
other fin. inst. (Robust: total liquid
liability; deposit bank asset; total
deposit)
system GMM
Note: (1) Besides the effect of financial development on output volatility, some literature also studies other contents (e.g. the effect on consumption volatility,
effect of international financial openness). Here, in the table we only report the part of research where we are interested in. (2) In order to save space we use
some abbreviations: ctr. (countries), fin. (financial), Y (year), SD (standard deviation), pc (per capita), y (output), gr (growth rate).
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Table 3.3 (cont.): List of relevant empirical literature about the effect of financial development on output volatility
Literature Sample countries Sample
period
-/+ effect of financial
development on vol(y)
Definition of output
volatility
Definition of financial development Econometric
method
Denizer, Iyigun
and Owen (2002)
70 ctr. 1956-1998 - 9Y SD of pc y gr 4 measures: M2/GDP, claims on the
nonfinancial private sector/GDP;
nonfinancial private sector credit/total
domestic credit; deposit money bank
domestic assets/(itself + central bank
domestic assets)
FE
Dodonov (2009) 24 EU ctr.
(construction and
manufacturing
firms)
2000-2005 + overall SD of firm-level
sale gr
market capitalization as % of GDP;
IMF’s index of financial markets
IV
Easterly, Islam and
Stiglitz (2000)
74 ctr. 1960-1997 -/+ (U-shaped) SD of pc y gr over two
periods: 1960-1978,
1979-1997
credit to private sector/GDP IV
Ferreira da Silva
(2002)
40 ctr. 1960-1997 - overall SD of band-pass
filtered y
4 measures: liquid liabilities/GDP;
total assets of deposit money
banks/financial intermediary system;
non-financial private sector credit/total
domestic credit; non-financial private
sector credit/GDP
GMM
Ferreira Tiryaki
(2003)
40 ctr. 1960-1997 insignificant 6Y SD of band-pass
filtered y
as the same as Ferreira da Silva (2002) GMM
Fidrmuc and
Scharler (2013)
20 OECD ctr. 1995-2005 insignificant (by bank
sector development, - by
stock market)
log abs. value of pc y gr
excluding time and
country FEs
(log of) total credit by banks/GDP,
bank assets/GDP
system GMM
Note: (1) Besides the effect of financial development on output volatility, some literature also studies other contents (e.g. the effect on consumption volatility,
effect of international financial openness). Here, in the table we only report the part of research where we are interested in. (2) In order to save space we use
some abbreviations: ctr. (countries), fin. (financial), Y (year), SD (standard deviation), pc (per capita), y (output), gr (growth rate).
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Table 3.3 (cont.): List of relevant empirical literature about the effect of financial development on output volatility
Literature Sample countries Sample
period
-/+ effect of financial
development on vol(y)
Definition of output
volatility
Definition of financial development Econometric
method
Hahn (2003) 22 OECD ctr. 1970-2000 insignificant (depends on
type of shock)
5Y or 10Y SD or abs.
diff. b/w max. and min.
of y gap (Robust: SD of
pc y gr)
stock market development; a
conglomerate index of financial
structure by Demirgu¨c et al. (2001)
IV, FE
Ibrahim and
Alagidede (2016)
23 Sub-Saharan
African ctr.
1980-2014 -/+ (U-shaped) for
business-cycle vol.;
insignificant for long-run
vol.
square root of calculated
variance of pc y using
spectral method
private credit to GDP ratio PMG (pooled
mean group);
MG
Kunieda (2008) 90 ctr. 1971-2000 +/- (inverse-U-shaped) 5Y SD of pc y gr private credit to GDP ratio GMM
Larrain (2006) 59 ctr.
(industry-level
data)
1963-1999 - overall SD of BK filtered
industrial y
private credit by deposit money banks
to GDP ratio
OLS, IV
Levchenko,
Rancie`re and
Thoenig (2009)
56 ctr.
(industry-level data
for manufacturing)
1970-1999 insignificant 10Y SD of industrial y gr private credit to GDP ratio DID
Mallick (2014) 114 ctr. (27 high-,
49 middle-, 38
low-income)
1980-2004 - for business-cycle vol.;
insignificant for long-run
vol.
square root of calculated
variance of pc y using
spectral method
(log of) credit to the private sector by
banks and other fin. inst. (Robust:
stock market capitalization to GDP
ratio)
OLS
Manganelli and
Popov (2015)
28 OECD ctr. 1970-2007 - (through the channel of
sectoral reallocation)
economy’s convergence
toward the benchmark
MVE-implied industrial
composition
value of total credits by financial
intermediaries to the private
sector/GDP (Robust: equity market
size; bond market size; various
measures of financial integration)
GMM
Note: (1) Besides the effect of financial development on output volatility, some literature also studies other contents (e.g. the effect on consumption volatility,
effect of international financial openness). Here, in the table we only report the part of research where we are interested in. (2) In order to save space we use
some abbreviations: ctr. (countries), fin. (financial), Y (year), SD (standard deviation), pc (per capita), y (output), gr (growth rate).
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Table 3.3 (cont.): List of relevant empirical literature about the effect of financial development on output volatility
Literature Sample countries Sample
period
-/+ effect of financial
development on vol(y)
Definition of output
volatility
Definition of financial development Econometric
method
Raddatz (2006) 48 ctr.
(industry-level data
for manufacturing)
1981-1998 - (in sectors with high
liquidity needs)
overall SD of industrial
value added gr
private credit to GDP ratio (Robust:
quality of accounting standards, stock
market capitalization)
2SLS
Raheem,
Bello Ajide and
Adeniyi (2016)
71 ctr. 1996-2012 - overall SD of pc y gr
(Robust: 5Y SD,
HP-filtered)
private sector credit/GDP; credit
provided by the banking sector/GDP
system GMM
Tharavanij (2007) 44 ctr. 1975-2004 insignificant (log) 5Y SD of pc y gr or
CF band-pass filtered pc
y
(log) private credit to GDP ratio
(Robust: M3 to GDP ratio)
pooled OLS,
RE, FE, IV
Xu (2009) 81 ctr. 1962-2000 - overall SD of pc y gr bank credits to private sector/GDP GMM,
Granger
causality test
Yang and Liu
(2016)
56 ctr. (24
developed, 32
developing)
1980-2009 -/+ (U-shaped) 5Y SD of pc y gr private sector domestic credits/GDP system GMM
Note: (1) Besides the effect of financial development on output volatility, some literature also studies other contents (e.g. the effect on consumption volatility,
effect of international financial openness). Here, in the table we only report the part of research where we are interested in. (2) In order to save space we use
some abbreviations: ctr. (countries), fin. (financial), Y (year), SD (standard deviation), pc (per capita), y (output), gr (growth rate).
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Appendix 3.C. List of countries and data source
We check the private credit to GDP ratios in different countries. We take an unbalanced panel
of 81 countries using the annual data between 2000 and 2014 from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) database. This country set counts for more than 95% of world GDP and
hence is representative of the world. The sample includes 50 developing countries and 31
developed economies, as listed in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: List of 50 developing and 31 developed economies in the sample
50 developing economies:
Argentina Dominican Republic Jamaica Pakistan Swaziland
Bangladesh Ecuador Kazakhstan Panama Thailand
Bolivia El Salvador Kyrgyz Republic Paraguay Tunisia
Brazil Ethiopia Lebanon Peru Turkey
Bulgaria Georgia Malaysia Philippines Uganda
Burkina Faso Guatemala Mauritius Poland Ukraine
Chile Hungary Mexico Romania Uruguay
China India Moldova Russia Venezuela
Colombia Indonesia Nicaragua South Africa Vietnam
Costa Rica Iran Nigeria Sri Lanka Zambia
31 developed economies:
Australia Finland Israel New Zealand Switzerland
Austria France Italy Norway United Kingdom
Belgium Germany Japan Portugal United States
Canada Greece Korea, Rep. Singapore
Cyprus Hong Kong, China Latvia Slovenia
Czech Republic Iceland Malta Spain
Denmark Ireland Netherlands Sweden
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In Figure 3.4 we plot the empirical CDF (cumulative distribution function) of “Domestic
credit to private sector (% of GDP)” (code FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS) for the groups of developing
and developed economies, respectively. Apparently, most developing countries have much
lower levels of financial development.
Figure 3.7: Empirical CDF of credit to GDP ratios in developing and developed economies
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